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ABSTRACT
James K.A. Smith argues that the first principle of Pentecostalism is that the same
Holy Spirit described in the New Testament is !actively, dynamically, and miraculously
present both in the ecclesial community and in creation” today. This ontological
experience of the Holy Spirit transforms Pentecostalism into a hermeneutic thorough
which Pentecostals interpret their social world. In his attempt to articulate a Pentecostal
epistemology Smith leaves implied what this project seeks to make explicit: the
emergence of subjectivity is mediated through the experiences of the body and is
therefore affective and phenomenological in nature. I argue that pentecostal spiritual
practices are the daily strategies through which believers attain an interpretive
understanding of their social world; pentecostals have a worldview that is grounded in the
phenomenological experience of pentecostalism. In developing this argument I rely on
queer theory and postcolonial theory to draw connections between Pentecostal, queer,
and Puerto Rican socio-political subjectivities and thereby articulate a theory of
subjectivity that privileges the material body as a site of knowledge production. I
examine the emergence and evolution of pentecostal spiritual practices, such as
glossolalia, testimony, and bodily expression in Puerto Rico and the ways in which they
operate as but one modality that reflect a queer epistemological posture of resistance that
operates as survival strategy for coping with the lasting presence of US imperial
colonialism. In doing so I consider Pentecostal and Puerto Rican socio-political
ii

subjectivities as queer subjectivities and demonstrate the ways in which they reflect each
other, as well as the ways in which they come together as one subjectivity rooted in the
experiences of the material body.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
This is a dissertation of testimony. It is a project that takes the experience of the
body seriously and centers it as one of, if not the, primary location from which
knowledge emerges. As such it is in a sense a dissertation of self, my-self. This work is
quasi auto-biographical and auto-ethnographic. It is rooted in my experience growing up
in a Caribbean/Latine pentecostal tradition.1 It has as its foundation the experience of
discovering my sexuality and how that discovery opened up a curiosity about what might
be possible within the tradition of my childhood. For years after I came out of the closet I
remembered pentecostalism as an oppressive and restrictive force in my life. But that
would change. In 2009 I began seminary in pursuit of a PhD. During my seminary years I
attended conferences on religion. At one of those conferences I stumbled upon a book
that would alter not only my understanding of what is possible in pentecostalism, but also
the trajectory of my own spiritual journey as well as the value and knowledge that the
experiences of my material body have to offer. That book is titled Thinking in Tongues:

1
In this text I will primarily use lowercase “p” when speaking of pentecostalism broadly to
highlight that while there is a common thread in Pentecostal denominations there are also distinct
differences between white pentecostalism and Black and Latine pentecostalisms.
In recent years Latinos in the U.S. and some parts of Latin America have been engaging in a
conversation about how to make Spanish, which is a binary gendered language, more inclusive of nonbinary genders and sexualities. For example, many words in Spanish, particularly adjectives used to
describe people, are gendered as masculine or feminine; i.e. Latino in the masculine form and Latina in the
feminine form. Some may be familiar with another form that has come into fashion in the last decade,
Latinx. While this term accomplishes the disruption of the binary nature of Spanish it can be awkward to
pronounce in Spanish. Therefore, in this text I will use Latine, a more recently developed term that
accomplishes the binary disruption but which is also more easily pronounced within the grammar
constraints of Spanish.

1

Pentecostal Contributions to Christian Philosophy. In this text the author, James K.A.
Smith, claims that epistemologically, pentecostalism’s “emphasis on experience and
affectivity [can] be the ground for a critique of dominant rationalisms . . . and provide a
fund for unique developments in phenomenology and our accounts of knowledge.”2
However, the power and significance of this claim, which would become the foundation
of this dissertation, did not catch my attention during my M.Div. work. At that time what
struck me was the obvious connection between what Smith was doing in that text and the
project of queer theory; critique of dominant systems rooted in an embodied
epistemology. Smith claims that through the knowing that emerges in the body’s
experience with the divine pentecostals know in a deep and embodied way, and that this
knowing is essential to their ability to be counter-cultural in a western, “civilized,” and
hegemonic protestant Christianity. Pentecostalism, in so far as it centers above all else the
“move of the Spirit,” is at its core a movement that is rooted in the disruption of the status
quo. These claims remind me of the project of queer theory which is concerned with
disrupting hegemonic and patriarchal structures of order that organize human society
along binary lines of gender and sexuality. Queer theory is concerned with dismantling
those systems and questioning the epistemological posture of the subject which has been
oriented towards systems of social order that have traditionally been quite rigid in the
Western political imagination. Whether noted explicitly or not queer theory is also rooted
first in the experience of the body, or in desire. As such queer theory, like Smith’s

2
Smith, James K.A., Thinking in Tongues: Pentecostal Contributions to Christian Philosophy
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2010), 13.
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pentecostalism, takes the experience of the body seriously as a site for knowledge. This
dissertation is an exercise in unpacking Smith’s claim in light of queer theory.
This dissertation is also an examination of another aspect of my life experience
and identity; I am a part of the Puerto Rican diaspora in the United States. As a first
generation U.S.-born Puerto Rican I understand the liminal space of living as a quasicolonial subject. Puerto Rico remains one of the last colonies of the modern era and as
such questions of Puerto Rico’s political status (Is it a country? Do I think it should
become the 51st state of the United States?) have haunted me my entire life. Belonging to
a family that is from a place that exists in political liminality reflected itself in my own
day-to-day life. Growing up a Spanish speaking Latino boy in the white suburbs of
Philadelphia I found myself living in two worlds, the white, English-speaking world of
suburban public schools, and the very Puerto Rican, Spanish speaking world of home and
church. There is much pride among the Puerto Rican diaspora. Many of us take knowing
the language, eating our cultural foods, and preserving our Puerto Rican culture very
seriously. However, I was never Puerto Rican enough; when visiting my family on the
island I was always an outsider. I lived “out there,” on the U.S. mainland. I have and
continue to explore this transnational identity using queer theory and critical race theory
to theorize that liminal identity. Additionally, as pentecostals committed to a theology of
holiness and sanctification we eschewed most social practices deemed secular (i.e. music,
tv, movies, dancing, fashion and stylistic trends) as well as anything remotely resembling
Catholicism or Santeria, both of which were considered unchristian. Thus my relationship
to Puerto Rican culture is further complicated. This dissertation is an exploration into the
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complexities, and my complexities, of Puerto Rican socio-religio-political, racialized, and
queer subjectivity.
Bringing these two strains of my work together (pentecostal epistemology and
Puerto Rican queer/racial social and political subjectivity) relies on a set of
presuppositions that ground this project. First, pentecostalism produces a particular
epistemological posture in its practitioners. This particular posture comes from an
experiential hermeneutic that informs the subject’s worldview. This experience is rooted
in a particular belief about the nature and active presence of God in the world. Second,
queerness produces a particular epistemological posture in queer subjects. This posture is
produced by the subject experiencing desire that does not conform to normative
prescriptions of gender that are the foundation of patriarchy and compulsory
heterosexuality. Desire here is not used to signal sexual desire nor is this a reduction of
queerness to object desire. Desire in this context refers to a longing within oneself to
simply be, to allow oneself to surrender to the flow of the seemingly intrinsic
characteristics of their subjectivity, even when those characteristics buck up against
normative and hegemonic social prescriptions of identity. Third, race produces a
particular epistemological posture in racialized subjects. This posture is produced through
a mechanism of survival and self-determination in the presence of white supremacy. As
racialized subjects we are measured against the standard and supposed neutrality of
whiteness and thus find ourselves ever searching for a subjectivity that stands on its own
in an oppositional posture vis-à-vis whiteness. Fourth, colonialism produces a particular
epistemological posture in colonized subjects. This posture is produced through a
mechanism of survival and self-determination in the presence of colonial/imperial
4

projects of domination, and the erasure of the native’s religion, culture, and social world.
The colonized subject survives through learning and rehearsing the colonizer’s social
world and carving out spaces in the midst of that world to preserve what they can of their
native self. In the context of Puerto Rico this plays out in the loss of the cultures of
Tainos and enslaved Africans. Together these claims make up the foundation of this
dissertation and guide the task of this work, which is to express a theory of the subject
that takes both the material body of the subject and the influences of the social world,
namely religion, as integral aspects of the subject’s formation.
To accomplish this task I rely on continental philosophy, queer and feminist
theory, philosophy of religion, Latinx and Black studies, historical accounts from the
birth of the modern pentecostal movement as well as theological and philosophical
contributions from pentecostal theorists, and the scholarly work of other Puerto Rican
queer and cultural theorists.3 Along with theory I also tap into the deep knowing in myself
that is the result of my own experience growing up in a pentecostal tradition, and in my
experience as a Puerto Rican queer person. This work not only relies on the connection
between those seemingly disparate experiences, it asserts that the connection between
them gives rise to new understandings as to the role of religious, spiritual, cultural, and
political emancipatory practices in the struggle for liberation by those who live on the
margins of dominant society.
However, the liberative role of pentecostalism cannot be overstated or accepted as
simply and essentially true. As liberative and revolutionary as I argue that pentecostalism

3

Here I use Latinx rather than Latine because I am referencing the proper name of this field of

study.

5

is, and can be, it is nonetheless the case that historical versions of pentecostalism have
been weighed down by dogma and fundamentalism. Here I want to address two
distinctions I make with regard to Pentecostalism that allow me to mark it as a religious
location for queer liberation. First is the distinction between capital “P” and lowercase
“p.” Capital “P” Pentecostalism denotes a denominational distinction that concerns
doctrine, polity, etc. Groups like the Assemblies of God, the Church of God in Christ, or
the denomination of my childhood, Iglesia de Dios Pentecostal M.I. (Pentecostal Church
of God, International Movement), are denominations that ascribe to doctrines that deny
the humanity and imago dei for queer folks. As I noted in my master’s thesis, which
focused on the question of how pentecostalism might operate as a liberative religious
space for queer folks despite a history of homophobic theology, these denominations are
often characterized by the expulsion of those their theology deems essentially sinful.
These theologies are often built on biblical passages such as Genesis 1:27, the story of
Sodom and Gomorrah, Leviticus 18:22, Romans 1:26-27, among others.4 Theologies that
rely on these texts frame homosexuality as going against the cosmic order of God for the
world and create an environment that is unfriendly, intolerable, and often violent for
queer people. Queer people who grow up in those Pentecostal churches, as I did, almost
always experience rejection and ostracization from the community and their family which
can have devastating effects in terms of housing, financial stability, etc. For this reason I
follow James Smith in his distinction and use of capital “P” and lowercase “p.”5 When

4

Jared Vazquez, “Queer Tongues Confess, I Know, That I Know, That I Know: A Queer Reading
of James K.A. Smith’s Thinking in Tongues” (master’s thesis, Phillips Theological Seminary, 2012), 4.
5

Thinking in Tongues pp. xvi-xvii.
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referring to Pentecostalism I am signaling the religious communities and practices of
Pentecostal denominations, one might say Pentecostalism proper. However, those
denominations do not own the rights to the spiritual life and practice of pentecostalism
and so I use lower case “p” to denote a pentecostal spiritual practice that is not tied to
those denominations and the theologies or doctrines that organize them as religious
communities. As an example I would point to the Metropolitan Community Churches, a
denomination founded by a gay, former Pentecostal preacher. That denomination was
founded as a haven for queer folk who did not desire to leave the religious and spiritual
practices of their pre-out lives behind. It was a charismatic and pentecostal space that
adhered to many similar ideologies about the role of the Holy Spirit in the world without
the oppressive and homophobic theologies of other denominations.
The second distinction, which I also made in my master’s thesis, is that while it
seems common practice to group pentecostalism with fundamentalism I argue that this is
an error. While it is true that Pentecostal denominations historically have a tenuous
relationship with fundamentalism, more often found among white pentecostals,
pentecostalism at its core is not fundamentalist in nature. Fundamentalism is concerned
with the unwavering authority of scripture while pentecostalism is concerned with the
affective and active participation of the Holy Spirit in the immediate. These
characteristics are part of the reason that in the early days of the modern pentecostal
movement it was at odds with fundamentalism. Fundamentalists often distrusted
pentecostals because of their seeming devotion to the supernatural which was seen as
superstition and fanaticism.6 Pentecostals tend to view scripture as authoritative, and even
6

Vazquez, “Queer Tongues Confess,” 18-19.
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infallible, but because they also believe that Holy Spirit is a very present and active
participant in the ecclesial community there exists a degree of hierarchical complexity
between the scripture and the Holy Spirit. It is this belief about the Holy Spirit that I will
touch on below in my review of James Smith. For Smith this belief is an essential part of
what makes pentecostalism distinct, and it is where I find a foothold for queering
pentecostalism. I do not deny that Pentecostalism has caused much spiritual, and even
physical, violence against queer people, nor am I attempting to downplay the reality that
most pentecostal communities operate within oppressive patriarchal, homophobic and
transphobic ideologies and theologies. Yet, as oxymoronic as it may seem at first glance I
continue to argue through this dissertation for pentecostalism as a source of liberative
possibility. Therefore this work also seeks to liberate pentecostal thought so that it might
offer the kinds of contributions to Christian Philosophy which Smith saw as implicit in its
existence, as well as become a liberative space and practice for queer people.
Set Up and Outline of Argument
I ask particular questions specific to the rise of pentecostalism in Puerto Rico
during the 20th century, as well as of the socio-political culture vis-à-vis vis queer
identity: How might we think about the process by which pentecostal experience and
practice produce epistemological postures within the socio-political world of Puerto
Rico? How did the epistemological work of pentecostalism emerge and take shape in the
socio-political climate of the early 20th century? In what ways does pentecostalism
persist in its epistemological work in the current socio-political climate as Puerto Rico
continues to struggle with its political identity as neither U.S. state nor independent
nation, all the while beset by natural disasters and policies that cripple its economy?
8

What role have queer Puerto Ricans played in the cultural imagination of Puerto Rico?
How does the ambiguous citizenship of Puerto Ricans as colonial subjects play into
cultural productions of identity, both religious and queer? What are the connections
between pentecostal and queer epistemologies? I will answer these questions through
exploring the political and colonial history of Puerto Rico, an analysis of the theoretical
claims of Smith, rethinking queer studies by using patería (a word that comes from
“pato/a,” the Puerto Rican slang for faggot or dyke) as a rhetorical device, and
articulating my own theory of the subject. By answering the questions above, and through
this analysis, I will argue that the emergence and evolution of pentecostalism and
pentecostal spiritual practices, such as glossolalia, testimony, and bodily expression, are
but one modality that reflect a queer epistemological posture of resistance that operates as
survival strategy for coping with the presence of political, religious, cultural, and sexual
imperial colonialism.
Puerto Rico is one of the most Protestant nations of Latin America and the
majority of its Protestant inhabitants are Pentecostal.7 If pentecostalism is indeed a
survival strategy then it seems that Puerto Rico might serve as a kind of case study for an
analysis of subjectivity and resistance. Part of that analysis requires reflection on the
socio-political climate in which pentecostalism took root in Puerto Rico, as well as of the
marginalized queer and Afro-Latine members of Puerto Rican communities. While one
may not think of Puerto Rico as a colony qua colony its status as an Estado Libre
Asociado (a commonwealth) nonetheless situates it as a colonial territory, and as such

7

Pew Research Center Religion and Public Life, “Religion in Latin America: Widespread Change
in a Historically Catholic Region,” https://www.pewforum.org/2014/11/13/religion-in-latinamerica/#religious-affiliations-of-latin-americans-and-u-s-hispanics (accessed October 16, 2019).
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positions Puerto Ricans as transnational colonial subjects. This social and political reality
is not only the backdrop of the emergence of the religious phenomenon of
pentecostalism, it may also be what set the necessary conditions for its emergence. Puerto
Rico's vague postcolonial identity, in that it lies somewhere in a mix of being a selfgoverning nation and yet lacks full autonomy at multiple levels—legally, economically,
socially, etc.—is a macrocosm of the identity of Puerto Rican's themselves. The state and
its citizens are reflections of one another. Just as Puerto Rico seems unable (or unwilling)
to appropriately categorize itself, so too its citizens seem unable (or unwilling) to situate
and understand themselves as socio-political subjects and citizens that fit neatly into the
political imaginary of the U.S.8 The internalization of these failed (or successful?)
attempts at categorization through multiple referendums on U.S. statehood vs.
independence produce a perpetual feeling of !otherness,” of having a sense of nationhood
and yet being a citizen of a state that exists in political ambiguity. This was made evident,
for example, in the 1998 referendum on Puerto Rican statehood or independence in which
the majority of Puerto Rican voters chose “none of the above” as their choice at the ballot
box. This sense of ambiguity has also been evidenced in the lack of U.S. support in recent
decades as Puerto Rico continues to plummet into financial distress that has been
compounded by the double assault of Irma and Maria during the 2017 hurricane season.
Thus, at the heart of this project is the question of which practices allow Puerto Ricans to
survive, and even thrive, in the midst of such ambiguity, and what role religious practice

8

Puerto Ricans are born U.S. citizens, but their access to the full benefits of citizenship is limited
to their physical location; i.e. Puerto Ricans can vote, and have representation in Congress and in the
Electoral College, but not if they are residents on the island itself.
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and queer subjectivity play in the process of resistance and the emergence of the political
subject.
Review of Interlocutors
James K.A. Smith
James K.A. Smith’s Thinking in Tongues (TIT) is a philosophical exploration of
what pentecostal ideologies can offer the broader field of Christian philosophy. Smith
takes on several fields of philosophical thought but it his articulation of a particularly
pentecostal worldview and epistemology that I find helpful for my arguments in this
project. The primary and foundational argument that Smith makes with respect to these
two themes, and which he places at the heart of pentecostalism, is an ontological claim:
the same Spirit who moved among the apostles at Pentecost in Acts, is still !actively,
dynamically, and miraculously present both in the ecclesial community and in creation.”9
This leads Smith to a claim that he names as pentecostalism"s first principle: “the
revolutionary activity of the Spirit always disrupts and subverts the status quo of the
powerful.”10 Smith argues that this first principle sets the conditions for a particular
pentecostal hermeneutic from which flows a distinct pentecostal worldview. Smith argues
that by experiencing the activity of the Spirit in the world ontologically pentecostals are
shaped in such a way that they acquire a peculiar stance from which they approach the
world. We might then describe pentecostalism itself as a hermeneutic, a way of

9

James K.A. Smith, “Thinking in Tongues,” First Things no. 182 (April 2008), ATLA Religion
Database with ATLASerials, EBSCOhost (accessed March 24, 2011), 27.
10

Smith, “Thinking in Tongues,” 30.
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experiencing and thus interpreting the world. Thus it seems that pentecostal spiritual
practices operate as strategies or tactics through which believers attain an interpretive
understanding of their social world; pentecostals have a worldview that is grounded in the
phenomenological experience of pentecostalism.11 Pentecostals then develop a particular
epistemological posture in which they come to understand the world around them. Here
Smith is relying on the hermeneutical project of Gadamer who, interpreting Heidegger,
defines hermeneutics as “a description of the way interpretive understanding is
achieved.” The implied claim Smith is making is that pentecostalism becomes the
12

primary way pentecostals interpret and understand the world in which they dwell. This is
key because it means that one of the essential pentecostal presuppositions, that the Spirit
is actively engaged in the world, is itself a legitimizing interpretive device through which
pentecostals make sense of their social world. It is epistemological.
For Smith this hermeneutic is exemplified in the narrative of Acts 2, in which the
Apostle Peter stands and offers a counterinterpretation to the onlookers. In Acts 2 the
disciples who followed Jesus are waiting for a promise that Jesus had made. Upon the
arrival of the promise those who are gathered begin to speak in other languages which
presumably were unknown to them. When the crowd who has gathered to witness this
event begins to wonder at this strange phenomenon many begin to assume that the
disciples are merely drunk. But Peter stands and claims that what is happening is not the
result of drunkenness, but rather that an even older promise is being fulfilled, that which

11

Smith, Thinking in Tongues, 23-25.
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Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd revised ed., trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald
G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 2004), 269.
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was prophesied by Joel, that God would pour out God’s spirit on all humankind. The
moment of that linguistic eruption, which pentecostals claim to experience today in what
has been termed glossolalia, is evidence of something otherworldly that interacts with the
pentecostal believer in the here and now. Here is the crux of this argument, that
“experience is interpretive,” and the experience of the Spirit for the pentecostal believer
is an essential piece of how they interpret the world. There is a tradition in some
pentecostal traditions when giving a testimony during a church service. In this tradition
the speaker begins their testimony with the assertion that they are saved, sanctified, and
filled with the Holy Spirit with the evidence of speaking in other tongues. In other words,
to have experienced, affectively, phenomenologically, and materially the Spirit of God is
a kind of litmus test as to the value of that person’s interpretations of their lived
experiences.
A pentecostal hermeneutic is explicitly tied to pentecostal experience and it
begins by privileging an epistemology that is grounded in affectivity. This results in a
pentecostal epistemological posture that reflects a reality in the faith experience of
pentecostals; pentecostals are not simply following one form of faith practice, they are
being in a particular and important way.13 By epistemological posture I mean one’s
orientation towards and in relation to what one values as legitimate sources of
knowledge. Thus the pentecostal epistemological posture is an interpretive stance that is
rooted in experience.14 Smith describes this as an affective narrative epistemology, which
I will explore in later chapters as I articulate a pentecostal subjectivity.
13

Italics indicate Being in a quasi-Heideggerian sense.
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Gadamer, Truth and Method, 269.
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Methodologically Smith de-privileges hermeneutics of suspicion in favor of a
hermeneutics of trust. However, even a brief examination of the hermeneutic that Smith
proposes reveals that while a pentecostal hermeneutic may almost blindly trust the move
of the Spirit, it is simultaneously suspicious of the social world beyond the worship
service and the powers and structures that order that social world. I find that Smith’s
hermeneutic is closer to a suspicious hermeneutics than he, and more dogmatic and
fundamentalist leaning pentecostals, might be comfortable with. It is this proximity to
suspicious hermeneutics along with his assertion of the disruption and subversion of the
status quo of the powerful, and the focus on embodied experience that lead me to make
connections between the philosophical pentecostal program that Smith articulates and
queer theory. Thus by thinking critically about Smith’s claims with queer theory I engage
the task of queering pentecostalism, so to speak.
Crucial to this project is a focus on what Smith leaves merely implied; that
pentecostal experience is mediated through the experiences of the body and that therefore
the production, or emergence of subjectivity is phenomenological in nature. It is therefore
to the question of the subject and subjectivity that I am led to in the process of exploring
Smith’s claims. Various questions then become relevant as I consider the pentecostal
subject. How does pentecostal spiritual practice interact with the other social systems that
inflect the lives of pentecostals? What role does this particular religious practice play
intersectionally with other factors that shape one's worldview; e.g. race/ethnicity,
nationality, class, gender, sexuality, etc. If pentecostalism situates the believer in a
distinct epistemological posture, what does that work of situating say about the rest of the
social world in which that believer lives out their daily life? Where does pentecostalism
14

fit in the epistemological development of the believer? If pentecostalism privileges the
affective, then what is the role of human experience in determining what one understands
as true about their place in the world? Finally, if we are to take the affective narrative
epistemology of pentecostal experience seriously then what other affective narrative
epistemologies are we compelled to take seriously as well? These questions help to guide
my articulation of the pentecostal subject in chapter 4 and serve as way to make
connections between the pentecostal subject, the Puerto Rican subject, and the queer
subject.
Judith Butler
In Bodies That Matter (BTM) Judith Butler takes on a central question which
concerns the connection between the materiality of the body and the performativity of
gender and the how of "sex" in that relationship.15 BTM is a response to critiques of
Butler’s groundbreaking Gender Trouble in which some of her critics read too heavy an
emphasis on the discursive qualities that she assigns to gender and sexuality. It is the
analysis of those discursive qualities that gave rise to her theory of performativity, which
is itself an explication of the co-constitutive nature of the discursive and material
production of the subject. Sex is the focal point through which she analyzes the
performative and the discursive. Sex is the site in which she locates the imperial project
of gender and sexuality. The driving question in Bodies is how we recognize the real
material bodies onto which the discourse of sex writes itself without overly subsuming
the body to nothing more than the effect of that discourse. Furthermore, how to we think

15

Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex (New York: Routledge,
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about the production of the material body itself, to think of the material body as more
than a blank canvas onto which sex is written, that the very writing of sex onto the body
conforms to the contours of that body which existed before anything was written onto it?
In other words, how do we find balance and draw the lines around the material world in a
way that honors our materiality while at the same time recognizing that our perception of,
and interaction with the material world (i.e. our material bodies) is always already
discursively conditioned and produced?
One of Butler's tentative answers to this question is that we must think about
matter as more than mere site or surface, and instead as a "process of materialization" out
of which, over time, emerge the effects that we come to call the body.16 That is, we must
consider how it is that what we call matter comes to be recognized as a body, even as a
given, and by extension how gender and sex come to be known and perceived as given.
What seems necessary is a Foucaultian inquiry into the manner in which sex is
materialized. In other words, while we can acknowledge that there are material bodies
that truly exist despite the various constructions of the subject, those bodies are only ever
perceived and engaged through a discursive lens that has determined what those bodies
are and given them meaning. In order to move beyond the claim that sex and gender are
discursively constituted the question ought to be concerned with the "regulatory norms"
by which the body comes to be sexed and gendered.17 We cannot speak of the materiality
of bodies without also talking about the history of the ways in which matter has been
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discursively subjugated to various hierarchies of power.18 This is not a claim that
materiality is ultimately subject to language and thus exclusively produced by language.
Rather, the claim is that language and materiality are intertwined in a relationship
wherein they are mutually constitutive. To speak of materiality is to invoke signs and
signifiers which reveal themselves in the material world and are thus material. Language
and materiality are neither opposed to one another, nor does one collapse into the other
but instead are, to use Butler's language, always implicated in each other.19
In Bodies Butler also reinvokes her example of drag from Gender Trouble as a
way to elaborate her claims about the ways in which gender conscripts the body into
stylized performances. But she is clear that drag ought not to be read as a kind of ultimate
performativity.20 It is not a mirror to the way in which gender operates; one puts on a wig
and makeup and pretends to be a thing one really is not. Butler writes that “[i]n imitating
gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself—as well as its
contingency.”21 Thus drag’s effectiveness is that it highlights the hyperbolic nature of
gender, revealing its falsity as something natural and given. Drag imitates gender through
exaggerated performance of gender scripts and exposes gender itself as exaggeration.
Through the use of camp, drag does more than mimic normative gender performance, it
pushes the limits of stylizations and postures deemed acceptable to that gender. Drag
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engages in rowdy and lewd enactments that are often offensive to patriarchal scripts of
gender, and in doing so resists the presumption of gender as representation of the natural
order. In similar fashion I will argue that pentecostalism reveals the falsity of imperial
colonialism and religion as essential to the natural order of the state. That is,
pentecostalism pushes the limits of stylizations, postures, and enactments which are
deemed acceptable to Religion (i.e. western imperial Christianity) and sanctioned by the
State. However, just as for Butler drag is not always everywhere subversive, nor does it
necessarily ensure the destabilization of gender's hegemony, so too pentecostalism is not
always and everywhere immune to the effects of the colonial-imperial religion and
state.22 In popular imagination Pentecostalism too often capitulates to doctrines and
dogma rooted in the hegemonic patriarchal models of the Western imperial state and thus
reflects and practices sexism, homophobia/transphobia, etc.
Through her rearticulation of performativity in Bodies Butler is again asserting
the potential in drag to allow the subversive to arise from within the subject in order to
enact political resistance.23 It is in this process of materialization that certain bodies
emerge which perform a disidentification within the hegemonic normative scripts, and it
is at this site that the potential for queer politics is mobilized.24 Similarly Pentecostal
practice has potential to operate as a form of resistance to western imperial notions of
how religious, or moral, bodies are expected to behave.
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José Esteban Muñoz
In his groundbreaking text Disidentifications Muñoz begins with the idea that the
act of spectacle offers the minoritarian subject a posture through which the subject might
“situate itself in history and thus seize social agency.”25 It is from this starting place that
he imagines a process by which those on the margins find a way through the red tape of
acceptability, and the imperial, colonial, hetero-patriarchal, capitalist state. This is a
process that he names disidentification. According to Muñoz, disidentification describes
survival strategies that allow the minoritarian subject to participate in the majoritarian
society in which it dwells through negotiations expressed through bodily practices and
performances that refuse to mimic “normative citizenship.”26 These negotiations align the
subject along planes of subjectivity that employ the awkward rather than discard it, and in
doing so privilege queer over normal. The work of disidentification is the cultivation in
the subject of an epistemological posture that is rooted in affectivity. Muñoz
demonstrates this, and sets the stage for his claims, by beginning with the example of
Marga Gomez’ performance, “Marga Gomez is Pretty, Witty, and Gay.” His use of
Gomez is poignant because in her solo performance the stage is set as her bedroom, and
she does most of the show from her bed. In this example, the bedroom functions as the
most intimate space where the body of the queer subject lives into its queerness, away
from the surveillance of the state. In the bedroom the queer subject roots herself in her
own body and knows herself through the simplest of bodily practices, being naked, or
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having sex with herself. The queer, disidentified subject emerges into a posture that is
reflective of the way their body maneuvers through the world, both in private and in
public. Similarly, for the pentecostal, the focus on individual pursuit of holiness and
sanctification often leads to daily practices of solitary prayer. It is in these practices that
one encounters the divine, often speaking in tongues alone, or weeping. In the private
place of prayer the pentecostal subject too roots herself in her body and knows herself
through these affective experiences. From these affective and bodily experiences the disidentified pentecostal subject emerges, situated in a posture that reflects the way she
maneuvers the world outside that private enclave of prayer. It is the experience of the
body that matters here, and is the threshold through which the subject comes to know
itself. Muñoz’s theory will help me push Butler’s theory of performativity, which already
resists hegemonic ideals of gender and sexuality, into disidentified postures that mimic
the material and bodily quotidian performances of the minoritarian subject. While drag is
a helpful metaphor, I will argue that one can also simply look to the daily lives of the
minoritarian, and disidentified subject. Furthermore, I will argue that Pentecostalism
functions, or at the very least is capable of functioning, as a survival strategy similar to
Muñoz’s disidentification.
Using Muñoz’s theory I will analyze Smith’s claims about pentecostalism and
push them to their queer limit. Smith remains too conservative in his analysis and in so
doing denies pentecostalism of its ultimate possibility, a possibility that I argue is implicit
in his theorization. That ultimate possibility in pentecostalism is found in its implicitly
queer horizon. It is in the turn toward that queer horizon that Muñoz offers the liberative
potential that Smith cannot. Muñoz is not stymied like Smith because Muñoz is not
20

interested in the minoritarian subject ultimately fitting in to the majoritarian social
program. Neither is Muñoz interested in a kind of fitting in that requires that the
minoritarian subject maintain a posture of counter-identification, and so remain
intelligible to the state as other. Such an intelligible posture of counter-identification,
while on the surface seemingly disruptive, nonetheless relies on and perpetuates the
dominant narrative of normative subjectivity. While in Smith there is a hesitation to
follow pentecostalism into its queer possibility, Muñoz would share none of this
trepidation because in the end Muñoz is not interested in protecting and reifying the
social structures that protect majoritarian subjectivity, structures that work to undergird
state power.27 Smith, on the other hand, struggles with following the pentecostal subject’s
queer becoming because such disidentificatory becoming threatens theological and
dogmatic principles that preserve pentecostalism as Pentecostalism, christianities as
Christianity. Yet these principles ultimately participate in the protection of the state’s
power, which is rooted in the control of queer and other minoritarian subjects.
Pentecostalism, for Smith, contains a liberative possibility vis a vis affective
epistemology, but that possibility is always tempered by a confessional doctrine which, as
Foucault argued, is itself an apparatus of state control. While this is not an explicitly
theological project I intend to use the theory of disidentification to chart a strategy of
survival which I read as implicit in pentecostal practice and theology. But, unlike Smith,
this project will allow pentecostalism the freedom to be queer. In so doing I will argue
that there is an essential thread in pentecostalism that is not merely capable of work
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similar to disidentification, but that is itself the same work described differently and
which is perceivable in disidentificatory performances.
Moving Forward: Mapping My Work in the Discourse
The task of describing my own queer theory voice relies on the way that I
understand the work of religious studies and specifically cultural theory, which is where I
see my work fitting in. Cultural theory ought to do more than map and describe
observable social phenomenon. The study of culture is both an ethical and political act
and as such it contains for my work an imperative to make claims about how the actions
of individuals, social groups, governments, etc., are the result of larger systemic
structures without unnecessarily absolving responsibility for those actions.
In my work to this point I have primarily been interested in the process of identity
formation insofar as how individuals come to perceive themselves. This question begins
for me with an investigation of the epistemological positions of individuals and social
groups and an inquiry into how one epistemological position varies from others. This is a
question about where and how one is situated in the world and how that particular
situatedness affects their relation with other individuals and with society as a whole,
which is part of a critical approach to cultural theory. Of course, the question of
epistemology will also lend itself to theories of the subject, which may not fall squarely
within the wheelhouse of cultural theory but which certainly an important aspect in the
study of culture. With the consideration of the subject on the table, as it were, such an
inquiry raises the question of the epistemological positionality of the subject with regard
to the religious, political, racial, and sexual. That is, I approach the epistemological
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through the experiences of the material body—for example the physical religious
experiences of individuals.
Cultural theory becomes implicated in the question because I am just as interested
in the emergence of the religious phenomenon itself as I am in the bodily and mental
experiences of individuals in particular religious movements. Inquiring into the
emergence of a religious movement is akin to the question of the emergence of the
subject. Without overstating the matter, I see in religious movements a kind of
subjectivity, a sense of self or self-identity (for example in the ways that the myriad of
Protestant denominations define and single themselves out against each other). This is not
an attempt to attribute some sentience to a cultural phenomenon, yet when we speak
discursively of pentecostalism, for example, we speak of it as if there is a particular kind
of essence to it despite knowing that something like pentecostalism is not much more
than the collection of people who call themselves pentecostal.
To think about the subject, identity, and epistemology is also to think about the
social world and the discourses that organize the social world of the subject. I depend on
queer theory for this work because is interested in unmasking the ways that identity, and
specifically sexuality, is constructed discursively. For example, queer theory exposes the
ways in which both hetero and homo are bound up in the discursive nature of sexuality
and are the apparatuses by which sexuality is deployed and exerts its dominance.28 Thus,
sexuality is the mechanism by which society and the state maintain order; it categorizes
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bodies based on acts in order to ensure the creation and perpetuation of legitimate
citizens.29 The argument here is not that sexualities are fictions, or that sexual acts are
devoid of particular significance and meaning. Rather, it is to call into question the ways
in which society categorizes and legislates bodies. Specifically, it is to call into question
the way that society relies on orders of natural and unnatural to maintain control. It is this
kind of critique that can nuance cultural theory even further, because it pushes the
envelope and asks us to consider the next thing that even cultural critics take for granted:
the experiences of the material body. Anzaldúa understood this, that the body is the
“ground of thought,” that the body is itself the text that should capture our attention when
theorizing the self and emergence of the subject.30 Additionally, recalling Anzaldúa’s
words from above, it is crucial to understand that for some sexuality is a central part of
the hermeneutics of self, though it does not fill that center entirely. Rather, it is a part of
what Anzaldúa alludes to when she writes that for her the understanding of her own
sexuality and hermeneutic of self is always tied to the relationship she has to her culture.
Crucial to both the project Muñoz is engaged in, and the reason why I find his
work essential to my own and to the world of cultural theory, is that Muñoz does not
center his explication of disidentification in theory, though theory is his bedrock and
there is no lack of it in his text. Rather, he chooses to analyze culture producers; drag
queens, film makers, writers, and artists. In these subjects Muñoz identifies the various
ways that disidentification plays out, the manner in which they find ways to rescript their
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own subjectivity through productions of themselves that recast their bodies and identities
within larger hegemonic cultural narratives. In short, disidentification is about moving
beyond mere survival and into flourishing, it is primarily a response to the hegemonic
demands for conformity.31 It is about reimagining the already encoded meanings that
minoritarian subjects are presented with and about rewriting the script they are demanded
to play.32 Part of this requires attention to the stories these subjects tell about the
experiences of their bodies. It requires one to trust the subject. This is not dissimilar to
the practice of testimony in pentecostal traditions where one shares the story of their
experience with the ineffable. It requires us to trust the material body of the minoritarian
subject.
Finally, the work of queer scholars of color complicate, nuance, and destabilize
the discipline of queer studies and offer yet another way that queers of color bring a
necessary critique to the discipline of cultural theory by highlighting the shortcomings in
analyses of race, gender, and sexuality, etc. Queer scholars of color manage to unsettle
the discourse by challenging the idea of which narratives are permitted to participate in
the discourse and how those narratives are legitimated, and in his way performing a kind
of destabilization by adding depth and value to the discourses at the intersections of sex,
gender, class, and race.
In Black Queer Studies (BQS), for example, the terms queer and black are brought
together in order that they might add to each other as well as critique each other. This is
key because in doing so they almost naturally get to questions of culture and cultural
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productions. For most of the history of black studies there was a singular focus on race.
Likewise, for most of the history of queer studies the field was enmeshed in whiteness.
For example, the contributions of black women were routinely ignored and pushed aside
in favor of work by black men. In this way black studies retained a masculinist flavor that
ignored the struggle of those who were marginalized within the black community. There
was so much focus on the oppression suffered at the mercy of white supremacy that the
patriarchal and heterosexist oppression within the black community was virtually
ignored. Or worse, it deployed itself by accusing marginal voices of infection by
whiteness (i.e. homosexuality theorized as a "white disease"). 33 Similarly, queer studies
was so focused on sexual equality that it could not see the disparity caused by racial and
class differences.34 And while queer studies has offered much in the way of dismantling
fixed identity binaries, like black studies, it has failed to take into account the many
intersections that people live into. One particular essay in BQS does a particularly fine
job of explicating the possibility of such an intersection. Roderick Ferguson challenges
the idea of the social construction of sexuality by genealogically demonstrating that
sexuality emerged within the discourse of ethnicity and not separate from it.35 Such an
argument takes the necessary step to challenge the idea that the various aspects of an
identity are somehow politically neutral, and clears the way for my own arguments in this
dissertation. What Ferguson and the other authors demonstrate is that the politics of
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identity are complex, the categories do not simply implicate one another, they are
mutually constitutive and cannot be thought apart from each other. This demonstrates that
not only in the field of black and queer studies, but also in cultural studies, we cannot risk
underestimating the politics of power ever present in the complex formulations and
structures that make up that thing we call culture, and the academy.
To accomplish a similar task in this dissertation as BQS does I will rely on works
by Latine and Puerto Rican scholars who have been grappling with similar questions for
decades. These works are found in volumes like Gay Latino Studies, Boricua Pop:
Puerto Ricans and the Latinization of American Culture, None of the Above: Puerto
Ricans in the Global Era, Queer Ricans: Cultures and Sexualities in the Diaspora, and
volume xix, no. I of CENTRO: Journal of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies which
focused on sexuality and was titled Puerto Rican Queer Sexualities. Combining the
contributions in these works with my theorizing of Pentecostalism I will illuminate the
connections between religion, socio-political subjectivity, race, and queer identity and
demonstrate the roles they play in the epistemological formation of the subject. In short,
this dissertation is about how our bodies behave over against the socially constructed
narratives about how the body is expected to behave and how those counter behaviors
inform who we understand ourselves to be; i.e. our identities, or subjectivity.
Mapping the Dissertation
In this introduction my goal has been to set the premise of my argument with a
review of my primary interlocutors, to map this work within the broader discourse of
Queer Studies, Religious Studies, and Cultural Theory. I have introduced key concepts
and provided some essential definitions that will be necessary for understanding the
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articulation of my arguments. By outlining the arguments of Smith, Butler, and Muñoz I
have laid the groundwork for the chapters that follow as well as articulated my own queer
theory voice.
In chapter two I will explore both the political history of Puerto Rico and the rise
of Pentecostalism in the Caribbean and Puerto Rico in light of the political back drop of
the late 19th and early 20th centuries. By investigating the historicity and theological
claims around Pentecostalism I will lay the groundwork for later chapters by
demonstrating how this religious movement fits into the larger narrative of "postcolonial" politics in Puerto Rico and the political relationship of Puerto Rico to the U.S.
If I understand identity to be the product of particular epistemological postures within
one's social world, then the socio-political climate of Puerto Rico, and the external forces
that shaped it, underscore the identity of Puerto Ricans as well as their social-religiouspolitical subjectivity.
Chapter three is an analysis of the key theoretical texts in Continental Philosophy
which are concerned with the question of the Subject as a way of providing evidence for
the claims I am making about subjectivity. It serves as a literary review, but moves
beyond mere review in that it will attempt to reorient the discourse of post-colonial
theory towards the religious as a vital social phenomenon that exemplifies the
epistemological processes of subjectivity. Chapter four follows the topics of the previous
chapter closely and explores what a Puerto Rican religio-political subjectivity looks like
by theorizing both the colonial status of Puerto Rico and pentecostalism as a practice that
reveals the affective qualities of pentecostal epistemology. Namely I examine the way in
which the body, and participation of the body in pentecostalism is privileged above the
28

cognitions of the mind. Thus the experience of the material body becomes the guiding
pedagogical influence that orients pentecostals to the world. This chapter takes into
consideration the ways in which pentecostalism operates in a particular
phenomenological register as physical religious experience and explores pentecostalism’s
phenomenological distinctiveness.
In chapter four I also describe the theoretical concepts of vaivén, patería, and
jaibería which are essential in describing the socio-political subjectivity of Puerto Ricans.
If, like jotería and quare, patería is the description of my theory of Puerto Rican
subjectivity then vaivén and jaibería are the methodology. Vaivén is the Puerto Rican
term that describes the perpetual migration between the island and the U.S. mainland.
Jaibería, a word derived from the Spanish word for crab (jaiba), which denotes the
sideways movement of a crab and is a term that describes political strategies of evasion
and non-confrontation as opposed to direct and head on practices.36 My theorizing is not
afraid of “getting it wrong” or failing to be overly precise. This is a reflection of the state
of vaivén, that in-between state of always simultaneously coming and going, but rarely
arriving at a “final” destination. Vaivén and jaibería allow me to be playful with
categories, with “misuse” of theory that contradicts ways of being established in white
queer academia, that circumvent the need for conclusion and to deploy evasive strategies
as a process of Derridian deconstruction. Like Frances Negron Muntaner I am unafraid of
theoretical oscillation, I am “not afraid to slip conceptually, to be found theoretically
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lacking, to let language seduce me into inconsistency, or the “wrong” political posture.”37
Negron Muntaner writes that, “[theory] is a space to show my lacking selves—all of
them—and connect with others like me.” A methodology of vaivén allows me to find
myself at home in a discipline of queer studies which has too often been too rigid and
exclusionary of marginalized voices within the LGBTIQ community. The aim of this
chapter will be to explore the role that religious and political practices shape both
communities and individuals and how they operate in the life of the individual thus
shaping them as religious and political subjects.
Finally, the conclusion of this dissertation is that it is through the experience of
the body that we come to know the world, both our world and the world we share in
common with others. If our knowing is rooted so deeply in bodily experience then there
is something to be said about the moment before religious experience erupts, about the
necessary social and political conditions for that eruption. In this final chapter I take a
look back at the previous chapters and distill them into a statement about my own
intellectual work, my own theoretical voice, and I look forward to what my theory of
subjectivity might mean for the future Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans as well as for
pentecostal philosophy and spiritual practice.
#
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CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL REVIEW OF POLITICS AND
PENTECOSTALISM IN PUERTO RICO
The process of theorizing Puerto Rican subjectivity requires first that one
understand the socio-political-historical context of Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans. In
particular one must begin by taking seriously the location and political category of Puerto
Rico, a small island in the Caribbean Ocean which exists as an Estado Libre Asociado
(ELA) or commonwealth of the U.S. Puerto Rico was ruled by the Spanish crown since
the early sixteenth century until the end of the nineteenth century when control was
transferred to the U.S. Puerto Rico has never existed as an autonomous state. Even now,
with a democratically and locally elected governor and government, the island remains
under the direct governance of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic
Stability Act (PROMESA) of 2016 that created a seven-member board who are appointed
directly by the U.S. President and without approval from Congress. The sitting governor
of Puerto Rico is an eighth member but has no voting rights. This board, though put in
place to deal with the economic debt crisis in Puerto Rico, has assumed complete control
of all government departments and agencies and has veto power over all legislation. What
is more, the board, which is unelected and exerts its authority over all policy matters of
Puerto Rico’s government, is not accountable to the government of Puerto Rico nor to its
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citizens.38 This may seem extreme to a non-Puerto Rican U.S. born citizen, and yet to
Puerto Ricans it is merely a continuation of over five hundred years of uninterrupted
colonial rule. Thus to theorize on Puerto Rican subjectivity, socially, politically, and
religiously, is to theorize a subjectivity that has seemingly never escaped the position of
bondsman.
With regard to its geographic location, Puerto Rico is the closet U.S. colony to the
U.S. mainland, making travel to and from the island uncomplicated and expeditious.
Flights to Puerto Rico are short (under four hours from New York City or Washington
DC and just over two hours from Miami, FL) and relatively inexpensive. This makes
traveling to and from the island not only extremely accessible but also highly frequent.
This geographic reality has a significant impact on migration to and from the island and
creates a migratory experience that is very different from that of other Latines who enter
the U.S. at the Mexico/U.S. border. This is important to note because most theorizing on
Latinidad in U.S. Latinx Studies involves the theme of border crossing focused on the
southwestern border of the U.S. As I discuss the history of Puerto Rico below it is
important to keep in mind its location and how the easy access to the island from the U.S.
mainland affected that history.
In order to frame my argument regarding both the political landscape in Puerto
Rico and the rise of Pentecostalism and its effects this chapter will briefly explore the
overarching themes in the history of Puerto Rico from the arrival of the Spanish in the
fifteenth century, the acquisition of the island by the United States and early policies and
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practices of the U.S., and some of the recent political and social history of the island and
the Puerto Rican diaspora in the U.S. This will not be an in-depth exploration as this is
not a historical project. Instead, I will focus on overarching themes of both the political
history as well as of the rise of the pentecostal movement. Because my thesis concerns
the epistemological framework shaped by the subject’s experience in the world,
considering these histories will elucidate the connections and interplay between politics
and religion and their effects on identity. As I will demonstrate through this brief
exploration into the history of Puerto Rico it is these political realities which create the
necessary conditions for a movement like the emergence of pentecostalism. They will
also demonstrate how the project of imperial colonialism produces environments where
state religion supersedes indigenous spiritual practices and thus colonizes indigenous
people in a secondary way.
In the second half of the chapter I will give a short history of Pentecostal
movements around the globe. This is important because it provides context for
pentecostalism as a movement beyond the specificity of Puerto Rico and therefore allows
me to consider the influences of pentecostalism on local communities regardless of social
context. Additionally, the denomination established by the founder of Pentecostalism in
Puerto Rico was named and considered an international enterprise. This leads me to
consider both the ways that despite its potential for de colonial practices even a
movement as radically different as pentecostalism can succumb to dominant discourses,
but also the curious ways that such a global movement allows pentecostals develop a
sense of participation in something larger than themselves. If, as mentioned in chapter

33

one, the Spirit of God is actively working in the world today then a global movement,
that sometimes erupts spontaneously, is evidence of that claim.
Political Backdrop
Overview
Since the end of the Spanish-American War(date?), Puerto Rico has been a
territory of the United States. When the U.S. acquired Puerto Rico, it remained a colony
in the truest sense of the term; it was occupied and ruled by the U.S. military, and a
governor appointed by the U.S. President. It was not until the late 1940’s that Puerto
Ricans were permitted to self-elect a governor. Shortly after, they ratified a constitution
which made Puerto Rico an Estado Libre Asociado, or commonwealth, under the political
jurisdiction of the U.S., which they remain to this day. There have been several
referendums on whether Puerto Rico ought to be granted full statehood in the United
States or become an independent nation but they have never produced either outcome.
The political status of Puerto Rico remains a liminal and precarious one; it is not a fully
independent nation, nor does it receive all of the rights and benefits of U.S. statehood.
Puerto Rico does not even have a voting representative in the U.S. Congress, nor are they
granted any electoral votes for the election of the U.S. president. Puerto Rico lacks true
autonomy, as it has since the Spanish arrived in the early 1500’s.
Arrival of colonialism: the crown and religion
At the time of the arrival of the Spanish, the Caribbean the island of Boriken—the
indigenous name of Puerto Rico—was inhabited by an indigenous population
traditionally known as the Taíno, which was quite diverse in indigenous ethnic makeup
and social-political structure. Puerto Rico is part of the Greater Antilles and as such was
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part of a larger population and more sophisticated social structure. These populations had
an organized society, political structure, language, spiritual practices, and cultural
mythologies. The indigenous society was agricultural.39 They had varying degrees of
social organization and class structure which demonstrates that they were in a moment of
continuing social development which, if uninterrupted, would have continued to grow in
complexity.40 An important aspect of culture in the Caribbean is that the region was
characterized by a history of encounter and inculturation among the indigenous peoples
and so the arrival of the Spanish, while being a group unlike any the Taínos had
encountered before, was not an experience wholly unknown to them. Yet the Spanish
operated from a colonial and imperial perspective and thus saw the Caribbean as a place
over which to take dominion in service to the Spanish crown.
In the early 1500’s, the Spanish, which had already established settlements on
Hispaniola, began to establish settlements on Puerto Rico within a few years of making
contact with its inhabitants. Not long after they began to take the indigenous population
as slaves for labor and copulation, and cultivate the island’s resources. The first mass
scale stripping of the islands resources was the enterprise of gold mining, which began in
the first few years after the first settlements were established. This enterprise did not last
long, though its decline was likely due to loss of indigenous labor due to death and
migration to escape the Spanish rather than to depletion of gold on the island.41 This kind
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of exploitation of the island’s natural resources and inhabitants followed the pattern of
much of the colonies in other parts of Latin America and the world and would continue
well into the twentieth century with the production of sugar.
The moment of contact between the Spanish and the indigenous populations of
the Caribbean produced a distinct experience for the indigenous in that the arrival of the
Spanish acted as an interruption in their social development. Having no precedent for this
type of contact with a society so different from their own, the indigenous populations
were confronted with the need to develop new and innovative ways to survive that
encounter.42 Part of the response by the indigenous was to rely on strategies of migration
between the islands in order to escape the Spanish invasion. The Taínos of Borinken had
already began establishing relations and settlements of their own with inhabitants of
islands to the east, which may have allowed greater migration than was possible for the
larger islands to the west like Hispaniola and Cuba. The Taínos also rebelled and fought
back against the invading Spanish. In 1511 there was an uprising led by the cacique
(tribal chief) Agüeybaná which resulted in a harsh response by the Spanish and eventual
enslavement to forced labor of the indigenous, though by this time many are thought to
have already fled the island.43 Those who remained and were subdued developed
alternative strategies of more passive resistance such as withholding information about
the topography of the island and the healing properties of native flora.44 The indigenous
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also resisted assimilation to Spanish cultural and religious practices as evidenced by
abandoning the Spanish customs they were forced to learn in favor of their own upon
returning to their villages.45 The indigenous resistance in Puerto Rico, which lasted well
into the sixteenth century, lasted longer than other areas of the Caribbean and was likely
due to various factors including their previous knowledge of tactics used by the Spanish
on Hispaniola blended with established practices of migration and new subversive
practices.46
The important thing to glean from this brief retelling of the moment of contact
and the years immediately following is that it exemplifies a characteristic rooted in a
Boricua way of being: The history of Puerto Rico and its inhabitants is one of continuous
resistance, even passive resistance, that has allowed Puerto Ricans to !retain and
negotiate our identities” despite the colonial presence on the island for the last 500
years.47 The historical culture of the Caribbean has always been one characterized by
variation and movement.48 In this way one can begin to understand Boricua, or Puerto
Rican sensibility as the “product of centuries of cultural transformations,” which
continues to be a defining quality even among present day Puerto Ricans.49 This reality is
exemplified in the rise of twentieth- and twenty-first century Puerto Ricans identifying as
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Taíno, even though the presence of Taíno DNA in Puerto Ricans is minimal. What this
points to, however, is a deep sense of knowing and memory of a sense of identity tied to
the island and those centuries of cultural transformations and survival. This brief history
of the early colonial encounter mirrors the practices of resistance, migration, and
rebellion that continued into the twentieth century as I will review below.
State of the Puerto Rican political landscape at the time of U.S. takeover
The U.S. takeover of Puerto Rico in 1898 after the Spanish American War had
four lasting effects that are important to note for my argument, political, economic, racial,
and religious. First, taking Puerto Rico was an essential part of the United States situating
itself as a global power.50 While various locations around the globe were seen as valuable
to U.S. interests, it was Puerto Rico which most captured the attention of U.S. officials
and offered control of the Caribbean and Central America. I should add the interest of
having the U.S. establish a permanent presence in Puerto Rico was not one-sided. Early
on, some political actors in Puerto Rico too longed for a connection to the U.S. and
expressed desire for statehood. While citizenship was granted in 1912 the lack of
statehood, or even a guarantee of its eventual inclusion to the Union, reflected a desire to
keep Puerto Rico in its status as a U.S. colony.51
Second, following U.S. takeover the economic promise of the island was
immediately concentrated on the production of commodities, of which sugar and tobacco
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became the primary industries.52 In fact, the first U.S. appointed governor was a U.S.
sugar magnate who saw Puerto Rico as one way to secure U.S. interests in trade of sugar
around the globe. This dissertation is not concerned with the details of the economic
development of Puerto Rico after the U.S. takeover, but it is important to note that the
enterprises of sugar and tobacco did not last and led to eventual migration of Puerto
Ricans to other parts of the U.S. for employment opportunities. The first large migration
out of Puerto Rico after the 1898 occupation was to the sugar cane fields in Hawaii
where, before New York began to attract migrants from the island, the largest population
of Puerto Ricans outside the island lived.53
Third, there was strong interest on the part of U.S. officials to present Puerto Rico
as “white” compared to other U.S. territories and islands in the Caribbean. This
presentation as a white colony in the Caribbean also reflected a desire to maintain control
of the island for a long time in that it demonstrates a concern with acceptance of the
island and its inhabitants by average Americans.54 Slavery was abolished in Puerto Rico
by the Spanish in 1873 but the racial divide between Puerto Ricans of mostly European
descent and those of predominantly indigenous or African descent, and those who are of
mixed race with darker skin, was similar to the U.S.55 Yet while in the U.S. what is
known as the “one-drop rule” classified those with even small amounts of African
ancestry as “black,” in Puerto Rico the reverse was the case. Even a small amount of
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European ancestry afforded one classification as “white.” Additionally, Puerto Rico saw
more migration from Europe during the 19th century than the rest of the Caribbean,
which fed the Spanish, and later U.S., desire for Puerto Rico to be seen as the pearl of the
Caribbean. This may also be part of the reason why some Puerto Ricans do not see
themselves as Caribbean islanders but rather as part of the U.S. mainland.56 This trend of
Puerto Ricans understanding themselves as distinct from the rest of the Caribbean is also
seen in the discipline of theology wherein Puerto Rican theologians are more likely to
engage with Latine theologians in the U.S. and Latin America rather than with other
Caribbean theologians, the majority of whom are non-Latine and Black. 57
Fourth, along the lines of theology and religion, it is significant to note that during
the Spanish occupation the State religion was Catholicism. Protestantism was seen both
by Puerto Ricans and U.S. officials as coming hand in hand with democracy once the
U.S. took control of the island. The U.S. immediately allowed Protestant missionaries to
travel to Puerto Rico and establish churches, which had been outlawed under Spanish rule
(though clandestine Protestant communities existed in small numbers). Furthermore,
missionaries had the support of the U.S. government because the conversions of Puerto
Ricans to Protestantism was understood as being linked to their successful
Americanization.58 In the late 1800"s and early 1900’s Puerto Rico had the fastest
growing Protestant population of the Caribbean, a trend that continued well into the
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1900s.59 However, perhaps an unseen product of this shift in policy towards religious
practices was the rise of other fringe and non-Christian forms of religious expression.
Espiritismo, for instance, emerged among the middle class as a response to colonial
Catholocism.60 Santería, a tradition similar to Voodoo rooted in West African spiritual
traditions, also began to flourish on the island and reflected a more embodied and
indigenous sensibility than the Protestant denominations. This may have paved the way
for Pentecostalism to emerge with the force that it did. In fact, Puerto Rico would go on
to become one of the most Pentecostal nations of Latin America buy the mid twentieth
century.61
Racial Formations in Puerto Rico
Race in Puerto Rico is complex and nuanced. Puerto Ricans on the island and in
diaspora are characterized racially primarily by our mixedness. Most Puerto Ricans have
some level of European, Amerindian, and African ancestry in our DNA. Studies have
shown that the average Puerto Rican is made up of about 65% European, 20% African,
and 15% Amerindian/other. What is also striking is that the same study found that about
60% of Puerto Ricans carry Amerindian lineage but that it is exclusively matrilineal
suggesting the near total decimation of indigenous men on the island by colonial
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settlers.62 Of course there will be Puerto Ricans with differing amounts of racial mixture,
there are even those who may be mostly European and white or very African and black.
What is of particular interest, however, is that while the majority of Puerto Ricans have
significant African ancestry, in recent decades some 65-80% of Puerto Ricans on the
island identity as white on the U.S. census. This is also striking considering that in the
early and mid-nineteenth century nearly half of the island identified as black.63 The
question becomes: what accounts for this shift to whiteness and what does that shift say
about Puerto Ricans and the policies of the Spanish and the U.S., and about Puerto Rican
identity and subjectivity more broadly?
During Spanish occupation there was a concerted effort to whiten both the image
and population of the island. For example, Europeans were encouraged to migrate to
Puerto Rico. Additionally, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there is
evidence that census takers seem to have routinely changed race categories on census
forms; black individuals were reclassified as mulato and mulatos were reclassified as
white. However, it is not certain what impact this practice had overall. What is more
likely is that this practice was a reflection of the shifting social conceptions of race.64 For
example, the children of mixed unions were more likely to be classified as white, which
was essentially the reverse of the one drop rule in the U.S. Jorge Duany rightly argues
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that the statistics about racial makeup (i.e. census data) do not reveal scientific truths
about DNA but rather is a reflection of the dominant cultural discourses of race.65
Essential to the question of race, and a reflection of this shift in the conceptions of race, is
the narrative in Puerto Rico that teaches islanders beginning in grade school that Puerto
Rico is a racially democratic society because Puerto Ricans are all an ideal blend of three
races, white, indigenous, and black, which makes us all equals.66 The first Puerto Rican
governor repeated this racial mythology throughout his tenure and one might argue that it
was a driving factor in his efforts at increasing acceptance of Puerto Ricans in the U.S.
mainland. In many ways both Puerto Rican elites and U.S. leadership seemed to believe
that the successful integration of Puerto Ricans into the larger U.S. society depended on
Puerto Ricans being cast as white in the racial drama of the country.
Emergence of Pentecostalism
Protestantism in Puerto Rico
During the first 300 or so years of Spanish rule in Puerto Rico all things
Protestant were censored and forbidden. But in 1869 Spain relented and issued a decree
of religious tolerance on the island, and in November of that year some 300 Protestants
who had been living in secret gathered for the first public Protestant religious service.
The presence of Protestants continued to grow and in 1898 when the U.S. invaded the
island and took possession of it. Protestant missionaries from the mainland began to
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descend on Puerto Rico, dividing up the island and establishing churches.67 By the late
1800’s Puerto Rico had the fastest-growing Protestant population of all the former
Spanish colonies in the Caribbean.68 Edmonds and Gonzalez explain that this is likely
due to the peculiar way that Puerto Rico seems to distinguish itself from other Caribbean
countries.69 But it was not only Protestant Christians who gained a foothold in Puerto
Rico. A religious practice known as espiritismo began to grow in popularity in the late
nineteenth century. Espiritismo, which was introduced by the children of middle-class
Puerto Ricans educated in Europe, began as an intellectual and philosophical movement,
but it was the spiritual dimension of healing that appealed to the lower classes. 70 This
mystical dimension of miraculous healing blended well with the ongoing mixture of
African religious traditions and Catholicism which had been occurring all over the
Caribbean.71 Still, having the full support of the U.S. government who saw this as an
opportunity to “Americanize” the island, Protestants quickly became the dominant group.
U.S. efforts at Americanization even led the Catholic church to ensure that all bishops on
the island were North American.72 This began a cultural transformation of Puerto Rico
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which I believe would impact the way its citizens saw themselves as well as prepare the
way for a counter-cultural religious movement like pentecostalism.
Emergence of Pentecostalism
In much of North American mythology about Pentecostalism, the origin of the
global movement is placed at the Azusa Street revival of 1906. I remember as a child
learning about the great revival at Azusa; it was proof that what we believed was real.
However, this has not only lived in the popular imagination of pentecostals. The idea that
Azusa is the contemporary fulcrum of the modern pentecostal movement has been
supported by several religious scholars, and even when scholars admit that the origins of
the modern pentecostal movement is complicated they still center Azusa Street.73 As you
will see in the following section, the modern-day pentecostal movement seems to have
several beginnings, some of which occurred without knowledge of Azusa. I mention this
because my discussion of Azusa below should not be seen as another moment of
centering the U.S. Pentecostal movement. I will explicate the need to decenter North
American experience later on. However, as this project focuses on the arrival of
Pentecostalism in Puerto Rico, and because the pentecostal movement on the island can
in fact be traced to Azusa, I feel compelled to take a moment to discuss Azusa and its
influence.
What is known as the Azusa Street revival occurred at a mission on Azusa Street
in Los Angeles, California in 1906. That mission was led by William Joseph Seymour, a
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self-educated son of former slaves from Louisiana.74 After leaving the south and living in
several cities Seymour ended up in Houston, Texas where he attended a black church.
During one of the services he heard a woman praying aloud in what seemed to be a
different language. When he later met the woman she told him about a white preacher
from Topeka, Kansas named Charles Parham who preached holiness and baptism in the
Holy Spirit. Seymour sought out the white preacher and for a time attended the bible
school of Charles Parham in Kansas.75 Parham was a known sympathizer of the Ku Klux
Klan and his racism did not permit Seymour to attend class with other white students, so
Seymour sat outside of the classroom and listened in through the open door or window.76
Seymour took the holiness teachings he learned at Parham’s school and traveled to Los
Angeles where he began to preach them. In 1906 revival erupted, and it shook the social
conscious of both the religious and secular press. The shock at the revival was in large
part due to the breakdown of social barriers. In the early 1900’s ,when the U.S. south was
deeply entrenched in segregation and Jim Crow, at Seymour’s revival gatherings “white
bishops and black workers, men and women, Asians and Mexicans, white professors and
black laundry women were equals.”77 Today some describe the Azusa revival as having
broken down the social barriers of division such as race, class, gender, wealth, language,
education, and church affiliation, though the segregation of pentecostals along race
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followed not long after.78 It was not only social and cultural disruptions that drove the
early movement. In the same year as the Azusa revival San Francisco was rocked by the
largest earthquake on record to that date. That natural catastrophe solidified the belief
among these new pentecostals that the eschatological promise of the end of the world was
near.79 The mission seemed clear, they must take this message and gift of baptism in the
Holy Spirit to the world with urgency, and that they did.
The pentecostal revival of Azusa eventually reached Puerto Rico in 1916. As
discussed above, during the turn of the twentieth century Puerto Rico was racked by
poverty. Because of the dire economic state of the island and rampant poverty, a great
migration of Puerto Ricans to the U.S. mainland and other parts began. As a part of that
migration, the founder of pentecostalism in Puerto Rico, Juan L. Lugo, and his mother
and sister emigrated to Hawaii for work and to build a better life. It was there that he was
evangelized by missionaries from Azusa and eventually was ordained in the Assemblies
of God.80 Juan Lugo felt a pull to return to Puerto Rico and share the gift he had found in
this new movement. It is poignant that it was economic migratory phenomena that
allowed for this particular narrative. As will be discussed in Chapter Four, the connection
between the economic and political impacts of colonialism and the development of
religious, social, and political subjectivity go hand in hand. For now, what is important is
to note the patterns by which pentecostalism spread throughout the world. The initial
sparks throughout the globe were usually instigated by foreign missionaries but it was the
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indigenous populations which sustained the movement in their communities, as will be
discussed in more detail in the following section. However, in the case of Puerto Rico it
was a native returning to his homeland to share what he had experienced.
When Juan Lugo arrived in Puerto Rico the Protestant presence had been growing
and evangelizing much of the island for nearly 50 years. Yet despite the successful
conversion of Puerto Ricans to Protestantism, Lugo quickly began drawing crowds in the
hundreds of people coming to hear this gospel of revival, both Protestant and catholic
alike. Not long after, Lugo began holding revival services in a Methodist church, though
these were quickly squashed by the pastor of the church. This left Lugo no remedy but to
locate a facility where he could continue with his mission. So adamant was the resistance
of the dominant Protestant churches that they filed civil suit to stop Lugo. However, he
and others had already registered and incorporated their church as part of the Assemblies
of God denomination from the U.S. with local officials. The magistrate upheld their
rights to remain an incorporated church. His only warning to the pentecostals was to
remember the 10:30pm noise ordinance that was in effect.81 By 1931 Lugo had created
his own pentecostal denomination indigenous to the island and had established 37 distinct
congregations, solidifying the presence of pentecostalism in Puerto Rico for decades to
come. By the time of the publication of Rubén Peréz Torres Poder desde lo Alto in 1997
more than two-thirds of Protestants in Puerto Rico were pentecostals.82
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Brief Comparison to Other Pentecostal Emergences Around the Globe
The significance in taking a moment to compare global pentecostal movements is
that, as they spring up, they take a particular shape based on their contextual locations.
This has led some scholars to talk of “pentecostalisms” rather than a unifying Pentecostal
movement.83 This means that while there are similarities among the movements, for
example speaking in tongues and ecstatic or charismatic bodily expression, each location
wherein pentecostalism erupts is characterized epistemologically in different ways.84 That
in itself suggests that one of the key factors that possibly makes pentecostalism one of the
fastest growing Christian movements is that it lends itself to appropriation by the local
community without the missionaries overly dictating the terms of engagement. Perhaps
this creates enough of a distance from the experience of the imposition of colonial and
imperial religion that the local community feels a sense of ownership. In this sense
pentecostalism becomes an indigenous form of religious expression and can serve
whichever purpose those communities need in that moment. For some this may seem like
a detriment to the movement. However, while it is true that a lack of formal structure
causes much splintering in pentecostal movements, it is also a sign of pentecostalism’s
flexibility and resistance to European Christian constraints that demand a particular kind
of order rooted in imperial ideologies of power. What this means is that the particular
epistemological function of pentecostalism in Puerto Rico does not necessarily need to
match its epistemological functions in other regions of the world. Yet what is similar
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among many of the movements is the manner in which they take root in a community, the
way it spreads from missionaries to the local community by way of decontextualization
by local translators, and the subsequent move of the local community to assume
leadership and ownership of their pentecostal expression and in some cases eschew the
missionaries who brought them pentecostalism.
Africa
In Africa the emergence of pentecostal, or Pentecostal-like churches has seemed
to follow two trajectories. In his book African Pentecostalism, Ogbu Kalu describes that
some churches developed from direct missionary enterprise of mainline denominations
while others seemingly sprang up organically and indigenously. A third possible
trajectory involves a mix of both missionary and indigenous occurrences. For example, in
the 1930’s five young men who belonged to Nigeria’s True Faith Tabernacle were
expelled from the church for speaking in tongues. They went on to form the Church of
Jesus Christ and subsequently invited the Assemblies of God (AOG) to support them.
The AOG sent a pastor and his wife to take over the new church.85 Kalu points out that
some pentecostal, or charismatic revitalizations, sprung up among other denominational
groups and churches such as holiness groups, Quakers, evangelical Protestants,
Anglicans, and Catholics. Important to note is that these movements began as early as
1901, 5 years before the Azusa revival in Los Angeles. This is important because it
destabilizes the hegemonic narrative that the west brought this movement to the world.
The reality is that such pentecostal movements seem to erupt at multiple locations during
the same period.
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In the case of Africa one key group to bring pentecostal religious practice to the
continent were African Americans. Kalu notes that the contribution of African American
Pentecostals in this missionary enterprise to Africa can be divided into three phases: 1)
early contact by African Americans inspired by evangelical spirituality in the eighteenth
century; 2) a nationalist ideology that was emerging in the U.S. and Africa during the
early 1900’s and which was deeply tied to religion, emancipation, and the back-to-Africa
movement; 3) missionary work of black Holiness and Pentecostal groups.86 Of particular
interest to this project is the second point, the role that nationalist sentiment and desire for
emancipation plays in the way that pentecostalism operates among the African churches
and communities. However, it would be wrong to assume that such nationalist sentiments
were imported by western missionaries, even black missionaries. As I have discussed
above, indigenous religious movements in Africa are not only capable of providing an
anti-imperial framework alongside western lead movements, they may in fact be the
driving force.
In the religious sense one might connect and trace nationalist sentiments in these
communities to Ethiopianism, which was a movement that sprang from indigenous
Africans who were educated by western missionaries and who were interested in the
ways that indigenous spirituality could appropriate the Christian Gospel and make it
uniquely African.87 Kalu writes:
[Ethiopianism] challenged white representation of African values, cultures, and
the practice of Christian faith. It challenged white monopoly of the cultic and
decision-making powers within the church, and the monopoly of the interpretation
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of the canon and the cultural symbols worship. Ethiopianism countered the
denigration of indigenous cultures with a nationalist antistructure, and a quest for
the Africanization of the gospel. A religious interpretation of this movement sets
the stage for understanding the patterns of Africans’ quest for identity through
religious power in the period under the colonial canopy and thereafter.88
As a response to social, cultural, and political turmoil in Africa, Ethiopianism allowed for
indigenous Africans to begin a process of self-determination. This is evident in Max
Warren’s book in which he discusses revivalism in Africa during the 1930’s. In that text
he observes that central to missionary enterprise in Africa to that point had been the
tension between power and truth.89 That is, there was a cultural sentiment that resisted
the western missionary’s idea of truth and which powers determine truth. Thus there was
a tension between western Christianity and the power of indigenous spiritual traditions,
or the power of local tribal chiefs, and most importantly for this project the power of the
masses. One can then understand the appeal of pentecostalism which focuses on the
power and presence of the Holy Spirit and the individual believer’s experience of the
Spirit. The epistemological shift, rooted in a larger frame of independence from imperial
rule, might be attributed in part to the idea that once the believer encounters Holy Spirit
“baptism” (often evidenced by speaking in tongues) they are legitimated in the work of
religious (and political?) self-determination. The shift in spiritual epistemological
postures run alongside shifts in socio-political postures. Furthermore, as I will discuss
below this epistemological phenomenon is not restricted to Africa but shows up in other
contexts such as Asia, namely in China and India.
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Asia
In Asia missionary efforts from western countries were similar to those in Africa.
However, while in Africa there seems to have been significant organic and indigenous
pentecostal eruptions along with the growth of pentecostal churches established by
westerners, in places like China it seems that the majority of churches began from
missionary efforts. It was not until later in the early twentieth century that the Chinese
pentecostals seemed to take full ownership of their churches. A common thread that these
Chinese pentecostals share with their African counterparts is a strong nationalist
sentiment that resented western interference. While I have not found much evidence of
indigenous eruptions, what is clear is that by the 1930’s the majority of Chinese
pentecostals belonged to Chinese independent pentecostal churches founded and run by
indigenous Chinese. Additionally, pentecostalism’s focus on the supernatural found a
natural alliance with Chinese folk religions. In particular the availability of spiritual
power to all believers regardless of rank or class along with suspicion of hierarchical and
rationalistic Christianity allowed these churches to emerge. Furthermore, it is important
to note that at the time these independent Chinese churches were being founded the social
and political climate of China was deeply resentful of western interference in China’s
affairs.90
The political turmoil in China during the early twentieth century seems to have set
the stage for Chinese Christians to reimagine a culturally and uniquely Chinese Christians
which was rooted in pentecostal belief and religious practice. This is precisely what
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occurred and is likely be a result of how much western missionaries depended on Chinese
natives to translate for them and to reach the local people. In fact, what have been called
“native evangelists” and “bible women” were significantly responsible for aiding contact
between western missionaries and local communities. Most importantly, however, was
the role these native evangelists and bible women played in contextualizing the
pentecostal message in ways that made it relevant to the local culture.91 The
epistemological shifts in religion and politics find similar connections as they did in
Africa.
In India western missionaries also arrived during a time of turmoil and resentment
of the west. Similar to China’s distaste for the presence of the West there was wide
spread resentment at the presence of the British and the imperialist policies that created
great poverty in India.92 Also similar to China, missionaries in India depended heavily on
native evangelists and bible women to translate for them. As in China, this meant that it
became the task of these native evangelists to translate the pentecostal message of
western missionaries into the local context and culture. It is telling that Allan Anderson
named his chapter on the beginning of Indian pentecostalism “To Suit their Nature and
Feelings.”93 Additionally, and similarly to Africa, there is evidence that some of the
pentecostal revivals and eruptions were led or initiated by indigenous Indian’s who had
never heard of the Azusa revival which further complicates the narrative that Azusa
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missionaries took pentecost to the world, or that pentecost is a uniquely North American
phenomenon.94
Anderson has argued that the pentecostal revival in India began and was led in
full force by Pandita Ramabai, a converted Brahmin who married outside her caste.
Anderson says of Ramabai that she is the most famous Indian woman, she was a
reformer, Bible translator, and social activist. After having studied education in Britain
and the U.S. she returned to India and established a mission that would come to be named
Mukti. But Ramabai did not only bring back theories of education she had learned in the
west, she also brought back an affinity for independent denominations and a distaste for
state religion.95 It was a Mukti, a mission for destitute girls and women that the revival in
India took hold and it was those women who were at the forefront of the pentecostal
movement in India. In fact, Anderson notes that one missionary who had visited India
during this time commented that what most impressed her was the “extreme
unimportance of the missionary.” But perhaps even more significant was that the spread
of the revival was lead by the women from the Mukti Mission.96 I note this significance
because the leading roles of indigenous people and women demonstrate the countercultural possibility of pentecostalism. In a time when most denominations did not ordain
women or those without formal seminary educated these revivals were lead precisely by
those populations excluded from church and denominational leadership. This is not to
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argue that pentecostalism is a utopian movement. But it does support Smith’s idea that
the first principal of pentecostalism is that the move of the Holy Spirit disrupts the status
quo.
Latin America
The story of pentecostalism in Latin America follows much the same as in the
previous regions of the globe. While Catholicism has a long history in Latin America due
to the imperial colonial enterprise of the Spanish and Portuguese, primarily, the arrival of
pentecostal revival followed much of the same patterns and arrived just early as in other
parts of the world. Anderson notes that some denominations in Latin America were
founded earlier than the major denominations in the U.S., once again directing the
narrative that global pentecostalism flows exclusively from Azusa.97 As in other places
around the globe much of the initial pentecostal activity was instigated by North
American missionaries. For example, one account places the introduction of
pentecostalism in El Salvador as early as 1904 by a Canadian missionary, though this is
disputed by some.98 Two examples that seem to follow the trend of early indigenous
control of the movement come from Chile and Brazil. In Chile a schism in the Methodist
Episcopal church resulted in a primarily Chilean led church even though its leader was an
American.99 Because the American leader depended so heavily on Chileans for
infrastructure, and other work this church quickly became a fully self sustaining Chilean
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church with virtually no influence or assistance from North American missions. Later the
American leader would clash with the majority of Chilean pastors over the use of
instruments and popular music in church which lead to another schism. However, the
original denomination that he founded, the Methodist Pentecostal Church (MPC),
remained dominant under full Chilean leadership and most pentecostals in Chile belong
to churches to trace their origins to the MPC.100
In Brazil the story is not much different. The Brazilian pentecostal movement
began in two places around the same time in 1910, São Paulo to the south and Pará in the
north. In the case of São Paulo an Italian missionary from Chicago went to establish a
ministry that would outreach to Italians living in Brazil. After being ousted from a
Presbyterian church for teaching pentecostalism he founded Christian Congregation
which would become the largest pentecostal denomination in Brazil. In the same year two
Swedish Baptist missionaries went to Pará and began prayer meetings. However, their
inability to speak Portuguese meant that once again it was indigenous Brazilians who
began the initial evangelizing work in the local communities.101 Distinct from some other
global regions the pentecostal movement in Brazil quickly became autochthonous with
out support from outside of Brazil.102 A defining characteristic of Latin American
pentecostalism which was evident in both Chile and Brazil was its vehemently antiCatholic sentiment. This attitude resulted in some cases violent mobs set themselves on
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pentecostals at the direction, some claim, or catholic priests.103 While the anti-Catholic
sentiment was not as violent in Puerto Rico there was nonetheless a sense of conversion
to something more meaningful even though the conversion was contained within the
larger Christian paradigm. As a child I remember a common sentiment in my pentecostal
church that Catholics were not even Christian but something different all together.
While perhaps seemingly unrelated at first glance, exploring the history of
pentecostalism in Puerto Rico and around the globe creates a space from which to
consider the ways in which religious movements like pentecostalism can offer strategies
for resistance and liberation in colonial contexts. The common experiences of
pentecostalism being quickly appropriated by local communities, that it traditionally
tended to take hold among poor and uneducated communities, and the way that it has
tended to set itself over against other forms of more liturgical and hierarchical, and even
state sponsored, Christian traditions provides additional space to theorize its implicit
epistemological potential. This too will be discussed and unpacked in chapter 4.
Conclusions
The political history of the U.S. in Puerto Rico is one marked by colonial
practices that divested the island of its resources and its people of a sense of autonomous
self-governance. Even after the U.S. allowed Puerto Ricans to elect their own
government its status as an ELA meant that Puerto Rico was severely limited in its ability
to self-determine its own destiny as a nation in its own right. The effects of U.S. policy
regarding Puerto Rico have created an identity crisis for both the state and its citizens,
which I will discuss in chapter 4. This identity crisis is the catalyst for my theorizing of
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the Puerto Rican political subject, as well as the basis from which I develop a de-colonial
analysis of what it means to survive under in the shadow of U.S. imperialism.
The project of colonialism began with the West imposing itself as the producer of
knowledge for the world. As such the empires of the West were motivated by a sense of
entitlement in not only acquiring knowledge about the places in the world which were
new to the West but also in exerting their dominion over those places. In fact, one could
argue that it was the desire for dominion that came first and that the scientific projects of
knowledge came after and served as a legitimizing cover for an enterprise that was often
little more than raiding and pillaging. In Decolonizing Methodologies Linda Tuhiwai
Smith articulates how modernity provided the framework for a scientific categorization
of the world by colonial powers.104 She writes that imperialism and colonialism came to
be the “specific formations through which the west came to ‘see,’ to ‘name,’ and to
‘know’ indigenous communities.”105 As the “legitimate source of knowledge,” the west
assumed a responsibility to collect and classify information so as to increase its
knowledge, and thus understood itself as justified in subduing the rest of the world and
imposing European cultural sensibilities onto colonized peoples. Colonizing methods
relegated indigenous peoples to the status of object which resulted in the erasure of
personhood and thus alleviating any ethical or moral imperative on the part of the
colonizer. Smith states plainly the effects of this project: “Objectification is a process of
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dehumanization.”106 Once dehumanized, the identities of the colonized are legislated in
order to locate them within the new colonial social order making up the lowest and most
dispensable members of society. This allowed for indigenous people to be enslaved,
raped, displaced, and often killed in mass genocide or by foreign diseases. This also
allowed Europeans to remain ignorant of local cultural practices particularly regarding
sexuality and gender.107
Such colonial practices resulted in several particular phenomena: the importation
of enslaved Africans to replace the decimated indigenous populations used for forced
labor, a new class of mixed individuals of European/Amerindian, European/African, and
Amerindian/African, and the imposition of European Christian sexual and gender norms.
Thus one of the biggest and longest lasting effects of the colonial enterprise was the
emergence of new racial mixtures which resulted in various categories (i.e. mestizo for
European/Amerindian, mulato for European/African, and zambo for African/Amerindian)
in order for the European colonizers to make sense of and retain power in the shifting
racial landscape of the colonies. The other long lasting effect was the reframing of gender
and sexuality to fit a European, Christian, heterosexual and patriarchal paradigm.
Finally, when thinking about the global spread of pentecostalism it is easy for
North Americans to focus on the Azusa revival moment. However, it is important to note
that this is a particularly western view.108 While the Azusa revival did produce many
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missionaries who went out into the world, it did not maintain a proprietary hold on
pentecostalism and in no way ensured its homogeneity around the globe. As will be
shown below each region where pentecostalism emerged and took root flavored
pentecostalism differently. This is key for several reasons. First, if Smith’s claims about
the epistemological nature of pentecostalism are correct then it seems obvious that the
cultural influences which create disparate epistemological subjectivities in individuals
from different regions of the world would also influence the style of pentecostalism that
takes hold in that region. Secondly, if pentecostalism, like Catholicism, experiences
syncretism with indigenous religious practices, then it also seems likely that
pentecostalism will look a bit different from region to region. Finally, and perhaps most
significantly, as was common in places like Africa, indigenous “pentecostal” movements
have been known to emerge separate from classical pentecostal churches in which the
adherents were not even aware of Azusa and did not refer to themselves specifically as
pentecostal.109
#
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CHAPTER THREE: A REARTICULATION OF SUBJECTIVITY
To think about the subject is to enter a philosophical and theological dialogue that
is rooted, sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly, in various contextual and
historical ideologies about the social world, the cosmic order, God, religion, and the
projects of colonialism, imperialism, and capitalism. The questions of what makes up the
subject, how the subject emerges and comes to know itself, or how the subject
participates in its social world, are some of the primary questions that this dissertation is
concerned with and cannot be thought separately from the real conditions in which the
subject lives. To think about the subject is to think about human life and the multiplicity
of influences and factors that define our existence and our sense of self. In this chapter I
attempt to think about the subject in ways that move beyond theoretical discourse and
begin to take into account the lived realities of marginalized people. Thus the aim of this
chapter is to establish the scaffolding of a theory of the subject that sets the stage for the
focus of the next chapter, the religio-political queer subjectivity of Puerto Ricans (both on
the island and in diaspora) as quasi-colonial subjects under the rule of the United States.
In my efforts to articulate my theory of the subject I will first describe the subject
by explaining the relationship between three concepts that encapsulate what I call the
subject, the self, subjectivity, and subjectification. Once I have described these three
terms I will then situate my own work and theory of the subject among the work of other
thinkers. To do the work of thinking about the subject I begin with that ever-ubiquitous
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philosopher Hegel who, to paraphrase Arvind-Pal Mandair, remains the specter of the
West. To begin with Hegel is important because his notion of the dialectic is essential to
the notion of the other. Additionally, his philosophy emerged as a reflection of the
colonial and imperial enterprise of Western Europe and as such defined “the West” in
particular and lasting ways over against the colonized world.110 I will focus on Hegel’s
Master/Bondsman (or slave) metaphor by reading it alongside several thinkers who come
after him and and offer critiques that make it possible for me to both rely on Hegel as a
foundation for my theory of the subject and to move beyond Hegel and think about the
subject in material ways and not simply philosophical abstractions. Working through
Hegel’s metaphor in this way allows me to lay the foundation for my theory of the
subject which is rooted in the Foucaultian subject. For the purpose of this exploration I
understand the Foucaultian subject as a social construction, or the effects of power which
operates through discourses about the subject and the subject’s body, and disciplines that
maintain the subject by way of exerting their force on the subject’s body. Ultimately my
concern is the participation of the subject’s material body in the process of
subjectification; what it is that the material body provides to that process. In this
exploration of the subject I nuance my theory with thinkers like Judith Butler, Jose
Muñoz, Gloria Anzaldúa, Lawrence La Fountain-Stokes, and Dwight Hopkins, to name a
few. Throughout the chapter I will describe in various ways how my own theory of the
subject attempts to move beyond the thinkers highlighted in this exploration into the
subject.

110
Arvind-Pal S. Mandair, Religion and the Specter of the West: Sikhism, India, Postcoloniality,
and the Politics of Translation (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 16-17.

63

The Subject: Self, Subjectivity, and Subjectification
I distinguish the self, the subject, and subjectification in the following ways: The
self is something like the individual as a whole. That is, it is the full person that interacts
in the world and who possesses characteristics that make it distinct from other selves, and
who knows itself as such.111 I use subjectivity for the consciousness that emerges in the
self through processes that concern self-recognition in contrast and in relation to other
selves. Subjectivity also concerns the recognition of the world in which the self exists.
Subjectivity—both the awareness of oneself and of the world—comes only through the
appearance of and relation to, or material experience with, another subject, the other. It is
the other that initiates, so to speak, the moment of self-recognition and imposes itself on
the self which is also other to itself. Subject A becomes aware of itself by encountering
subject B, and subject B becomes aware of itself by encountering subject A. This process
of recognition is what we might call subjectification, something like the process by which
the self becomes self through the process of subjectivity enacting itself through
recognition in the presence of an other and the reciprocity, or accountability, that
accompanies that recognition. These three concepts are intertwined and interdependent,
even co-constitutive and simultaneously co-enacted. That is to say that while we may
speak of them as distinct and as emerging in time along a linear progression for the sake
of theorizing, they are in fact not so easily teased apart from one another.
Together these three concepts, the self, subjectivity, and subjectification,
constitute the abstract category of the subject as I understand and articulate it. As I
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mention in the introduction, in this dissertation I am engaging a methodology of vaiven
(coming and going). Vaiven as methodology produces a theory of the subject which is
oscillatory in nature. In some ways my theorizing reflects a reality of the subject itself,
that it is always shifting in a dialectic process that seemingly never arrives at a final
destination but rather is always becoming. This is the posture from which I critique
Hegel, whose philosophy was centered on the Absolute as the expression of ultimate
arrival, of ultimate knowing, of the culmination of human history and being. In a postcolonial frame, or that of a queer of color critique, the notion of vaiven signals something
different, something more unsteady, or at least seemingly unsteady to the colonial
characteristics of domination and conquest, both of which are expressions of the ultimate
realization of the Western imperial state come to fruition. The notion of vaiven questions
and pushes back against the focus on teleological arrival, recognizing that such “arrival”
comes at the expense of the colonized subject. By naming that violence enacted by the
West on the colonized world, and undermining its sense of self-realization, vaiven forces
the West, and Hegel, to remain trapped in an oscillatory existence like the colonized
subject and thereby reframes the notion of the Subject.
The Hegelian Subject
In Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel describes the subject as being wrapped up in
the unfolding of the Absolute. The Absolute is that which knows or recognizes itself as
being-for-itself in a transcendent way and as such reveals itself as the fullness of
knowledge and thus truth. The Absolute is also capable of pure self-recognition, which
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for Hegel is an essential piece of the process of subjectification.112 This fullness of
knowing vis-á-vis the nature of being comes from the interiority of thought, we might say
the “consciousness” of the Absolute, which is expressed in, or through, the external
world. For Hegel the human subject is a kind of reflection, or lesser expression of the
Absolute, in that its defining quality is that it knows itself through its expression in the
world. The subject is also a participant in the becoming of the Absolute in that it is
through the becoming of the subject that the Absolute unfolds, or comes to be revealed.113
Thus the subject participates in the revelation of the fullness of knowledge. For Hegel the
subject is defined by the characteristic that it reflects into itself, and that among its
primary characteristics is that of self-movement. In other words, the act of self-reflection
is not one wherein consciousness is set in a fixed position from which it is observed from
the outside. Rather, the very act of reflection presumes movement, progression, a
dialectic becoming.114 Thus Hegel’s core idea is, what he is describing in his philosophy,
is that all being is ultimately moving through a dialectic process that will culminate in a
fullness of knowledge, or truth, which is the very expression of being. Truth, or being, is
not something distinct and separate from consciousness, or what Hegel names Spirit, it is
rather determined from within consciousness. While the the dialectic process of
becoming is valuable to my theorizing of the subject I part ways with Hegel where his
theory articulates the process of becoming in such a way that it seems to privilege the
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mind and deprivilege the material body, and perhaps the material world, in the process of
knowing. In my reading of Hegel the material body is seemingly a passive vehicle
through which the being-for-itself that produces the subject functions, but it does not
actively participate in the emergence of the subject. In other words, in the emergence of
the subject the crucial action takes place in consciousness and the material body
seemingly adds no substantive knowledge to the process.
Hegel’s key metaphor that demonstrates this dialectic becoming of the subject is
that of the master and bondsman, or slave. In this relationship the master is the
“consciousness that exists for itself” and comes into its own by recognizing the slave as
other and subduing the slave into servitude.115 The effect is the diminishing of the
subjectivity of the slave. In this process the master achieves self-recognition and
overcomes its own otherness and returns back to itself but at the expense of the slave’s
autonomy.116 The slave also experiences self recognition and thus both master and slave
experience coming into oneself, the emergence of subjectivity. However, while the
master achieves this coming-into-oneself through self-recognition in the encounter with
the slave the slave experiences coming-into-oneself through recognizing their own
creativity, and thus a sense of self, in the production of their labor, which is owned by the
master. There is here an unequal experience even though Hegel’s metaphor claims that
there is mutual recognition between the two, a moment of absolute reciprocity. Hegel
writes: “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists
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for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.”117 The idea that the selfconscious recognizes itself as existing in the moment of encounter is a key idea on which
I theorize the subject. The issue with Hegel’s metaphor is that such an absolute
reciprocity is in fact absent, as noted by Franz Fanon.118 The master and slave do not
share an experience of mutual recognition because an inequity of experience remains.
The master recognizes the slave and thus the consciousness of the master returns to itself
for itself, the master knows themself as an autonomous self. Yet the slave’s
consciousness is realized first through the act labor and subsequently the recognition of
the master as an other, a process that requires the slave’s servitude.119 Additionally,
Hegel’s metaphor fails to attend to the participation of the material body. As I will argue
below the primary issues I find in the Hegelian subject are the relational ethic that lacks
genuine reciprocity and the passive role of the material body.
To think critically about the Hegelian subject in relation to my work I begin by
examining critiques by Marx, Franz Fanon, and Kierkegaard. Marx’ critique helps to
demonstrate that the way labor is imagined in Hegel’s metaphor is inadequate in
providing the slave the conditions for becoming. Fanon highlights the problem with the
unequal experience of master and slave and the inability of the slave to experience a
fullness of autonomy, and thus dignity. Kierkegaard takes issue with the process of the
subject’s becoming because, as he argues, the initiation of the moment of becoming is too
interior to the subject alone. Kierkegaard requires some other force that begins the
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process of subjectification. First, however, Kierkegaard describes what constitutes the
self which is connected to the initiating force of the process of subjectification.
Borrowing from these critiques I begin to articulate the subject in a way that makes up for
what I find lacks in Hegel. Following this I will begin to map my way to the queer
subject, which is the culmination of this chapter. To do so I will build off of these
critiques by briefly exploring the work of Derrida and his exposition of God’s visit to
Abraham, Sarah Ahmed and her repositioning of the body as an active participant in the
arrangement of the very space through which the body is perceived, and finally Gloria
Anzaldúa and her centering of the body as the location from which knowledge is
produced.
Karl Marx offers a critique of Hegel that situates the subject in the material world
through thinking about the process of labor. Situating the subject in this way allows me to
theorize the Subject in relation to a decolonial liberative ethics, which I discuss in later
chapters. Marx rightly critiques Hegel’s metaphor by demonstrating how thorough
capitalism labor is the source of the alienation of the subject rather than being a process
by which the subjectivity of the slave is realized. Marx notes that while the aim of labor
in the capitalist scheme is the production of commodities, in actuality the worker
becomes estranged from their labor and the process results in positioning labor and
worker (or for the purpose of this project the colonized subject) as commodities.120 The
value of labor and the worker become for the capitalist their defining quality. The result
is that as the worker is pushed to produce more the greater the degree of estrangement
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between labor and worker becomes, and the greater the commodification of the
worker.121 Thus Marx observes that the wellbeing of the worker is inversely
proportionate to the worker's production. This estrangement, or alienation, through the
process of labor for another reveals that Hegel’s metaphor in fact fails to provide the
slave with the potential for becoming. For Marx it is when the worker labors of their own
volition and for their own enjoyment that the self appears, but this does not occur in
Hegel’s metaphor.122 I argue that the commodification and thus the estrangement from
labor has as a consequence a social estrangement, the estrangement of humans from one
another, as well as an isolation and individuation that leaves the self estranged from its
own self.123 This seemingly undermines the entire master/slave metaphor. In Hegel's
slave/master dialectic the slave and the master remain without a coming into the truth of
self-consciousness because the slave is alienated from their own labor and the master has
not recognized themselves in an other as an equal. Thus neither subjectivity is realized
and the self remains in an ambiguous space of commodification, unconnected to the
productions of their bodies and from each other.
Marx demystifies the master/slave relationship and grounds it in the material
world, pointing out the real and tangible effects that are realized in the lives of the
working class resulting in their "spiritual" and material disenfranchisement. In doing this
Marx connects the subject, the body, and the act of labor to one another. This connection
made by Marx allows me to think about the enterprise of colonialism as one whose
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primary effect was to divorce the native from their land through the theft of that land and
subsequently forcing the native (or colonized subject) into enslavement for the
enrichment of the colonial empire. By having had the material home of their being
forcibly removed from their jurisdiction and being forced to labor for what is no longer
theirs to posses the colonized subject has their dignity and sense of self undermined.
What matters in Marx’s critique is the revelation that the ability to experience genuine
autonomy in the encounter with the other is essential to the becoming of the self.
Furthermore, as such I argue that labor cannot be a mechanism through which we
describe the process of subjectification because the act of labor is too weighed down with
with the supremacy of capitalism and the focus on productions that others (the capitalist)
find valuable. Thus the judgment of the value of the self for the colonized subject remains
in the purview of the other who owns the means of production, which have been
confiscated by force. Rather, subjectification must be rooted in a relational ethic of
absolute reciprocity and must allow for both the self and the other to appear as equals,
where the self experiences genuine autonomy to appear without qualification.
Turning to Fanon’s critique mentioned above that there remains absent an
absolute reciprocity between master and slave I argue that Hegel"s dialectic results in
three problematic descriptions of the self, subjectivity and the process of subjectification.
First, Hegel"s conception of the emergence of the Master's self from within divorces that
self from a mutually emancipatory social-relational ethic and conceives of a self that
emerges only for itself through the undoing of the other. In other words, even though
Hegel offers a kind of relationality in the master/slave narrative, the self of the slave does
not realize itself through the same process of recognition as the master. There lacks a
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particular sort of ethics of relation and mutuality in a self whose being emerges solely
from its own consciousness and for its own consciousness in what amounts to a one-sided
experience of encounter. Second, subjectivity seemingly becomes primarily an interior
affair originating and centered in the thinking mind and, at least for the master, ignoring
the body. The material body is deprivileged in the subjectivity of the master and the mind
given primacy in the process of subjectification of the master, which subsequently
separates the self of the master from the material body. Thirdly, contrary to the
experience of the master the slave"s consciousness of being-for-itself is tied to their labor.
While Hegel’s metaphor focuses on the production of the slave"s labor what I draw from
his metaphor is that it is the participation of the slave’s body in the act of labor that is
key. In other words, the master’s subjectivity is divorced from the body because the
master’s body does not engage in labor while the slave’s subjectivity is rooted in the
body which is caught up in the act of laboring. Allegorically, these reveal an ideology of
Western supremacy over the colonized world, and more specifically the colonized body.
The first subject (or the West/colonizer), who is master, comes to realize the fullness of
itself only through the domination of the slave (the colonies/colonized), and the
appropriation of the slave’s labor. Furthermore, for the colonized subject the process of
subjectification seems centered on the movement of the body as opposed to the
colonizing subject who’s subjectification seems centered on the movement of the
consciousness, or the mind. We can now perceive how Hegel’s metaphor operates as
more than a mere explication of the emergence of subjectivity. This metaphor represents
a philosophical articulation of the ideologies that allowed the West to cast the colonized
as “primitive,” less capable of “civilization,” and thus naturally subservient to the West.
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It solidified for the now enlightened West the “proper” order and hierarchy of human
civilization.
Fanon’s critique reveals yet another problematic aspect of the relationship of the
master and slave, or colonizer and colonized. This problem concerns the benevolence of
the colonizer in the act of granting the colonized freedom from bondage. Returning to the
social-relational ethic I mentioned above Fanon uses Hegel’s metaphor to think about the
reality of chattel slavery in the Caribbean. He observes that the master who sets a slave
free has in that moment recognized the slave as an other and thus experiences something
like the master in Hegel’s metaphor. The slave, however, does not experience the
epistemological shift of the master. The slave’s consciousness has not turned back into
itself through a process of recognizing the master as other. No, the slave’s freedom, or
freedom to be a full self, is granted by the master, robbing the slave of a fullness of being
for itself. For Hegel this process of claiming one's own being for oneself means that the
self must distinguish itself from its other and thus in a sense must risk danger, or death.124
Thus only through the risk of conflict which might bring about the death of oneself is
being in-itself-for-itself made reality.125 Yet in Hegel’s master/slave metaphor the risk is
unequal. The master has not experienced the danger and risk of death because the slave
does not engage in the dialectic struggle like the master does.126 The slave, the colonized
and enslaved self, has been alienated from itself and authentic recognition made virtually
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impossible.127 Fanon argues that the only way for the slave to achieve being-for-itself is
to behave like the master and treat the master as equal, or even as a slave. That is, the
slave must inhabit a space where it is possible to grant the master freedom, where such a
power over another exists. The slave must take, even by violent force, the freedom that
will enact the full emergence of their subjectivity.
The necessity of violence in Fanon is not something that I preserve in my
theorizing. I recognize that Fanon is using Hegel to describe the real material conditions
of the colonized world which enacted extreme violence on the colonized, and in that
sense my critique of his call for violence should not be taken too heavy-handedly. Still,
there is something valuable in thinking critically about the moment of self-emancipation,
even if violent in nature. The self-emancipation of the slave by force is an act that
requires the participation of the body. However, this is a different kind of participation
than that of labor and production as seen in Hegel’s metaphor. In the instance of selfemancipation the slave has put aside their labor in service to their master and has
assumed a position equal to that of the master. Thus the action of the slave’s body is not
one that produces for the master’s colonial enterprise but one that participates for the
slave’s own self and not for the master’s self, thus repositioning the master in the
hierarchy of colonial power. Through this we come to perceive an alternative in the
emergence of subjectivity, the body participates for its own self rather than for another
through labor and as such emancipates itself from the implicit inequality of the relational
ethic of Hegel’s metaphor. No longer is the participation of the body relegated to
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servitude as a mere vehicle for production but rather participates with the consciousness
in the process of subjectification for its own self. This is key to my argument regarding
the process of subjectification, that both the body and the consciousness must participate
equally for each subject involved in the moment of encounter.128
To this point I have suggested that the process of subjectification cannot include
acts of labor and production that places focus on objects and thus make an object of the
self, that there must exist a genuinely absolute reciprocity, and that not only should the
body be understood as playing an explicitly active role in the process but that the
participation of the body must be one of autonomy rather than servitude. What remains is
a consideration of the initiation of the process of subjectification, or rather of the force
behind that initiation. For this I turn to Kierkegaard who in Sickness Unto Death provides
several propositions about the self that are helpful to my argument, namely that of the
importance of the material body in the process of subjectification, and the idea that the
self is contingent. By using Kierkegaard in this way I am able to point to the queer
subject.
In Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard begins with a discussion about the nature of
the self. He writes: “A human being is spirit. But what is Spirit? Spirit is the self. But
what is the self? The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation’s relating
itself to itself in the relation; the self is not the relation but is the relation’s relating itself
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to itself."129 With regard to this active relation as constitutes the self, Kierkegaard
continues by asserting that the human being is a relation between physical and psychical.
This is key. If, for example, we consider the relation between body and consciousness (or
soul to use Kierkegaard’s language) and the self is understood to be only, or primarily, a
soul, a misrelating occurs because one side of the equation is seemingly undervalued.130
The actual self emerges when the relation between body and consciousness relates fully
to itself as that which it is, body and consciousness, and the self no longer desires to
resist what it is nor desires to be something else. We are not consciousness alone, nor the
body alone. We are only ever the continual relation of the two. But the relation of the two
does not produce a third who is the self. The self is the very constant, unending relation
of consciousness and body. In this I perceive the potential to assert that in some sense the
body exists without consciousness, and consciousness exists without the body, but
separately neither is the self. The singular self is only the self when the two are in
relation. In this way the self might be thought of as a symbiotic dialectic process in which
rather than the body and consciousness superseding each other to produce an idealized
third they instead relate to each other mutually and simply are what they are: always
already a relation. In this sense the self can be understood to be always mediating
between two states, consciousness and body, and necessarily constituted by the continual

129

Søren Kierkgaard, The Sickness Unto Death, trans., Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong,
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980), 14.
130
A 1941 translation published by Princeton University Press translates this example as relating
between body and soul.

76

process of that relation.131 If we recall for a moment Hegel’s metaphor and consider it
slightly differently then this relation of body and consciousness would occur for both
master and slave as a part of the process of subjectification for each of them.
The self, however, does not consist alone of the relation of self to itself because
for Kierkegaard the self is contingent in a way dissimilar to Hegel. For Kierkegaard the
self does not discover in the process of subjectification, or becoming, that it has always
been what is has become as it does for Hegel. For Kierkegaard the process of
subjectification requires a disruption of Hegel’s “circle of immanence,” it requires an
other who is not subsumed but remains radically distinct.132 In other words, in addition to
the self-contained relation, so to speak, the relation to a self who is wholly other is an
essential and constitutive part of the self. Thus subjectification is not a private act that
concerns only the self. Rather, the process of subjectification is one of relating to another
self who plays the part of other, and who has set the entire process of the original, interior
relation of the self in motion.133 Kierkegaard will name this other that constitutes the
original relation of the self as Other, or God. As such the self is always relating to itself
and to God in the process of becoming.134 Yet I argue that rather than consider God to be
the force that sets in motion the process of relation we might instead consider that force
to be the presence of the other, another self who is equal to the first self. The other to
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whom the self relates is not an abstract ineffable Other but the other who is materially
present, and as such an equal. Thus the self is referential in that it is always relating to
itself and to another self. Kierkegaard's subject differs from the "radically self-generated"
Hegelian subject in that it is constituted by its very relation to the Other which remains in
a state of radical alterity rather than being subsumed into the unfolding of the
Absolute.135 The self, and the process of subjectification out of which emerges the subject
cannot be self-generating, something outside of and bigger than the individual self must
be the genesis that constitutes the initial relation. It is at this point in Kierkegaard’s
theorizing that I want to suggest that we consider that this other that represents alterity to
be the other, the face of the stranger that catches the self unaware and in a moment of
vulnerability, and not the radical alterity defined as God.136 If we entertain this suggestion
then we arrive at a particular ethical question about the care of both oneself and the other.
That the self is contingent in this way means that the Hegelian subject cannot emerge at
the expense of another’s autonomy, and that Kierkegaard’s subject must contend with
another self as that force which constitutes its own subjectivity.
Without moving too quickly to an explicit discussion of ethics at this point I can
begin to map my way to the queer subject by articulating some thoughts on the subject
from where I have left Hegel and Kierkegaard. Firstly, the moment of encounter between
two selves is only made possible through the presence of their bodies in proximity to
each other. It is not the idea of another unknown self that brings with it the risk of danger.
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It is only the presence of another material body that can enact violence to one’s own body
that presents real risk. In his essay on hospitality Jaques Derrida describes the visitation
of the other, of the stranger who appears without expectation.137 In the example of
Yahweh’s visit to Abraham it is the very real presence of the Other which disarms
Abraham. Even in this example Yahweh is present before Abraham, presumably in a
material body. Thus the approach of the strange other brings with it a material
confrontation. To speak of welcoming the stranger into one’s home is to put at risk the
shelter that provides one’s body safety from the rest of the world. For Derrida this act of
welcoming is always imbued with the potential for the destruction of one’s home and
body.
This example of encounter is important because it lays additional ground for my
own thinking about the subject in that it is an encounter that is rooted in an ethics of
hospitality despite the ever present risk of danger and thus overcoming the apparent
instinct to violence of Hegel’s metaphor. The risk is not to engage in violent struggle
which might result in one’s destruction, but it is instead the choice to set aside violence
and open oneself to the other. Furthermore, it highlights the role of the body in the
process of subjectification by considering the subject in relation to the space the subject’s
body inhabits. It is not simply a matter of the other appearing in undelineated, abstract
space, but of the other showing up in the contextual space the self inhabits, the home of
the self. There is risk not only for the self but also for the home of the self. Such a risk
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implies that the subject has effects on the space it inhabits, which also implies an active
and even relation between the subject and space which is also constitutive of the self.
Reading Merleau-Ponty, Sara Ahmed describes the role of the body as giving
space its function. In other words, space is delineated by the ways in which bodies extend
into and move within a given set of spacial lines which are themselves organized by how
the body is oriented towards them.138 I draw on this discussion of bodies and space to
think about the role that our bodies play in the process of subjectification. One way that
Ahmed uses Merleau-Ponty is to think about the way that the body accommodates itself
in a space. One might presume to think of bodies in relation to space in such a way that it
is the body that shifts to fit the space but for Ahmed there is something else going on.
The body does not merely shift itself but also effects space through its actions, or to quote
Ahmed: “spacial lines only ‘line up’ as effects of bodily actions on and in the world.”139
This feels reminiscent of the way in which the body and its habits co-create each other.140
Bourdieu uses the language of appropriation to describe the actions of the body and
habitus, they appropriate each other in their continual unfolding and becoming.
As an example, Ahmed uses Merleau-Ponty to think about sexuality and sexual
orientation beyond being constituted by the object of desire and rather through the body’s
orientation to the space in which it is encompassed, or the way a body inhabits a space.
Thus it is the manner in which a body moves, or extends itself to inhabit space, that
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determines how that body is sexualized. For Ahmed, the notion of identity is a matter of
orientations to the world, and the orientation of the body is an essential piece of identity.
This allows me to consider not only the dilemma of the colonized body and the way those
bodies are restricted from movement by literal bondage, but also the juxtaposition of the
pentecostal subject who by expecting to and then experiencing the Spirit shifts their
epistemological posture in order to view the world in such a way that allows for the
arrival of the divine stranger. To paraphrase Derrida, they move into a posture of
expectation while simultaneously not knowing what they are expecting nor even that they
are expecting. We might even wonder about the arrival of the Holy Spirit, who was and
was not expected, and the experience of what pentecostal’s call “dancing in the Spirit,” a
quasi-ecstatic experience wherein the believer enters a trance-like state and gyrates in
what appears to be an uncontrollable and unchoreographed fashion. How might those
bodily actions effect the epistemological spacial lines of the pentecostal subject’s being?
It suffices for now to say that Ahmed’s phenomenology is one that positions the body
actively in the creation of the world in which the self inhabits and it is this line of
theorizing that I am deploying when I articulate the queer, pentecostal, and Puerto Rican
subject.
Thirdly, contrary to the role of the body as mere vehicle for the process of
subjectification in Hegel’s thought, for the native people of North America the body
exists as a source of knowledge. For example, in naming his formative text God is Red
Vine Deloria privileges the body as foundational to knowing. An indigenous theologian,
Deloria sought to reimagine the Christian God in the image of the colonized native rather
than as the white, European colonizer and thereby turn upside-down the theological and
81

cosmological ideology of imperial Christianity. The process of deconstructing the
violence of the West’s colonization and returning to indigenous ways of thinking about
knowledge begins with first imagining God, or the Other, in a new body, not as a white
colonizer but as red, like the brown-skinned indigenous peoples of North America. God
must not take the bodily form of Hegel’s master but rather that of the slave, colonized
other in whom the native subject sees their own subjectivity. Thus this short title “God is
Red” acts as a deconstructing and disorienting force that brings about a cognitive
dissonance by positioning God not as one of the conquerers but as one of the conquered,
and the possibility of such an imagining is contingent on the color of God’s body.
Reaffirming this focus on the body Chicana philosopher Gloria Anzaldúa centers
her own body as the source of her knowing. She writes: “My feminism is grounded not in
incorporeal abstraction but on corporeal realities. The material body is center, and
central. The body is the ground of thought.”141 For Anzaldúa the body is where thinking
and knowledge are rooted, in the experiences of the body with the world, or space, in
which it inhabits. Anzaldúa argues that it is the mixedness of the mestiza which allows
for a different kind of consciousness to arise.142 The body of the mestiza carries with it
the history of colonization, of rape and genocide, of theft and appropriation, of survival
through assuming temporary bodily postures that mimic those of the colonizer while also
preserving bits of knowledge that make up the genealogy of their people from before the
arrival of imperial conquest. The body carries memory, memory that is the ground of
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knowing. Thus we might argue that there is no consciousness without the body and no
subject without the experiences of the body because subjectification is a process that
exists only when the body and consciousness are entangled in their symbiotic becoming.
This is a form of vaivén, body and consciousness engaged in an unending oscillation
between states of being so furious that the self appears as a whole rather than as an
assemblage.
In order to articulate a theory of the subject I have had to first contend with Hegel,
because as mentioned above, his thought permeates the ethos of Europe and as such
reflects the ideologies that held up the imperial colonial project. I have argued above
several departures from Hegel in the attempt to layout groundwork for articulating a
subject that instead reflects the ideologies of the marginalized. Those departures are each
key characteristics of the subject and the process of subjectification that produce an
emancipated subject. These key elements are first a process that does not unequally
require the subjectification of some subjects to be mediated through labor. Secondly, the
relational ethic between subjects must be one in which each subject experiences the sense
of autonomy and as such a distribution of power that is not encumbered by social systems
that benefit some at the expense of others. By positing that in the encounter between self
and other the other remains subordinate to the self the other is conscripted into a posture
wherein they are unable to self-determine and liberate their own becoming from the
colonizer and the colonizing enterprise. Thirdly, the initiation of the process of
subjectification lies in the moment of mutual recognition. It is the other that initiates
becoming and as such a theory of the subject and subjectification must be grounded in a
social ethics. Finally, the body must be centered as an active participant with
83

consciousness as well as a source of knowledge that produces the self. Without a socialrelational ethic free from the mediations labor, and that provides absolute reciprocity the
subject lacks unencumbered ability to know itself. Without centering the body in the
process of subjectification a theory of the subject remains abstract and fails to take into
account the real forces that prevent some from realizing an unstifled becoming. Keeping
these essential elements at the forefront I will move on to thinking about the Foucaultian
Subject, through which I can begin to explicate how queerness and Pentecostalism
together describe the Puerto Rican socio-political Subject.
The Foucaultian Subject
Foucault's theory of the subject and his notion of subjectification have a
particularly important influence on my own ideas about the subject because while the
process of subjectificaiton requires an other the process is not entirely encompassed in
that interaction alone. The encounter that constitutes that process of becoming takes place
in space, in the social location of the subject. Here I take yet another step down from the
abstract and attempt to further ground my theory of the subject in the real material
existence of human individuals. In other words, while Hegel is concerned with the
unfolding of the Absolute and the revelation of ultimate truth I am concerned with the
material effects of discourses about truth on the living subject. Here I find Foucalut
helpful because, as briefly mentioned above, for Foucault the subject is the effect of both
the power that operates through disciplines on the body and the discourses that justify
those disciplines. In other words, the subject is socially constructed through discourses
that compel the body into postures that then have epistemological effects on the subject.
We might think of this alongside Ahmad’s spatial lines and imagine that the discourses
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that discipline the body are in part what sets the field of space along which spatial lines
are placed. Thus we can imagine that while the body is disciplined into postures vis-a-vis
discourses of truth the body is not necessarily conscripted without any effect on the
discourse, or space, itself. The self, both body and consciousness, is capable of
interacting, and indeed necessarily does interact, with space in a way where both the self
and space are affected. They are perhaps even effected, or made to come about by the
presence of each other. Secondly, Foucault’s exploration of the epimeleia heautou (the
care of oneself) opens space for us to think about the role of the body as well as map
again the ways in which the gnothi seauton (know yourself) came to dominate
philosophy and theories of the subject. Below I will think through both of these aspects of
Foucault’s theory beginning with the “care of oneself” before moving onto considering
how the shift in the discourse of knowledge and truth to the “know yourself” is an
enactment of the social construction of the self.
For Foucault the theory of the subject begins with the consideration and
examination of the relationship between the "subject" and "truth" as regards their
historical development in the West.143 In The History of Sexuality Foucault engages this
question through the specific example of how the West came to think about sex.
However, in thinking about the hermeneutics of the subject he shifts to thinking about the
relationship between the subject and truth on a broader scale, how their relationship takes
shape in such a way that it produces the specific discourse of sex that developed in the
West. To do this he begins by thinking about the differences in the relationship between,
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and interpretations of the epimeleia heautou (the care of oneself) and the gnothi seauton
(know yourself) throughout history. After all, Foucault is an archeologist of knowledge
and as such is interested in the layers of historicity that form the foundation of what we
“know” in our present historical location. Foucault's main concern is that in the
development of philosophical thought in the West the "know yourself" came to take on
more importance than the "care for oneself,” which was not always the case. This to him
seems to be at odds, or at least short sighted, with the philosophical scheme of a
hermeneutics of the subject.144 Foucault notes that the historical philosophical
formulation of subjectivity can be traced along the concern of the “care of oneself.”145
The question then becomes why in Western thought has the "know yourself" taken over
the "care for oneself" with such intensity so as to become virtually the single manner of
thinking subjectivity and the self when in fact it would seem that it was the "care of
oneself" that framed the "know yourself?"146
Before getting to this question of the shift between care and know it is important
to begin with the question of how the “care of oneself” and the “know yourself”
interacted with each other in Hellenistic and Roman philosophy vis-a-vis the subject and
truth, and what implications that interaction has for Foucault and for my own thoughts on
the subject. Foucault explains that for the Hellenistic and Roman philosophers the care of
oneself was of extreme importance, it was central. This is because the ancients
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understood that knowing oneself came only as a practice in the larger scheme of the care
of oneself, or was an effect of the practices of caring for oneself.147 Thus knowing oneself
comes after one has turned their attention to caring for oneself because the act of
attending to, or caring of, the self insists that one must begin to know themselves as part
of that act of care and attention. Thus one engages in the practices of knowing oneself
because they are a constituive part of the larger, and more important, practice of care.
Foucault notes that for Socrates the care of oneself was “the moment of first awakening”
and as such it precedes the knowing of oneself.148 This feels reminiscent of the moment
of encounter that initiates the process of subjectification. Yet I perceive something else at
work in this passage. Foucault likens this moment of first awakening to the act of waking
up at the start of a new day, or as he writes, “when one wakes up and has access to the
first light of day.” This is important because one does not wake up once and remain
awake indefinitely, one wakes up again and again with each new day. I conceive of a
subject that is always already becoming. In theorizing the subject philosophers have, in
attempting to describe its emergence, tended to do so long a linear progression with a
beginning and eventual end. However, it seems that the we only ever approach the
subject already in the process of becoming. In this sense we might think of the process of
subjectification as a repeated process, the self is encountering the other again and again,
and with each encounter the self experiences again and again the moment of awakening.
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The care of the self, then, is the way by which one ensures that awakening and ongoing
becoming which frames the ability to know oneself.
Foucault distinguishes the practices of care and knowing as spirituality and
philosophy, respectively. Spirituality concerns the practices that cause the subject to
come into question (subjectification), and is the way to access truth, while philosophy (or
knowing) is that which allows us to know that there is truth.149 Or we might say that
spirituality is the cumulation of practices that transform the subject so that the subject can
access truth. Additionally, he argues that the care of oneself was understood as an attitude
towards the self, and towards others and the world.150 Thus the practices of spirituality
take on an ethical bent that concerns itself with particular moral codes. However, these
moral codes, which had been practiced as a way to ensure the transformation of the
subject in order to access truth and save the subject, became focused on practices of nonegoism.151 The turn to non-egoism lead to practices of the denial of the self to the degree
that the meaning of care for oneself came to be devalued and even shunned. What is
more, the "care of oneself" came to be associated negatively with practices of selfrenunciation, as in Christian asceticism for example, and lost their positive foundation
which was the driving force early on.152 Thus the "care of oneself" came to be neglected.
In other words, the "care of oneself" came to be cast in a negative light that perhaps over
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emphasized a self-denial, a self-denial that came to be seen by philosophers as a
detriment to oneself rather than as care.
While the “care of oneself” and the “know yourself” were not thought of as
separate they. Came to be solidified as such in the Cartesian moment.153 It was the issue
of attempting to access truth through an experiment in extreme doubt, that led to the
reframing and requalifying of “know yourself” which in turn disqualified the “care of
oneself” as a primary way of discovering that which is “true.”154 In his exercise of
extreme doubt Descartes concludes that he cannot trust that anything exists in actuality
except for himself precisely because he is able to think and doubt in the first place. In this
Cartesian moment the ability of the rational mind to know itself simply through acts of
thought is not only named as the essential or primary way to know oneself, it becomes
the ultimate way to know truth. This was accomplished by elevating self-evidence to the
primary place of how one can know oneself, in other words how to access truth. To know
oneself becomes a form of consciousness, and thus the very existence of the subject
comes to be the source of access to being because the subject cannot doubt and thus deny
their own presence. Yet this moment begins with him sitting in mediation, an act of the
body, an act of a form discipline that made up part of the care of the self. While the
Cartesian moment wants to emphasize a disembodied access to truth the entire
experiment begins in an embodied way.
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The Cartesian moment did not only elevate the "know yourself" but it
simultaneously excluded the "care of oneself" from modern philosophical thought. This is
a paramount and crucial moment in the philosophical history of the self because at this
moment the body, that is the senses of the body and its interaction with the material
world, fade into the background and seemingly offer no validity to the knowing of
oneself. The body is removed from playing any part in accessing what it true.155 The self
is thus that which can think and doubt its own existence and, dare we say, nothing
more.156 Descartes thus centered the thinking subject, or consciousness, as the starting
point in the search for truth.
A symptom of this exclusion of the body is that knowledge becomes the sole
access point to truth and dismisses other practices like the care of oneself. The Cartesian
subject can access truth simply through knowing, or philosophy, and through no effect on
the subject’s being, which is the work of spirituality.157 However, the Cartesian subject is
not transformed because the practices that allow the subject to access truth, and thus go
through a process of subjectification, have been disregarded in favor of thought exercises
that supposedly open the door to truth. In turn this shifts the relationship between
subjectivity and truth. Consequently, because the subject and the transformation of the
subject are not participants in the knowing of truth, the search for truth becomes a
perpetual proliferation of knowledge for the sake of knowledge, or as Foucault eloquently
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writes the "indefinite dimension of progress, the end of which is unknown and the
advantage of which will only ever be the . . . accumulation of bodies of knowledge."158
The quest for truth, of enlightenment and fulfillment, which ought to involve the
processes by which the subject is transfigured, no longer exists and thus truth offers no
salvation or completion for the subject because the subject (or subjectivity) has been
excluded from truth. The subject does not become. As the care of self is forgotten so too
is the material body. This is important because as I began to argue in my discussion of
Hegel, the body is central to the emergence of the subject (subjectivity). However, the
effect of the Cartesian moment is that the subject’s body is not required for truth to be
known.
In order to nuance all of this further and continue to make connections with my
own theories I rely on Judith Butler who also argues that the fully self-contained
Cartesian interiority is an impossibility. Butler asks: Can the subject offer a narration of
the process by which its subjectivity emerged being that it could not have been there in
any prior state to its own emergence?159 In other words, how do we theorize our own
emergence? This is the original question that both Descartes and Hegel thought they had
successfully answered, that whether through thinking or self-reflection the self can know
itself from its own interiority. However, as Butler indicates, in order to be able to selfreflect the subject must have necessarily already experienced a process of individuation
that allows for self-reflection. As Butler puts it: “. . . I am already affected before I can
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say "I" and that I have to be affected to say "I" at all."160 Ultimately Butler urges us to
think of the emergence of the subject, the process by which the subject is acted upon and
then acts with agency to assert itself, as a simultaneous rather than linear in progression.
Here Butler channels Foucault and his notion that the subject is the effect of power
through the discourses, for example of identity, that precede the subject. These norms are
acting on the parts of the subject that they are also forming, and there is no end to this
affective creation other than death itself.161 In other words, the subject can only emerge in
a social world in which discourses of identity have already been predetermined and
written onto the subject’s body even before the subject can articulate an awareness of
itself. Thus the social world of the subject plays just as significant a role in the process of
subjectification as does the interiority of the mind.
In addition to the discourses that affect the subject is the presence of the other. As
discussed above the subject is affected by the other thus raising an ethical question
regarding the susceptibility of one subject to another in the moment of encounter.162 That
is, there is a transitive quality to encounter that blurs the ability to know who affected
whom first.163 Thus the subject always already emerges within the boundaries and limits
of an ethical dilemma, a relationality of encounter that must from its inception consider
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the other and the manner in which the self and the other affect each other.164 The effects
of the other transcend discursive norms that seek to conscript the subject into particular
identity categories. The effect of the other is one rooted in material bodily experiences. I
align myself with Butler when she writes that she is "less concerned with understanding
the activities of the thinking "I" than with the sensuous conditions of being."165 The self is
not mere free-floating consciousness, it is necessarily bound up with the material and its
effects. The self is a consciousness, but it is a consciousness that is mediated in and
through the experiences of the body in relation to other conscious selves who are also
bound up in material bodies, all of whom are affected by the discourses of power to
which they must respond in the process of subjectification. Thus following Foucault and
Butler I am concerned with the construction, engagement, and ethical relation of selves in
their social worlds and the conditions of those social worlds that constitute and predicate
the processes of subjectification.
The question that arises from this line of thinking is that of agency, which I feel
the need to address before moving on to the queer subject. In the master/slave narrative it
seemed that only the master had agency while the slave was limited by the production of
labor. In order to emancipate the slave in that narrative, so to speak, it is necessary to
understand that the agency of the subject concerns both the participation of the subject in
its own emergence as well as conditions in the social world of the subject which limit the
expression of its own agency. Thus such a theory of the subject is necessarily relational,
social, even communal and it takes seriously the effects of the social world in which the
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subject exists. One way to approach the question of the relation of the self to the world is
through the distinction between an individual and the social world, or community, in
which that individual thrives. Dwight Hopkins argues for a distinction between the
agency of the individual and the effects of the community upon the self-actualization of
the individual, even while they remain connected as evidenced by the phrase "I am
because we are." For some, even Hopkins, the notion of the “I am because we are”
induces anxiety about the agency of the self and the balance between the selfconstruction of the subject and the effects of its external world. Hopkins tends to lend
more weight to the self. However, I will argue that the agency of the self is more
complicated, nuanced, and less active than Hopkins would like to imagine. In this sense
my own position considers seriously the tension between the desire for a self-actualized
subject and the subject who is only ever the effects of both the other and the social world.
In contrast to Hopkins, my theory of the subject places a greater value on the constructing
nature of the world in the development of what is considered a self, though I do not
remove the sense of agency completely from the subject. This is the point of beginning
and departure from which I argue that the subject exists within frameworks that already
predetermine the agency of choice thus enacting a limit on the subject. Engaging
Hopkins's claims about the development of the self and the responsibility of community
in that process I will examine the potential for self-creation of the self by exploring both
his use of the gendered body and his positing the woman as the other.
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Hopkins argues that just as God is a creative force out of which the self originates,
so too is community the result of individual selves as creative agents.166 As mentioned
above, my own theory replaces God with the other, or in this case the creative force out
of which the self emerges with the social world in which the self exists. In Being Human
Hopkins makes an argument for a theological anthropology that defines what it means to
be an individual self that exists in and is constituted by community. An essential
distinction that must be made in a robust constructive theological anthropology is
between the relationship of the self to other selves and the way in which that relation
mirrors or offers clues to the interaction of the human and the divine.167 For a theological
anthropology to be effective and liberating it necessarily requires that the ideologies that
define the human/divine relationship be reflected, and productive, with respect to the
relationship between self and selves, or the community. It is this dialectic between the
self and community that is of interest: the self produces but is also constituted and shaped
by the community.168 Thus what it means to be human, to be a self, a subject, is a mix of
agential creativity and social influence.
While I largely agree with Hopkins's theory of self and community, the
dependence on the binary of male/female in his example of how gender can critique the
patriarchal social tendency of self-determination weakens his anthropology. Such a
reliance on a dualistic theory of gender hinders the very aim of what Hopkins seems to be
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after in his anthropology of the self. Hopkins rightfully identifies the limits and violence
of structures of patriarchy that monopolizes power and establishes hierarchies that limit
the potential of community by restricting the agency of certain selves; i.e. women.169 He
also rightfully asserts that the gender question exceeds women and that such a question
challenges the "equilibrium between all selves and self."170 Here Hopkins offers a built in
self-critique, so to speak, in that his critique of patriarchy engenders a space for
rethinking the binary relationship between self and selves, a binary that his theory
presupposes. However, the material reality of humanity is that there is no such strict
divide between male and female, if by male and female he means the division of
humanity based on genitalia. Thus if we take Butler's concern for the sensuous
experience of being seriously then the very foundation of Hopkins' anthropology, insofar
as it relies on particular bodies and strict definitions of those bodies, is already
problematic. It is an anthropology that depends on a conception of humanity that is itself
a construction of the human imagination. It is as if the premodern mythic cosmic order of
nature has resurfaced in Hopkins. Additionally, one must question the ways in which the
focus on the gender binary will implicate social and family structure and make up and the
ways that those structures reflect capitalist ideologies of production, thus alienating the
community as well as the self.
In response to Hopkins I argue that a robust explication of the equilibrium of
self/selves would benefit from a queer critique which, at its core, is a deconstruction and
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destabilization of stable sex and gender categories.171 In my review of Butler in the
introductory chapter I highlight her argument about the contingency of gender, of how
though socially constructed, the discourse of gender operates in such a way that it
conscripts bodies into particular stylized performances that serve to signal man or woman
and thus preserve the mythology of a natural order of the world. Queer critique theorizes
through the reality of the multiplicity of gender expressions, through the myriad of
biological genital enfleshments, each of which come to bear on the subject associated
with that particular body. Therefore I suggest a queer communal political and social
economy that, in actuality, does move beyond and exceeds the overly singular question of
the marginalization of women, an anthropology that encompasses the broadest possible
spectrum of humanity. We might imagine a communal economy that considers its
dependence on the body of the transgender sex worker, not as a critique of sex work
itself, but rather as a way to condemn a monopolizing economy that both exploits
particular kinds of bodies for its own proliferation and enacts violence on certain selves
by demanding adherence to binaries in order to ensure the dominance of dominant
regimes. An anthropology that begins here would be efficacious and ethically prescriptive
in that it would necessarily reprimand oppressive capitalist economies that depend on
compulsory and productive heterosexuality. The question of agency concerns the degree
to which the individual self has creative potential over the production of both the self and
selves. When a community is dependent on particular mythologies like that of a gender
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binary the self can only have a predetermined set of options if that self is to be selfactualized in a manner that the community recognizes as legitimate.
In Hopkins's system agency is comprised of two aspects, spontaneity and
intentionality. The unpredictable or spontaneous is that ability of the self to, with
intention, transgress the limits or boundaries of social mythologies on which the social
order depends through a process of reflection.172 Yet with regard to agency and an active
subject we must consider to what extent a subject is capable of exhibiting spontaneity
within the confines of its habitus, particularly when the subject’s body has been
disciplined to produce particular effects that are beneficial to the preservation of the
community. Pierre Bourdieu argues that the individual is subject to forces of their social
world that are so ubiquitous that they go unrecognized, they permeate so fully that their
effects go unfelt. Thus what appear to be individual acts and choices are in fact a
response to the conditions of the social world in which one lives. Certainly the self can
act, but the action is limited by the conditions under which that self develops.173
Therefore the question arises of whether there can be unique and unpredictable action
that emerge from within a subject if there can only be response to the world itself.
Hopkins argues that it is indeed possible for the self to “affect the processes that affect
the kind of selves we become,” and I would agree with Hopkins.174 The self is capable of
effecting the continual emergence and production of their own subjectivity because the
process of subjectification does not foreclose on itself and deny the self access to its
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process. Rather we might think of the process of subjectification as a series of openings
wherein the dialectic process is one of unending becoming. The manner in which selves
exist in their social world does not follow strictly the prescriptions of social orders.
Rather it is the other that inhabits a space that is capable of a mediation that interrupts the
movement of the social subjectivity.175 This interruption is the enactment of becoming,
and thus the self becomes thorough encounters with the multiplicity of others who enter
and exit the social world of the self.
My aim is to tease out a balance between an overly active agency of the subject
and the self as an automaton merely affected from without. It is a question of the degree
to which we ascribe agency to the self in any anthropology that begins with a reliance on
the existing organizing mythology (should I be using discourse rather than mythology?)
of that subject’s social world. The self exists in a dialectic relationship with the social
world so that while the self is in one sense determined by its world it also affects the
world that produces the conditions for the recognition of the self.176 The self has an
agential quality, but that agency is bound up and subject to the limits of its social world
which determines the conditions for the development of the self.
The Queer Subject
I begin theorizing the queer subject by noting that the queer subject emerges and
is produced from within and in spite of prevailing discourses proper human socialization
that intend to homogenize and control the subject. The queer subject recognizes itself as
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queer precisely because it fails to fit dominant and hegemonic scripts, for example those
of gender and sexuality. By way of concluding this chapter I will explore some of the key
ideas considered foundational to queer theory along with some nuances by queer people
of color in order to round out my theory of the subject and engage in the critical work I
outlined earlier in the chapter. While here I focus on gender and sexuality as a way to
think about the queer subject I ought to make clear that the notion of the queer subject in
my theorizing is not exclusively tied to those two categories. In the next chapter I
describe more fully a queer subject who is queer along religio-political lines.
I begin with the idea that the queer subject is distinctly political both in its
emergence and existence. The distinctly political nature of the queer subject is evident in
that the queer subject is always engaged in the disruption of the normative and
hegemonic discourses of sex and gender. That is, the queer subject reveals the un-static
and nonessential nature of sex and gender, its queerness throws into question the
presumed stability of sex and gender. As such the queer subject both emerges and exists
in the cracks, in the space in between male and female. This is not a claim that all queer
subjects are or perform a nonbinary presentation. Rather, to use the metaphor of cracks is
to argue that the queer subject destabilizes the discourse of essential, fixed, and binary
gender and sexuality, of male and female, of opposite sex attraction and same sex
attraction. This queer disruption of gender and sexuality is essential to theories of the
subject because it reveals the operation of power or force of normative discourses (or
metanarratives) which aim to conscript bodies into particular epistemological postures
that sustain the ideology that human being is discernible through observable and
recognizable sex characteristics. Additionally, a theory of the subject rooted in queer
100

theory, and specifically queer-of-color critique, will reflect a correction to the three
problematic areas in Hegel discussed above. The queer subject emerges in an ethical
imperative towards the other, is concerned with and privileges the body, and resists the
normative labor practices of self imposed onto it by dominant and hegemonic discourses
of imperial colonialism.
Foucault exposes the myth of both an essential, singular, and self-contained
subject and of its essential and natural sexuality through a genealogical investigation that
uncovers the ways that sexuality emerged and became rooted in the discourse of what it
means to be an individual self. Foucault is interested in how the self became imbued with
essential and categorizable qualities that permit one to exist in the larger society in certain
and legitimate ways, or how, in the words of David Halperin, sexuality became central to
the hermeneutics of the self.177 Foucault argues that sexuality is not essential to
humanness and that the taxonomy of nineteenth century sexuality that pervades western
society arose from a particular discourse which sought to medicalize and categorize
sexual experiences in order to produce a true discourse of sex in an effort to preserve
social order and control.178 The emergence of this discourse is itself rooted in a previous
discursive shift which was concerned with truth, sin, and confession in thirteenth century,
Christian Europe.179 Confession's operative function was to compel discursive practices
about the very thing that it also demanded remain unspoken; sin. Rather than remain
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unspoken the unspeakable was forced into the public discourse precisely by the demand
of secrecy. The so called attempt to repress discourses of sex actually caused its
proliferation.180 For sex to be controlled and, thus, a particular kind of society to be
produced, there were required systems that provided the state mechanisms by which it
could maintain its power over sex, which necessarily had to exist in the public discourse
and not hidden away and out of sight.181 Thus with the power of the state, namely the
power to discipline, social norms and particular discourses of identity and what it means
to be a functioning subject could be enforced and codified and thereby defining the
communities out of which the subject emerges.
Foucault argues that such an analysis of discourses and their effects must be done
through an analysis of power. Yet, rather than understand power as a force exerted by one
source, say the church's demand for confession, it should be understood as existing
ubiquitously. Power is everywhere, writes Foucault, and it must firstly be understood as a
"multiplicity of force relations."182 That is, there is always a relational dimension to
power that disallows it from being hoarded in one location, creating a situation wherein
some are left with no power. Resistance is always relational to power and not simply
opposed to it.183 It is in this way that the proliferation of discourses, like those about sex,
can be understood as well as their effects on the production of certain iterations of

180

Foucault, History of Sexuality, 11-12.

181

Foucault, History of Sexuality, 25.

182

Foucault, History of Sexuality, 92-93.

183

Nikki Sullivan, A Critical Introduction to Queer Theory (Washington Square, NY: New York
University Press, 2003), 42.

102

culture. The very deployment and persistence of such discourses depends on and is
initiated by the nuanced and delicate interplay of power, and of the bodies (even state
bodies) that vie for the upper hand and control of societies and other bodies. As such
discourse is both a mechanism by which hegemonic power proliferates but also the
process by which it is undermined.184 Invoking again the metaphor of master/slave we
might say that, unlike Fanon, Hegel failed to perceive that at any moment the slave could
raise their fist against the master and seize control of their own agency and subjectivity.
This idea of the subversive arising within a system of domination to enact
political resistance is not always expressed in violent overthrow, however. José Muñoz’s
Disidentifications explores the non-violent ways that queer subjects emerge and come to
know, or name, themselves as subjects in their own right and not merely over against
dominant, normative discourses. Muñoz accomplishes this task by nuancing the discourse
around identity beyond the normative model that relies on a binary model of essentialism
versus constructivism.185 That is, he desires to shift the conversation around identity
formation away from an either/or binary of fixed traits that the subject is imbued with on
the one hand, and on the other with traits that are socially conditioned and written onto
the subject through contextual experiences of the world around them. In other words, he
wants to trouble the political relationship between an individual and their society and
culture, or between the subject and the discourse that aims to control the subject. Muñoz
argues that both essentialism and constructivism are subject to the scripts of Western
psychoanalysis and as such are both always already socially constructed and contextually
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determined. Therefore, even what are termed essential dispositions are themselves
determined by hegemonic discursive ideologies and motivations rooted in a patriarchal
Western model. The essential is already a socially constructed paradigm. This then
presents a problematic for bodies that do not fit into the script of Western being and its
cast of legitimate identities. The identities of these bodies and the subjects they constitute
fit neither the essentialism nor constructivism arguments. The discourse, or language,
fails in its attempt to trace meaning onto the body of the queer subject precisely because
both the discourse and the queer body resist and elude each other.186 More precisely,
these bodies do not fit into these articulations of identity formation and the Western
model because the script was not written for them.187 However, the body/subject of the
white, male, heterosexual, fits the script so well not because he is fulfilling some
universal or a priori way of being. He fits the script because the script was written for him
and by him.
The queer subject acts as an undermining agent in the discourse of sex, not
because it represents an ultimate truth of sex that contradicts the normative discourse, but
because in participating in that discourse unsuccessfully it reveals the instability and
performative nature of gender and sexuality. Judith Butler argues that gender is a
discursive construction that imposes itself upon our bodies.188 The discursive and

186

Lawrence La Fountain-Stokes, Queer Ricans: Cultures and Sexualities in the Diaspora
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 156.
187

Muñoz, Disidentifications, 7.

188
Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York:
Routledge, 1990), 186.

104

constructed aspect of gender is not simply a claim about the shifting definitions of
masculine and feminine over time and across cultural contexts. Rather, Butler argues that
gender, and therefore sex and sexuality, has no essence. "Gender is a complexity whose
totality is permanently deferred, never fully what it is at any given juncture in time."189
Gender is always in a state of flux, always becoming, and never nailed down at any point
because it is perpetually produced and reproduced through the experiences of the material
body in language, in discourse. The production of gender is the result of the effects of
gender being written onto the surface of bodies. Thus the central thrust of her argument is
that gender exists only in the expression of itself in and through bodily gestures.190
It is here that Butler's deploys the notion of performativity, though in this usage
performance is not akin to the actor who takes on a role and becomes something that they
really are not, there is no essence to the subject before the performance, there is no
ontology outside of gestures.191 The subject for Butler and, the sexual subject (if such a
distinction can be made) in particular, is simultaneously produced in and through the
"acts, gestures, [and] enactments" in which the body is engaged.192 I would add to and
nuance this claim with Anzladúa’s claim that writing itself is a bodily gesture, or as
Anzaldúa explains, writing is not about being in your head but about being in your
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body.193 For Anzaldúa all of the self and knowledge originates in the body and the
experiences of the body. This very dissertation is an expression of that reality. I mention
in the introduction that this dissertation is autobiographical, it is produced through my
experience as queer, brown-skinned, Puerto Rican who grew up in the Pentecostal
tradition. In other words, I write from what my body has known. In this way if we
consider “writing” as an act of the body then even the tracing of gender onto the material
body is an act, or gesture, of that material body itself. Gender may be fabrication that
perpetuates through repeated actions and stylizations of bodies while simultaneously
conscripting those bodies into gendered categories.194 However, gender as identity is also
something embraced by the body, it is contingent on queer bodily gestures that interpret
the discourse of sex and gender through the real material experiences of the body.195
While one may argue that “gender” is a discursive construction intended to appear
interior to the subject one must also recognize that the performances of gender are
nonetheless grounded in the gestures of the material body. Indeed even the very notion of
interiority is exposed as socially constructed through public discourses which order
societies along axes of power. Butler concludes that gender thought of in these
performative ways demonstrates that gender is neither true or false, that is, there is no
originary or preexisting gender that we can point to.196 It is all stylized acts that
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perpetuate themselves through the repeated behaviors of bodies and social performances.
Further, it is these repeated social performances that imbue gender with a sense of
naturalness and givenness, which is more than a mere consequence, it is the very way in
which gender succeeds in it hegemonic dominance. Thus, the signification that plays
upon bodies to produce gender is constituted by a repetition that operates to hide its own
falsity and yet reinforce its power over bodies with substantiating effects.197
How then does the queer subject enact resistance that does not stand in simple
opposition to the hegemonic discourse of sex but instead participates in it and thus
destabilizes it through its own failure? Jose Muñoz answers this question with his
articulation of disidentification which is in essence a coping strategy that emerges from
the inability of certain bodies to fit into the prescribed gender performance demanded by
normative discourse. Disidentification is described as the "survival strategies the minority
subject practices in order to negotiate a phobic majoritarian public sphere that
continuously elides or punishes the existence of subjects who do not conform to the
phantasm of normative citizenship."198 Disidentificaiton is not about merely assimilating
to the dominant demands of identity or conversely resisting and counteridentifying.199 It
is, rather, about reframing categories, eliciting permanent structural changes, and
"negotiating the flux of discourse and power" rather than some essentializing choice
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between two polar opposites.200 The queer subject emerges in the in between places, in
the fissures that show up between those opposite and binary locations and by taking an
inventory of the experiences of its material body and thus creating a path of survival and
resilience.201
As I discuss in the introduction Judith Butler expands on the connection between
the materiality of the body, the performativity of gender, and the role of "sex" in that
relationship.202 Thinking with Butler a primary question that concerns my project is the
recognition of material bodies, which have been overlayed with various scripts of sex,
without reducing bodies to nothing more than the effect of the discourse of sex and
gender. I noted that for Butler such a recognition is accomplished through a "process of
materialization."203 The process of materialization describes how it is that what we call
matter comes to be recognized as matter, even as a given; materiality emerges from the
operations of power.204 Butler argues that we can acknowledge that there are material
bodies that truly exist despite the various constructions of the subject, but those bodies
are only ever perceived and engaged through a discursive lens that has determined what
those bodies are. Thus to move beyond the claim that sex and gender are discursively
constituted the question ought to be concerned with the "regulatory norms" by which
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matter comes to be sexed and gendered.205 In other words, for Butler we must take into
account the cultural productions out of which such materializations emerge. We cannot
speak of the materiality of bodies without also talking about the history of the ways in
which matter, and specifically the body, has been discursively subjugated to various
hierarchies of power.206 Yet we might state more explicitly the role of the material body
in this process so that, as Anzaldúa writes, our theorizing of the queer subject is not
confined to ephemeral abstractions but on the real experiences of bodies.207 Let us recall
Butler’s example of drag discussed previously. To use drag as metaphor is not to suggest
that it is a mirror to the way in which gender operates.208 Rather, the metaphoric use of
drag is effective because it highlights the hyperbolic nature of gender and reveals its
falsity as a thing of nature. Butler is attempting to articulate the way in which the
subversive can arise from within the very cultural system that eschews it to enact political
resistance.209 However, what Butler does not do is make an account of the experience of
the body being done up in drag. In other words, while drag can operate as a discursive
representation of the performative and unstable reality of gender categories, what about
the material experience of applying makeup, of dressing in clothing assigned to the
“opposite” gender, and of exposing oneself to the world? Or to go further, what of the
uncountable trans women who began their journey discovering their own gender variance
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through the art of drag? In those instances it would seem that the art of drag did not
simply act as a performance of queer subjectivity and the destabilization of the discourse
of sex and gender, it had lasting material effects on the bodies of those queer subjects.
A final note on the performative gestures by the queer subject concerns the notion
of the closet. In Epistemology of the Closet Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick lays out a theory of
the closet as not only a ubiquitous trope of gay life in the twentieth century, but one that
positions the "closet" as an ideology that undergirds and shapes the structuring of
twentieth-century society and culture as a whole. The thrust of her argument is that the
closet, as a place where one is presumably hidden and can choose to subsequently reveal
oneself by stepping out of it, discloses not only the relationship between the hetero/homo
binary but also the plethora of binaries that are the very threads that hold together the
modern social order. In other words, the closet is not a mere metaphor that exposes the
operative order of western society, it is the operative description of how Western society
is ordered.210 Sedgwick writes,
…attention and demarcation that has swirled around issues of homosexuality
since the end of the nineteenth century, in Europe and the United States, has been
impelled by the distinctively indicative relation of homosexuality to wider
mappings of secrecy and disclosure.211
The closet is more than the "defining structure of gay oppression," it is the cite at which
the larger ideologies of order in modern society are rooted and constructed.212 Whether
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public/private, majority/minority, natural/artificial, etc., each binary in twentieth-century
western culture is infused with notions of revelation and disclosure, or risk and legality,
of knowing and unknowing, of who knows what and when and how. In short, they are
concerned with whether or not citizens fit properly into the hegemonic social order or
whether they disrupt it. The production, or emergence, of the queer subject through the
enforcement of secrecy which intends to conscript queer subjects into normative ways of
being instead outlines the distinctions in experience that describe the queer subject.
The queer subject however does not simply exit the closet and close the door
behind. Sometimes the queer subject reenters the closet depending on the necessity of
survival and preservation. Other times the queer subject neither exits the closet nor
remains inside it but rather resides on the threshold between inside and outside. I explore
this state of in between in the next chapter in my discussion of vaiven, jotería/patería,
and the Puerto Rican queer political subject. However, in conclusion I will reiterate that
the queer subject is by definition political in that the emergence and performance of the
queer subject reveals the instability of the subject qua subject and as such represents an
ethical critique of the discourse of sex and gender. Furthermore, the queer subject reveals
that subjectivity, or identity as it were, is relational in nature. The subject’s sense of self
is never interior, it is always the effects of a relational and material experience of the
subject and its body to other subjects and bodies and to the particular and localized social
world of the subject.213 The queer subject is also rooted in its body because sexual
orientation is a phenomenon tied to the way that the body moves through the spaces and
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discourses of sex.214 Finally, through disidentificatory practices the queer subject resists
the labor of societal order imposed on it by dominant systems. The queer subject resists
the notion that its meaning and sense of self is found in producing the performances of
legitimate citizenship demanded by the state and instead takes hold of its own being-foritself in ways that disrupt hegemonic power and charts other or queer ways of being.
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CHAPTER FOUR: PUERTO RICAN RELIGIO-POLITICAL SUBJECTIVITY
AND RELIGIOUS PRACTICE AS RESPONSE
In both the 2010 and the 2020 United States decennial census the question of race
and ethnicity were front and center. Two questions on race and ethnicity on the census
forms were particularly interesting because only one group of people were singled out
with their own question; Latines. The first question asked whether one is of Hispanic,
Latino [sic], or Spanish origin and three specific Latine nationalities were each given
their own option: Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban. It did not escape my notice that
these three specifically named options are three nationalities whose diaspora within the
U.S. carry contested, ambiguous, and/or nonexistent citizenship in the U.S. political
imagination. Important to note is that this question about ethnic Latine identity was
separate from the next question which asked about race. This begs the question of what
category of race Latines fit into. Common in Latine communities, but especially in those
from the Caribbean, is a mix of skin color. There are people who appear white, black,
indigenous, and mixed in the Latine community and so the question of race is always a
complicated one.
The question of race is particularly complicated for Puerto Ricans because the
narrative of race on the island has been a central part of the imperial work of the U.S.,
and the Spanish previously, in constructing a carefully calculated racial identity of Puerto
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Rico and its citizens. The weight of categorization is heavy for many Puerto Ricans and
the distinct naming of Puerto Ricans in the census is a reflection of the precarious
citizenship of Puerto Ricans in the U.S. Why this concern with Latines, and specifically
Puerto Ricans? Other ethnic groups were not faced with these tricky and multi-layered
questions, though they face problematic categorizations in many ways, both shared with
and distinct from Latines. The answer, I believe, is that the census form demonstrated the
lasting legacy of U.S. colonialism and the role that Puerto Ricans play in the social and
political imagination of the U.S.
I argue that colonialism in Puerto Rico continues under U.S. control and that such
colonial presence creates an experience of ambiguity and shame for Puerto Ricans with
regard to identity vis-à-vis race, sexuality, and citizenship/nationality. Colonialism’s
legacy exists through a project of domination by which the U.S. has established itself as
the ultimate governing authority over Puerto Rico and only allows the island a semblance
of self-governance and self-determination, which creates a sense of national ambiguity
and is thus the perennial source of cultural/national shame.215 One particular historical
moment that punctuates the development of this shame is the 1948 Gag Law which
remained in place for nine years and outlawed owning or displaying the Puerto Rican
flag, even in one’s own home.216 By way of engaging this neo-colonial project of
complete control the U.S. as a hegemonic power center set the stage for the ongoing
categorization and classification of the social and political subjectivity of Puerto Ricans
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creating a segmented people that is never fully integrated into U.S. citizenry nor accepted
as autonomous. By doing so state borders are reified in a way that seemingly draws a
distinction between nation states while at the same time allowing a free flow of migration
between the island and the U.S. mainland. This form of border preservation is a process
of segmentation which creates for Puerto Ricans an existence as quasi-citizens; Puerto
Ricans hold U.S. passports but those living on the island are unable to vote for president
and have no voting representation in the U.S. Congress. Thus Puerto Ricans do not enjoy
the privileges of full citizenship.
Additionally, as noted in chapter 2, the religious intervention on the island after
the U.S. takeover through the missionizing efforts of mainline Protestant denominations
continued the familiar work of colonization through Christian baptism. Those efforts
were aimed at shifting the religious landscape of the island away from Catholicism and
the island’s connection to Spain and towards an American sensibility with respect to
religious practice. In similar ways to how the U.S. sought to whiten the population of
Puerto Rico so as to be more palatable to the U.S. social imaginary the work of
missionaries had the effect of remaking the religious culture of Puerto Rico into a more
Protestant and American one, even if not explicitly stated as the aim. What makes this
significant is that, even though currently Pentecostalism enjoys a level of popularity and
even somewhat of a “mainline denomination” sense of self, when it arrived in Puerto
Rico it was still a fringe religious movement in the U.S. Therefore this discussion will
also explore pentecostal religious practices in connection to the political subjectivity of
Puerto Ricans.
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In this chapter, then, I will explore the religio-political subjectivity of Puerto
Ricans through an exploration and analysis of the social, religious, and political identity
of Puerto Ricans both on the island and in diaspora in the continental U.S. With a focus
on pentecostal practices and spirituality I will also explore how religious practice affects
subjectivity in relation to the social and political reality of life as a Puerto Rican in the
shadow of U.S. colonialism. I use the phrase religio-political subjectivity to describe the
ways in which religious and political subjectivities interact with and nuance each other in
the daily lives of the individual. While political in this sense refers to the Foucaultian
idea of the interworking discourses and regimes of truth and power that operate to
organize and enforce control over society, which can include the religious, using the
phrase religio-political elevates religion as a particular institution that enforces a regime
of truth alongside the political. In this way I am attempting to describe the function of the
religious as similar to the political as in, for example, when one claims that everything is
political. I am cautious of claiming that everything is religious, but I will suggest that
everything is affected by the religious, at least as far as the West and the project of
colonialism is concerned. By joining the religious and political in this discussion of
subjectivity I highlight the ways in which the practice of religion connects to the practice
of the political.
This chapter explores this anxiety around ambiguous and precarious political
identity and the implications of that anxiety in order to articulate the subjectivity of
Puerto Ricans both on the island and in diaspora within a U.S. context. The colonial
project of conquest and subjugation of peoples and the eventual diluting and re-imagining
of their indigenous cultures serve as models for the way that colonialism is experienced
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more subtly in contemporary contexts. I begin by exploring the effects of colonialism on
the colonized subject before focusing on the specificity of Puerto Rican experience.
Finally, I will examine religious practice as response, and particularly how
pentecostalism and pentecostal practice can be a metaphor for what resistance and selfdetermination might look like in a colonial context like that of Puerto Rico.
Legacies of Colonialism
The racial dilemma described in chapter two has deep effects on Puerto Rican
subjectivity because the erasure of blackness and its political ties to the U.S. also mean
that in some ways Puerto Rico is imagined as distinct from other Caribbean nations.
More importantly, the racial dilemma adds to the sense of ambiguity and even shame.
The ambiguity of race is expressed in how eclectic Puerto Rican skin tones and
phenotype reflect our mixedness. The reality of that diversity and the disparate
experiences that darker skinned and Afro-Puerto Ricans live with compared to lighter
skinned and white Puerto Ricans, it betrays the myth of racial democracy. Furthermore,
for Puerto Ricans in diaspora the diversity of racial expression has impacts on access, and
to which non-Puerto Rican communities we attach ourselves; i.e. white or black. Those
living in urban centers tend to live in proximity to black Americans and because Puerto
Ricans are so mixed and carry significant African ancestry it is not uncommon for darker
skinned Puerto Ricans to be viewed as African Americans. Conversely very white Puerto
Ricans can easily pass as white as in the case of Holly Woodlawn, a brief starlet in the
Factory art world of Andy Warhol, who proudly passed as a white woman.217 What is
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more is that such a diversity of skin tone and phenotype can and often does exist in the
same biological family. Thus while there is without a doubt an anti-black sentiment in
Puerto Rican culture, which underlies the reason a large percentage of Puerto Ricans
identify as white, there is also exists a very real ambiguity about who Puerto Ricans are
racially. The question of race highlights the ambiguity that punctuates Puerto Rican
subjectivity.
In addition to race, gender and sexuality also play a significant role in the
subjectivity of Puerto Ricans. This refers both to the actual presence of queer persons in
Puerto Rican communities as well as the symbolic and metaphorical sexuality of Puerto
Rico as colony of the U.S. Queer Puerto Ricans highlight the shame of feminization, a
reminder of passive subjects dominated by the colonial oppressor.218 A key expression of
this shame is the the legal relegation queer Puerto Ricans to the margins of society acts as
a communal self-reminder that feminized subjects are not the image of who Puerto
Ricans are supposed to be in a masculinist and patriarchal system of hyper-masculine
nation states. Queer Puerto Ricans reflect the complex and multi-layered question of
identity of Puerto Ricans more broadly in that our socio-political identities are
complicated by our sexual identities and how those identities play off of our ambiguous
legal status, and how they inform each other. Within the frame of patriarchal ideologies,
the feminization of Puerto Ricans as a people by the colonial white gaze reaffirms the
absence of self-determination for Puerto Rico as a nation and for Puerto Ricans as
political subjects.219 Queer men in Puerto Rico are often called locas, crazy women

218

Negrón-Muntaner, Boricua Pop, 75.

219

Gonzalez, “Boricua Gazing,” 89.

118

whose wild ways interrupt the civility of the heterosexual order. As such these queer men
represent a resistance to a politics of western colonialism and domination and thereby
reifying the shame of some (elite) Puerto Ricans of Puerto Rico’s failure at being the
right kind of colony that merits emancipation from its colonizer.220 Faced with the
discomfort of that disruption, the patriarchal structures of power would rather ignore
queers than consider the full impact of our participation in society, and queers in turn find
that migrating to the U.S. mainland, or brincando el charco (jumping over the puddle, i.e.
the Atlantic Ocean) seemingly affords greater opportunity for self-determination.
Consider also the example of the legal particularities of how queer relationships
existed outside the social discourse on the island of Puerto Rico for many years. For
example, though gay acts, or “acts against nature” which was the language used in the
law, were prohibited by law beginning gin 1902 under Article 103, there was a continual
refusal both by law makers and the judges who interpret those laws to lay out explicitly
what those outlawed gay acts were.221 Such laws and interpretations of those laws are
indicative of a discomfort with any sexual acts deemed “against nature” to the point that
the specifics of the acts are left without explicit definition. Queers remained in an
ambiguous place of not being “legal” and yet unsure of what it is, exactly, that made us
“illegal.” In recent years the sodomy laws of Puerto Rico and the issue of equal rights for
queer persons has fallen in step with those of the U.S. mainland and as such queer Puerto
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Ricans on the island are afforded more of an equal status under the law. Still, the status of
queer Puerto Ricans as colonial subjects and as sexual deviants remain ambiguous
reflections of each other. To quote Frances Negrón-Muntaner regarding her choice to use
queer to describe Puerto Rican ethnonationalism: “It disrupts macho nationalism.” She
continues,
…the way that Puerto Ricans have been imagined as national subjects and have
negotiated with this location has had the result of generating a ‘queer’ sense of
nationhood that has largely rejected dominant (virile) definitions of nationhood as
the product of an epic past supported by infinite wealth and military might.222
Puerto Rico’s national subjectivity is thus perceived as feminine in contrast to the
masculine subjectivity of the U.S. and as such it is burdened with patriarchal notions of
strength, ability to self-govern, and a capitalist impulse to produce as a sign of its virility
and status as a nation state in its own right. In this way queer Puerto Ricans reflect the
position of Puerto Rico as a queer state and as such to theorize them together is to
acknowledge that the state and its citizens often are reflections of one another.
In theorizing a religio-political subjectivity it is important to attend to the
quotidian, or from the ground up, from where those who exist on the margins. There are
several key themes that are not only important in the larger discourse but also to my own
work because they create a theoretical foundation that enact a shift away from western
hegemonic frameworks. Three such themes are theorized by the Chicana philosopher
Gloria Anzaldúa—borderlands, nepantla, and mestizaje. In the violent and changing
colonial social world, the colonized other found themselves (and continue to find
themselves) in a struggle to survive that involved navigating not only the demands to
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conform to the dominant definitions of what counts as a legitimate citizen of the state, but
also to make sense of the racial and sexual/gender identities imposed by Europeans and
the legal status assigned to those identities. But this is not only historical reality. As I will
argue below the legacies of these colonial practices are still present and those who live in
current day colonies, like Puerto Ricans, continue to live with the effects of those
practices. Coming to terms with such realities can leave one feeling as though they are, in
the words of Gloria Anzaldúa, “floundering in uncharted seas.”223 The colonizing project
leaves the colonized feeling unraveled, unsure of who they are, unfamiliar with the
locations in which they reside, in a borderlands caught between worlds. To quote
Anzaldúa: “A borderland is a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional
residue of an unnatural boundary. It is a constant state of transition. The prohibited and
forbidden are its inhabitants.” The borderlands are a place of in-betweenness that never
abates. Yet, argues Anzaldúa, rather than despair, this state of nepantla is where the
colonized subject discovers the power of their mestizaje and transcends borders,
envisioning the borderlands as a place of intersection, where identity is re-formed.
“Borderlands” has become a subgenera of its own in Latinx Studies rooted in the
work of thinkers like Gloria Anzaldúa. Two major themes in borderlands theory are the
metaphors of the vast desert and the illegality of crossing that desert that divides Mexico
and the U.S. The images that accompany these themes are of coyotes smuggling migrants
across national borders, of border patrols arresting and detaining migrants, of detention
centers, of people leaving containers of water in the vast stretches of desert for migrants
to drink, and of rape and assault in those desert places. Considering that Mexican
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Americans make up the largest segment of the Latine population in the U.S. and that
much of the southwest was once Mexico, it is with good reason that this version of
migration and transnational citizenship takes up so much space in the academic discourse
of Latinx Studies. However, the metaphor of borderlands does not fit the experience of
the second largest group of Latines in the U.S., Puerto Ricans. As natural born U.S.
citizens Puerto Ricans can travel back and forth between Puerto Rico and the U.S. with
little more than a government issued I.D. And because travel to and from the island is
done primarily by airplane the borderlands that Puerto Ricans live in is an airbus in the
sky over the Atlantic Ocean. Thus both the legal status of Puerto Rico as a colony
(though not officially a colony in the strictest terms) and the experience of frequent
airline migration are the other two loci on which Puerto Rican subjectivity hinges.
Nepantla, brilliantly theorized by Anzaldúa, comes from the Aztec concept of inbetween, thus orienting us away from Catholic theology and towards indigenous
ideologies of being. It denotes an ever-shifting positionality that resists the static
subjectivity of western thought. While thinkers like Foucault question the static subject,
nepantla is different because it roots itself not in discursive practices but in bodily
practices and movements. It traces the migration of bodies across vast deserts and
emptiness, a vastness created by the erection of a border (another important theme) that
dissected peoples, nations, and individuals. Anzaldua sees this border traced on her own
body, marking her as both indigenous and Spanish, Mexican and American, white and
brown, but never fully one or the other. This hybridity is the product of the colonial
project of miscegenation (mestizaje) that sought to erase a people but instead created
another. It is in this mestizaje that the force of Latinx theories of self and community are
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rooted. Together they begin to flesh out a commonality among Latino/as that does not
lose its care to remember the particularities of daily life. A sense of Latinidad emerges
that allows one to simultaneously map out a quasi-universal human experience while
realizing that the universal quality of that experience is deeply flavored with the
particular effects of time and space.
Mestizaje is a declaration of self that transcends the duality offered up by the
colonizer.224 This is a complicated task of rummaging that opens one up to unknown and
unsure depths of ambiguity. Beginning with the realization and acceptance of one’s
blended identity, the mestizo must engage in a reflective process of “despojando,
desgranando, y quitando paja” (stripping away, threshing, and sorting), must
differentiate between “lo heredado, lo adquirido y lo impuesto” (the inherited, the
acquired, and the imposed).225 It is the process by which the colonized develops a
tolerance for ambiguity. Mestizos/Mulatos/Zambos remain in that place that offers no
“normalcy” for the sake of the normative culture of the colonizer. The way of mestizaje
(or mulatez, which places a focus on the African roots of particular latinidad) is to use
one’s magic, which comes by embracing all the parts of what makes them, other.226 So it
is that with mestizaje comes a liberation born out of the relinquishment of the need to
blame the oppressor and look upon them with contempt. This is a process of discovering
and deploying strategies of survival in a system of dominance where the colonized are the
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ones with the least amount of state power.227 In the next section I will explore this notion
of strategies from the underside of the power structure by thinking critically about how
Puerto Ricans continue to survive under U.S. colonialism and develop a subjectivity that
is not defined solely in terms of reactionary postures or politics.
El Vaivén: Puerto Rican Political Subjectivity
The social imaginary of the U.S. regarding migration along the Mexico/US border
envisions migrants who travel north in search of a new opportunity, and even a new
permanent home. However, migration for many Latines in the U.S. is more transitory.
The trouble for some, like Mexican migrants, is that border crossing between two wholly
independent nations can be complex and encumbered with immigration policy from both
sides of the border, which limits their ability to travel back and forth between home and
“home.” Yet as U.S. citizens Puerto Ricans may traverse the Puerto Rico/US border
freely and without hassle. In both experiences transitory migration creates an ambiguity
of citizenship and social identity as the migrant attempts to create home in new places
while retaining the sense of self tied to their homeland. However, Puerto Rican’s
experience of border crossing is distinct in that it lacks the threat of violence that is
characteristic of migration along the southwestern border of the U.S. Anzadúa describes
the borderlands of the Mexico/U.S. border is a threatening one that migrants learn to
tolerate.228 Yet perhaps because Puerto Ricans are born U.S. citizens the experience of
migration and accompanying ambiguity of political situatedness lacks threat of violence
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or ever impending threat of deportation and thus this ambiguity is more than tolerated,
Puerto Ricans are at home with it.229 The difference between tolerating ambiguity and
being at home with it lies in how one experiences borders.
“Vaivén” describes how queer Puerto Ricans move through the world. This state
of vaivén comes from the Puerto Rican experience of constant travel between the island
and the U.S. mainland. “Vaivén” is a contraction of the words va y ven which translates
to going and coming. In her film “Brincando el Charco” Frances Negron Muntaner
captures this experience with the image of an airplane suspended in the sky which
invokes a state of always being caught mid journey, never quite arriving but caught in a
potentially endless oscillation between political categories. This is similar to the concept
of borderlands in Chicana/o theories of subjectivity. But unlike the Chicana subject the
Puerto Rican subject does not traverse deserts or cross borders “illegally.” The Puerto
Rican subject is a U.S. citizen, though only marginally. Our subjectivity is a precarious
one, one that rather than being securely oriented towards a destination is instead caught
midway between two places from which we are constantly going and coming.
Unlike the narrative of migration along the southern border of the U.S. Puerto
Ricans do not cross dangerous deserts hiding from border patrol. Neither to Puerto Ricans
float over oceanic straights on inner-tubes or makeshift rafts like so many Cuban refugees
have done. Puerto Ricans board airliners and fly to New York. Metaphorically Puerto
Ricans call this experience of migration brincando el charco, jumping the puddle. Puerto
Rico’s borders are not lined with walls of corrugated steel or barbed-wire fences. The
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unresolved colonial dilemma had produced a porous border with so much back and forth
migration that currently nearly half of all persons of Puerto Rican origin live in the
continental US230 Puerto Ricans call this phenomenon of migration el vaivén, literally
“coming and going.” While mestizaje seems to suggest a grounding in one’s
understanding of who one is, an identity of vaivén denotes a constant shifting, never
settling, unsteadiness, an identity that stays in the air.231
Alberto Sandoval Sánchez writes about Luis Rafael Sánchez’s “La guagua aérea”
(“The Airbus”), a comedic play about traveling to New York from Puerto Rico. This play
that examines the migratory experience of vaivén takes place in the cabin of an airplane
and throughout the journey hilarity ensues. In the midst of the conversations between
passengers and flight attendants what becomes clear is that this play is highlighting
Puerto Rican identity. Sandoval Sánches writes: “‘La guagua aérea’ embodies a
discursive and ideological analysis of Puerto Rican identity in its fluid, transitive,
floating, betwixt and between phase in the duration of the flight.” He continues:
What is at stake in Sánchez’s conclusion is that the so-called “floating identity” of
Puerto Ricans is articulated not only between two geographical spaces but also in
the creation of a space in midair where identity intersects, overlaps, and
multiplies. The fact is that this identity is a subjectivity-in-process that recognizes,
appropriates, and reaffirms its doubleness, multiplicity, heterogeneity, plurality,
and dissemination.232
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A defining characteristic of Puerto Rican identity and subjectivity is that it troubles the
notion of a static national identity and allows us to perceive the reality that identities, or
subjectivities, are always already in process. This demonstrates the becoming nature of
subjectivity that, while not a characteristic exclusive to Puerto Rican experience, is made
evident in Puerto Rican migratory practices. In some ways, from personal experience
with my own family, both the U.S. mainland and Puerto Rico are “home.” Thus Puerto
Ricans exist not only in both places simultaneously, but also in between both places. In
this way the barrios of Puerto Rico extend to the U.S., which is exemplified in the term
Nuyorican, which began as an insult islanders used for mainlanders for leaving the island
for the mainland. However some argue that such a migration to the mainland was, and is,
in fact an expression of self-determination and survival.233 This reality of fluidity,
constant movement, and migration highlights that those characteristics which
traditionally define nationhood, like territory, language, sovereignty, etc. are not
immutable.234
The colonial experience of Puerto Ricans and their “in the air” identities are
wrapped up in an ambiguous legal status that allows a free flow of migration between the
island and the mainland and yet disenfranchises those living on the island creating a
disparity between U.S. citizens based solely on location.235 Puerto Ricans thus seem to
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exist at best as quasi post-colonial subjects, theoretically the island is self-governing but
in practice the government can make no meaningful decision without the approval of the
U.S. government.236 As such this positions Puerto Ricans as transnational colonial
subjects where there is only a vague postcolonial existence that lies somewhere in a mix
of being a nation and yet subject to another at multiple levels—legally, economically,
socially, the lines are blurred. The continuation of this situation and the subsequent
lasting ambiguity of colonial citizenship does not mean that there has been no desire or
attempt to remedy the ethnonational identity crisis of Puerto Ricans. However, the
various uses of categories in attempts to establish firmly the identity of Puerto Ricans
have failed. For example, in 1998 Puerto Ricans voted on the official status of the
relationship between itself and the U.S. with no effective outcome. Such referendums
have occurred a handful of times in the last 40 years and I will examine the 1998
statehood referendum below.
Additionally, it is noteworthy that even when Puerto Ricans do not physically
migrate between the island and the U.S. mainland, their sense of self and identity is
firmly rooted in Puerto Rico, or at least a Puerto Rican sense of self and identity. The
term Nuyorican exemplifies this in that it demonstrates that there is always a perpetual
feeling of having Puerto Rico near. New York is seemingly lived in as if it were merely
another barrio on the island. Additionally, Puerto Ricans who live on the island and those
of us in diaspora live out a daily experience of an identity that is caught up in a perpetual
migratory oscillation that seems to trap our identities “up there,” in the air, hovering in an
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airplane somewhere over the ocean that separates the island of our ancestors from the
main land of our colonial subjugator.237 Ours is an identity whose metaphor is un vacilón,
an oscillation between U.S. citizen and Puerto Rican, a constant shifting from English to
Spanish, a transnational migration between various states (States?) of queerness.238 I do
not mean to suggest that I, or any of us lack a desire to have an understanding of who we
are as a people within the landscape of modern national identity. Rather, I mean to think
critically about how a metaphor that keeps our identity “up in the air” might be helpful in
ways that are different from one that seeks to ground us. This is reflected not only in the
ways that Puerto Ricans identify in the dominant U.S. white culture, but how we identify
with each other. We experience a conflict between criteria for Puerto Rican-ness that
exhibits itself in the of pride in being born on the island versus the uneasiness, or shame,
in not sharing in the cultural/national birthplace.239 It is more common when asked “what
we are” for Puerto Ricans to answer “where we are from.” Thus when asked by gringos,
white Americans, “what we are” we answer that we are from Puerto Rico; note, not
latina/o, not Caribbean.240 But when those of us born in the U.S. are asked the same
question by other Puerto Ricans we answer that we are from where ever it was that we
were born; New York, Philadelphia, Chicago.241 It is remarkable how indicative this is of
how anxious we are with our own identities. We know that we are Puerto Rican, but we
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are unsure of what that means exactly in the context of nationality and U.S. citizenship.
Thus Puerto Rican socio-political subjectivity can be summed up in the notion vaivén,
always already in a process of subjectification that is marked by an oscillatory quality,
never settled and always fluctuating between and within our “post-colonial” coloniality.
Jaibería and Patería
The crisis of identity described above demonstrates the way in which Puerto
Ricans have navigated their colonial dilemma and how they continue to make sense of
political and social identities that exist in a transitory state of perpetual migration. If
vaivén takes on the role of describing the particular colonial subjectivity of Puerto Ricans
then jaibería and patería describe the tactics Puerto Ricans use to cope with a
subjectivity of vaivén. Both of these tactics are rooted in a strategy of survival that
various Puerto Rican theorists have identified as la brega. In Puerto Rican slang to
“bregar” means to work something out as best one can when faced with a difficult or
impossible situation. Cristina Esteves-Wolff describes la brega as a strategy of resistance
that also doubles as an allegory for the conflicted Puerto Rican subjectivity that is caught
between the colonial domination of the U.S. and the seemingly impossible task of
political emancipation.242 Indeed Esteves-Wolff describes Puerto Rican colonialism as sui
genesis because the colonial practices employed by the U.S. that have created for Puerto
Ricans a quasi-membership in the citizenry that is distinct from other colonial empires.243

242

Cristina Esteves-Wolff, “Disrupting Colonial Identity: Puerto Rican Subjectivities in Cultural
Essays” Centro Journal 32 no. 1 (Spring 2020): 40.
243

Esteves-Wolff, “Disrupting Colonial Identity,” 34-35.

130

Jaibería and patería, then, particular and contextual tactics deployed in in the execution of
la brega that arise out of a specific experience of colonialism.
Jaibería is a term that originates in jaiba, a mountain crab. Frances NegrónMuntaner explains that considering that the mountain crab moves forward by moving
sideways the notion of jaibería describes “collective practices of nonconfrontation and
evasion.”244 Being confronted with a situation in which one cannot possibly win rather
than addressing it head-on proceeding in a round-about manner allows one to attain some
form of progression and avoid the worst possible outcomes. Consider the example of the
1998 statehood referendum. Over 70% of Puerto Rican voters participated in the election.
Their options were several ranging from statehood to remaining as an ELA. When the
vote was tallied the results took everyone by surprise, 50.3% of the voters selected “none
of the above!” To some this might appear as if Puerto Ricans had chosen a nonsensical
reality. How and why would they have voted for none of the options presented?
However, thinking about this moment critically reveals that this was not a refusal of any
determination on the matter. Rather, this was a rejection of the manner in which the U.S.
congress could attempt to “conceive of a single solution to address the complexity of
Puerto Rican (trans)locations,” an attempt at national, or collective, self-determination.245
For Puerto Ricans to choose “none of the above” from the various options offered
was not a reflection of the lack of desire for some kind of formal legal status, nor was it a
moment of obtuseness. Puerto Ricans understand deeply that they are caught in an
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ambiguous legal designation that, while providing some benefit, costs a great deal. As
Negron-Muntaner has argued this was a moment in which Puerto Ricans exerted agency
in a moment where there seemingly was none.246 Faced with options that did not
accurately capture the Puerto Rican desire for self-determination voters decided to avoid
the the question altogether. This was not a moment of failure. Rather, it was a moment of
exercising the most accessible form of agency, refusal. Jaibería describes a tactic wherein
Puerto Ricans move sideways to chart alternate routes that avoid the limited and
constrictive formulations that demand conformity to the U.S. colonial imagination. The
Puerto Rican body politic enacts a collective realignment of the spatial lines of the
political/colonial space, extending itself into that space in a way that affirms a sense of
self and dignity, even when and if it may not be intelligible to the colonial empire. This
experience at the polls gives clues to the transnational identity of Puerto Ricans as well as
to trans-social identity of queers. It is a testament to the refusal of continuing
categorizations that seek to simplify the complexity of Puerto Rican national identity so
that Puerto Ricans might fit more squarely within the dominant structures of order.
Patería: Remapping Jotería and Latine Queer Theory
The term jotería has gained traction in the last decade both in Latinx Studies and
Queer Studies as a way to articulate a distention in the experience of queer people from
Latine descent. Early Chicana feminists like Gloria Anzaldúa and Cherríe Moraga began
using the term “jotería” as a way to distinguish their experience as queer Latinas from
feminism, and later queer studies, which was rooted in the theorizing of white scholars.
As early as 1981, when queer studies was just emerging and the “foundational” works of
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scholars like Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick were still years away from publication, Anzaldúa
and Moraga were gathering queer women of color to write about a queer experience that
was invisible to a white academy.247 Before the queer theory boom of the early 1990’s
Anzaldúa wrote in her foundational work Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza:
Colored homosexuals . . . have more knowledge of other cultures; have always
been at the forefront (although sometimes in the closet) of all liberation struggles
in this country; have suffered more injustices and have survived them against all
odds. Chicanos need to acknowledge the political and artistic contributions of
their queer. People, listen to what your jotería is saying.248
This demand was not only necessary for Chicana/o communities, it was and continues to
be crucial for the academic field of queer studies. The need to acknowledge the voices of
queer people of color by developing and engaging in “jotería studies” is more than mere
attempt at cheap inclusion. Those voices have been essential to the field of queer studies
broadly from its earliest days and it is essential that they continue to be integral to queer
theory.
To write about queerness requires acknowledging as Judith Butler did the
problematic nature of “queer” in that it excludes as much as it includes.249 However, it
was Gloria Anzaldua writing a few years earlier who articulated the trouble with the term
queer vis a vis people of color.
Queer is used as a false unifying umbrella which all “queers” of all races,
ethnicities and classes are shoved under. At times we need this umbrella to
solidify our ranks against outsiders. But even when we seek shelter under it we
must not forget that it homogenizes, erases our differences. Yes, we may all love
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members of the same sex but we are not the same. Our ethnic communities deal
differently with us. I must constantly assert my differentness, must say, this is
what I think of loving women. I must stress: The difference is in my relationship
to my culture.250
To articulate a Boricua jotería, or patería in particular, is to name an experience of being
queer (but not white), black (but not African American) and brown (but not understood as
indigenous), and of having awkward U.S. citizenship, and living as a colonial subject that
is specific to Puerto Rican experience.
Juan D. Ochoa articulates how jotería, the roots of which can be historically
traced back to the 1960’s, is “more than a Spanish translation of the term ‘queer’” and
how it “is an extension of the political imaginary” of Chicana/o experience.251 Following
Ochoa I contend that a Boricua jotería is similarly an extension of the political imaginary
of queer Puerto Ricans. (Boricua is a term derived from the indigenous name for Puerto
Rico, Boriken, and is often used to express pride in being of Puerto Rican descent.) The
political imaginary of a Boricua jotería is particularly situated in an experience of
questionable citizenship that accompanies the political identity of Puerto Rico and Puerto
Ricans. As Frances Negron-Muntaner comments in an interview with Rita Gonzales “the
perennial source of Puerto Rican shame—national ambiguity—becomes a resource to
imagine alternatives to the master narratives of colonialism, nationalism, and
masculinity.”252 If the goal is to take seriously the social context of queer Chicana/os with
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the term jotería then in my theorizing of Puerto Rican queer subjectivity I propose
another term specific to Puerto Rican experience; patería, which is derived from pato or
pata, the word for duck used as slang that equates to faggot. Similar to the use of
joto/jota, from which jotería is derived, to call someone a pato/pata is to mark them as
“queer, strange, different, sexually or gender non-compliant, or simply marginal.”253
“Pato/Pata” is significant in cultural and social terms to the development of the queer
Puerto Rican subject. In his essay “Queer Ducks, Puerto Rican patos, and JewishAmerican feygelekh: Birds and the cultural representation of homosexuality” Lawrence
La Fountain-Stokes discusses the cultural significance of “pato” through a discussion of
eight texts by queer Puerto Ricans such as “La Patografía” by Ángel Lozada which is a
novel about a gay teenager from a poor dysfunctional family coming to grips with his
sexuality and which represents the locations of impossibility for queer Puerto Ricans on
the island.254 The message of this novel should not lead us to think that queer presence in
Puerto Rico has never survived attempts at annihilation, or that there have been no
attempts among queer activists on the island to shift the social acceptance of queer
people. However, it does signal the role of queer people in the Puerto Rican ethnonational
imagination as the continuing source of shame.
While jotería signals a particular experience of being queer and Latine, an
experience that seems to dominate Queer Latino Studies, it also signals an experience tied
to the Mexico/US border. I am using patería in an attempt to signal an experience of
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Latinidad rooted in the Afro-Caribbean and its ongoing colonial reality. This is not an
attempt to coin a new term or to wholesale replace jotería, and I will continue to use the
term in my work and in this text. Rather, patería serves as a rhetorical tool which can be
deployed at times to signal a queer experience particular to Puerto Ricans both on the
island and in diaspora. Additionally, my usage of patería is similar to E. Patrick
Johnson’s use of quare to describe the particular vernacular experience of black queer
folk in relation to their own communities as opposed to the academic uses of queer which
reside in white experience.255 In other words, if we accept Esteves-Wolff’s suggestion of
the sui genesis coloniality of Puerto Rico then we must also consider that tropes used to
describe the experiences of other Latine populations would fail in their ability to capture
the particularities of a queer Puerto Rican subjectivity.
Each of these themes are important because they provide a theoretical framework
that honors the affective and material experiences of bodies. Because my work examines
the emergence of identity with regard to ethnicity, sexuality, and religious practice, and
seeks to trouble any essential or given quality to each, I rely on themes that provide
fluidity. In thinking about the specificity of Puerto Rican religious experience I return to
the term vaivén. This term is valuable in the discourse of Latine religion for two reasons.
First, it emerges from a Caribbean, mainly Puerto Rican, experience of migration. As
mentioned above simply because this experience of migration is seemingly effortless
does not mean that the trauma of migration and colonialism are erased, they simply
operate differently. Secondly, vaivén denotes movement, movement so frequent across
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the US/Puerto Rico border that it evokes an image of the traveler remaining still, stuck in
the air between two places. Vaivén provides a way for my work to push the limits of
Latinidad and decenter the Mexico/US border as the primary geographical metaphor for
theorizing Latino/a social worlds and religiosity.
Religious Practice and Subjectivity
A key aspect of theorizing Latino/a religiosity is beginning not in the
philosophical stratosphere, but squarely on the ground, in the quotidian. When thinking
the daily lives of Latino/as and the everyday kind of religion lived by Latino/as we can
begin to understand the function, nature and political implications of religion on the
subject and its emergence in various ways. As I mentioned previously, much of the
discourse on and Latino/as in the U.S. has traditionally been centered on the social and
political drama along the Mexico/US border which has equated to Mexican experience in
the southwest. Additionally, and perhaps because of the focus on the southwest much of
the discourse of Latine religiosity has centered on the Catholic religious history of these
geographic regions, and with good reason; Catholicism remains one of the oldest and
most powerful cultural/religious influences among Latines. With regard to both of these
areas of focus, the Mexico/US border and Catholicism, my aim is to question not merely
the foundational position that they hold but also the subsequent effects that they have on
the discourse as a whole if they remain the primary lens through which Latino/a
religiosity is theorized. It is true that the largest segments of Latino/s populations remain
Catholic, and that in the U.S. Mexican Americans make up a vast portion of the Latino/a
minority group. However, if the discourse remains focused on these two experiences of
Latino/a life then it will, I fear, remain too homogenous and lack the subtle nuance that is
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possible considering the diverse experience of Latines. Those narratives, however,
remain helpful in thinking about Puerto Rican religious subjectivity as it relates to
pentecostal spiritual practice.
As I have argued in the previous chapter the body must be considered as essential
in the formation of the self, as a place where knowledge is produced. This is why I find
so much promise in pentecostalism. At its core pentecostalism is grounded in an affective
epistemology that privileges the experience of bodies. Pentecostalism legitimizes the
person because it first legitimizes the body. Yet too often pentecostalism is uncritically
categorized as fundamentalist because of its location at the center of evangelicalism
which tends towards fundamentalist ideologies and practices. Yet it is precisely because
pentecostalism is not fundamentalist in nature that it contains a liberative potential. This
is because while fundamentalists place overwhelming authority on religious text,
pentecostals place greater authority on the embodied experience of the divine; whereas
fundamentalists ground their theology in “formal theological systems,” pentecostal
theology is “imbedded in testimonies . . . and bodily movement.”256 There is therefore in
pentecostalism the possibility for writing oneself into a divine narrative, of discovering
wholeness and agency, and of imagining a different future when theological doctrines
might otherwise impose limits on one's liberative potential.
The pentecostal believer must find a way to make sense of a world that, according
to traditional Christian theology, is broken, or has fallen out of step with the divine order
and intention for creation. In the pentecostal tradition in which I was raised we were
taught that the way to do this is to commit oneself first and foremost to the quest for
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holiness and sanctification, which began with the discipline of the body so that the Holy
Spirit might dwell within oneself. There is much that I might critique about specific
disciplines practiced and the lack of cognitive dissonance between, for example,
prohibitions against alcohol and its negative effects on the body and the absence of
prescriptions against foods that cause high rates of diabetes or high cholesterol in Latine
communities. However, if we set those aside for the moment and consider the pentecostal
discipline of the body along the lines of the care of oneself then we can read the
pentecostal discipline of the body as an act that honors the material body and prepares it
for the dwelling of the divine. For pentecostals to have the Holy Spirit dwelling within
one was, in a sense, to be one with God and therefore be an active participant in the
reordering of one’s world to align with the divine purpose for creation. While for the
pentecostal believer this participation with the divine may have a particularly
eschatological bent in that the focus is the eventual material remaking of the world by
God, theoretically we might consider this in light of Manuel Vazquez’s argument of a
materialist understanding of religion that situates the body in a dialectic relationship with
the world around it.257 Evoking Bourdieu, Vazquez argues that the body is not agencyless but an active player in the shaping of the world. The pentecostal subject moves
through the world with a particular kind of fearless courage because the experiences of
their body with the divine both in worship services and personal devotions are accepted
as evidence that they know something about God’s intention. The body becomes a site of
knowledge.
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I have also argued that the body is a site of memory. The pentecostal theology that
was engrained in me taught me that the dwelling of the Holy Spirit was both an indication
of having properly begun the process of sanctification and of one’s ability to continue in
that process. The Holy Spirit was there to continue to purify the believer and rid the
believer of that which would become an obstacle to holiness. I cannot help but play with
this notion and consider the ways in which that sense of knowing in the believer acts as a
liberating force against the memory of colonization. The mulatez of the Puerto Rican
body is written the history of genocide, subjugation, divestment of lands and resources,
erasure of language and culture. Such cultural and collective trauma experienced by the
body politic of the colonized induces a cultural shame around the ability to selfdetermine, to feel empowered in one’s place the world.258 Yet the pentecostal experience
that is rooted in the body and not simply symbolic ritual perhaps becomes an alternative
that offers agency and purpose on a deeper level. The pentecostal experience provides an
epistemological shift which causes the believer begin to writing themselves differently
into the social/cosmic order of the world. This epistemological shift emerges affectively
through the ecstatic religious experiences of Pentecostalism, which while at first may
appear doctrinally dogmatic is in fact a space where in the believer has a certain sense of
theological agency.
The experience of pentecostalism narrates itself in the rituals of pentecostal
communities. The communal rituals of testimony, all night prayer vigils, the laying on of
hands, foot washing, in addition to more common rituals of Christianity like baptism and
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Communion create a space where pentecostal believers come together as a community of
people who are not merely Christians but as people who have experienced communally
an affective epistemological shift. Testimonies that narrate experiences of divine
intervention in the lives of community members serve to reinscribe the experiences of the
rest of the community as a whole. It was not an uncommon occurrence for someone
narrating their testimony to spontaneously break out in speaking in tongues, a sign of the
indwelling of the Holy Spirit. That spontaneous moment would also signal that the Holy
Spirit had arrived in a different way in that moment and inevitably others in the
congregation would also begin to speak in tongues or “dance in the Spirit.” This might
occur during the laying on of hands at the end of a service, or the occasional foot washing
ceremony, etc. Each time the experience of the individual and community would confirm
the deeply held knowledge that God had deemed them worthy in a way the outside world
had not.
In that coming together the community constructs a religious social world where
the social order of the colonizer matters less. The pentecostal believer finds access to
agency in community that does not exist for them outside of their spiritual community,
particularly when they are also poor and working class, uneducated or undereducated,
black and indigenous. This was the case in the denomination in which I was raised. Most
of the pastors of churches held full-time day jobs that did not allow for the traditional life
of clergy in mainline denominations. Moreover, many of the jobs that those pastors did
were blue collar jobs in factories or as janitors, for example. Some members of the
community might have been teachers, secretaries, and even occasionally professionals
like accountants. Yet regardless of one’s status in the outside world in the pentecostal
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social community it mattered little. Any member of the community was capable and had
access to holding a higher social position in the community than they might outside of it.
The religious self emerges from shared ritual in a similar way to the way that
gender emerges from performance. That is, like gender, the religious arises and is
produced through the repetition of rituals that reify themselves as meaningful in the daily
lives of practitioners. Rituals and performances are the dialectic and simultaneous
production of the movement of bodies in spaces. Thus it is the everyday experiences of
poverty, racism, political inequality, etc. that are the building blocks of what becomes
ritualized. Religion and the religious are the social productions of individuals and
communities making sense of their world and creating meaning through the repetition of
acts that engender agency. Religious movements take root in communities that are
particularly situated in a social and political context that has set the necessary conditions
for its emergence. The driving forces of coping and making sense of injustice are not
bound so much to church doctrine as they are to the traditions that emerge from the
cotidiano, the daily and mundane life of practitioners.259 We might here recall the Azusa
moment which emerged in a community that was made up of poor and working class, of
a mix of ethnic and racial backgrounds in a time when racial mixing was taboo. In other
words, early pentecostalism seemed to have taken root first among the marginalized
members of society and led to a communal practice of caring for one another in a world
that seemed to have discarded them. Feeding one’s poor neighbors and leveraging
resources to increase access to medical care and education take on ritual like qualities that
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imbue daily life with a sense of religious piety that has creative possibility and that
operates as political speech.260 Such was the case with pentecostalism among the poor in
Puerto Rico, in that it gave early converts who were mostly poor and working class a
sense of agency and provided an arena to care for their communities in ways that the
government did not.261
Religious phenomena are the result of daily devotional labor that produces sociopolitical capital at the subversive level. This everyday lived religion becomes the source
and catalyst for the shifting of social and political landscapes. Not on a primetime
political stage, but on the ground, among the people. It is a shift that is enacted by the
humanitarian work of groups like the Puerto Rican street gang turned social justice
advocates the Latin Kings of Harlem, or the sugar field worker in Puerto Rico who found
in pentecostalism the promise of self-determinancey and agency as Juan Lugo did when
he left Puerto Rico for Hawaii in search of work.
Conclusions
Puerto Ricans are a people who exist in vaivén and are continually in a state of
negotiation, with themselves, their community, and the larger social world. This state of
negotiation can induce what Delgadillo calls critical mobility, the ability to retrace the
residue of colonial history carried in the mixed body and open up space for a mulata
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consciousness to arise and discover agency and a voice.262 This critical mobility is part of
the reclaiming of ritual, of rewriting the signification of the symbolic through ritual
performances. Thus, whether explicitly religious or not the rewriting and perpetuation of
mythologies and ritual imbue the lives of colonized peoples with sense of sacredness. In
turn these ritual performances produce political agency which mobilizes communities
with a sense of togetherness and unity.263 Delgadillo writes that critical memory is an act
of creation, creation of new paradigms and spaces that resist oppressive ideologies
concerning gender, sexuality, nationality, class, etc.264 Additionally, she notes that
spirituality plays an important role in social/political formations. This is a critical analysis
of the manner in which the performance of religious ritual enacts a transnational politic of
agency and self-determination that would otherwise be erased by the political structures
that govern the lives of Puerto Ricans.265
I have articulated various forms of subjectivity, socio-political, queer, and
religious. These three do not seemingly blend very well together, particularly given the
hostility of Puerto Rican social culture and Pentecostalism to queerness. Yet, if we allow
ourselves to think through a methodology of vaivén we can allow ourselves to focus less
on a determinant conclusion and instead look for the connections that arise in the neverending coming and going of contemplation. These three subjectivists share similarities in
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the way that they seek to make sense of a world in which they exist as fringe or
marginalized identities. Like the socio-political and queer subject the pentecostal Puerto
Rican rather than take on the colonial government structural powers instead evaded, or
side-stepped them to some extent and realized their own agency beyond the reach of the
systems that would marginalize them.

#
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
The ideas and the work that serve as the ground for this dissertation began years
ago in my master"s thesis. The nascent thesis of that work which I have attempted to
articulate more fully in this dissertation was that identity, or subjectivity, is
phenomenological in nature. In other words, identity is rooted in the subject"s
epistemological postures and those postures emerge from what the subject experiences
through their material body. Throughout the life of the subject their experiences, both
cognitive and physical, affect and shift postures and thus the subject"s sense of self. One
species of experience that enacts such deep effect is the religious. This dissertation has
been a work in demonstrating the ways in which the experiences of the body provide
those who are marginalized the ability to survive and even thrive, particularly in the
interplay between the secular quotidian and the religious supernatural. The performances
of bodies, both the in the Butlerian sense and in ways that appear to be consciously
performed, express subjectivity and inform it. When one chooses, for example to express
their queerness and playfulness with gender by adorning themselves in particular ways
that do not follow the scripts their social world they experience a shift in their
epistemological posture, it moves them into a different material frequency that allows for
an opening where there was none before. In this same way queer and religious bodily
expressions, like dancing all night in your underwear at the local gay bar or speaking in
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tongues while experiencing ephemeral and mystifying vibrations in one’s body during a
church service, cause an epistemological shift into postures that had not previously been
imagined. Those epistemological postures reveal the nature of our subjectivity, they help
one answer the question “who am I?”
I began this dissertation by claiming that this is a dissertation of self. Indeed as a
US-born Puerto Rican who has lived in both the pentecostal and queer social worlds I can
affirm that the epistemological connections between them are more than skin deep. Can
the material body truly be trusted to produce knowledge like the conscious mind? I argue
that it must. It is therefore in that way that Pentecostal spirituality and queer being inform
and resemble each other in deep and meaningful ways; they both trust the material,
fleshly body. One particularly striking resemblance between pentecoatslism and
queerness is a deeply rooted sense of knowing. A common refrain in pentecostal
experience is that when being pressed about how one can know their experience of the
divine to be real is to respond with the repeating phrase “I know, that I know, that I
know.” Similarly, a common response from those who identify as queer or LGBTIQ is
that they were simply born that way. It is as if they too simply know, that they know, that
they know. It is this confidence in the experience of the material body that grounds this
dissertation. To take the body seriously, not in spite of the conscious mind but in
connection with it, opens up other ways of knowing and producing knowledge.
This work attempts to do just that, to take the experiences of the material body,
both conscious and unconscious, seriously and trust the phenomenological experiences of
the subject’s material body as a way to know itself and the world in meaningful and
important ways. In this way this dissertation is somewhat autoethnographic. While I have
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gone through much theory to articulate my thesis I nonetheless began by thinking about
my own experiences. Growing up as part of the Puerto Rican diaspora on the U.S.
mainland, in a Puerto Rican Pentecostal denomination, and then accepting my own
queerness in my twenties has allowed me the lived experience to know deeply that the
ways in which those experiences shape a person are connected. It is important to name
this because I do not believe that I can write a dissertation about the formation of
epistemological postures and the role of bodily experience in that process without
acknowledging the ways that I have been shaped by both of those phenomena. I cannot
write about Puerto Rican, pentecostal, and queer epistemologies without considering my
own subjectivity as a queer Puerto Rican who grew up pentecostal. In this way I have not
only relied on theory to write this dissertation, I have also looked within for what my
body already knows. By way of conclusion I will illustrate how this knowing emerges by
weaving a common thread through three primary areas of inquiry; pentecostal
epistemology, Puerto Rican transnational migratory subjectivity, and queer
disidentificatory practices.
Pentecostal Epistemologies: Knowing from Deep Within
In the introduction I outlined the key arguments made by James K.A. Smith in
Thinking in Tongues. In that text Smith argues for a pentecostal epistemology which is
possible because of a unique understanding of the world that pentecostalism provides.266
Smith speaks of a pentecostal philosophy and not a theology. In making that distinction
Smith moves pentecostal epistemology out of the realm of doctrinal belief and into that of
the philosophical conversation about subjectivity. In doing so, Smith has laid the ground
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work for my arguments in this dissertation because he allows me to interrogate the effects
of pentecostal practice on the individual without having to explicitly attend to the
practitioner’s theological and doctrinal beliefs. This is not to say that those beliefs are
unimportant. Rather, it allows me to consider pentecostalism critically without having it
dismissed as a mere fringe Christian theology with little intellectual ground.
A pentecostal epistemology begins with the ontological claim that Smith
identifies as the heart of pentecostalism: that the Holy Spirit one reads about in the New
Testament is quite literally active in the world today. While so many Christian
denominations seem to downplay the supernatural occurrences of healing, miracles, and
other phenomena, pentecostals remain convinced that these are very real, they exist and
can be witnessed today. For example, while different pentecostal groups value its
importance to varying degrees, glossolalia remains a key component of pentecostal
belief, spiritual practice, and religious gatherings. One can walk into almost any
pentecostal church service on Sunday and witness at least one person speaking in tongues
at some point. For Pentecostals the Christian life is more than ethical, moral, and
symbolic ideologies and principles, it is filled with the real and active presence of the
divine experienced in the body of the believer. It is this ontological understanding of the
participation of the divine in the world that is the ground upon which a pentecostal
epistemology rests.
An important aspect of pentecostal spirituality which describes such an
epistemology is the practice of testimony. This exercise in narrative is an expression of a
hermeneutical filter that aligns one’s personal experiences with the broader biblical
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cosmology and as such is an expression of what one knows to be true.267 Ontologically
speaking, pentecostals know because they experience in their body. Thus a pentecostal
epistemology privileges the material reality of the body and what the body knows. It is
through this bodily knowing that pentecostals make sense of their world. Furthermore,
what testimony reveals is that pentecostal spirituality imbues pentecostal epistemology
with an affective quality. That is, what counts as knowledge is understood affectively.
In the act of testimony there is a performance of oneself, the subject engages in a
performance of oneself that is confessional in nature. Sometimes this involves actual
public confessions of some dark moment in the life of the pentecostal believer, that one
used to be a drug addict, for example. But more than this there is a confession of oneself
as having become the type of subject who has accessed the divine. The proclamation at
the start of many testimonies that one is saved, sanctified, and filled with the Holy Spirit
(which is evidenced with the public expression of glossolalia) acts as a naming of oneself
and writing oneself into the larger narrative of the divine story of creation.268 Might the
Puerto Rican colonial subject who has embraced pentecostalism as a kind of liberation
from the oppression of the colonial state be enacting a form of resistance through
testimony and glossolalia as an act of confession that rewrites the script of social values
for their day-to-day life?269
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Butler suggests that for Foucault telling the truth about oneself comes with a price
in that to tell the truth of oneself requires that one concede to the norms and rationalities
that operate to foreclose on the fullest revelation of the self, a self liberated from the
regimes of power which are historical and contingent.270 Yet James Smith suggests that in
the Pentecostal spiritual practice of testimony and glossolalia there is enacted a refusal of
rationalism and that instead there is a performance of the nonsensical which is an attempt
at articulating the inarticulable.271 In other words, we might consider that the act of
testimony is a moment of confession that allows the subject to name itself, to tell the truth
of itself, without paying the price that Foucault seems intent on avoiding. The
exclamation of “I know, that I know, that I know” expresses a lack of concern, or focus,
on what makes sense, on the rational propositions of the mind because the knowing in
this exclamation is a knowing that is rooted in the experience of the material body. As
such testimony is a confession of truth that emerges from the body and as such is not
bound by what “makes sense” to the rational mind. Thinking through this performance of
testimony we can then frame glossolalia similarly. Glossolalia allows the marginalized
subject, assumed to have nothing substantive to say in relation to truth, to speak from that
place of “nothing.”272
Puerto Rican Epistemologies: Transnational Migratory Subjectivity

270

Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 121.

271

Smith, Thinking in Tongues, 51.

272
Ashon Crawley, Blackpentecostal Breath: The Aesthetics of Possibility (New York: Fordham
University Press, 2017), 207.

151

When thinking about the political subjectivity of Puerto Rico and its citizens it is
important to begin by acknowledging that they exist as transnational colonial subjects.
Despite the neoliberal ideology of the twentieth century that operates as if the period of
colonialism is over there is only a vague postcolonial existence for Puerto Rico due to its
continuing states as an Estado Libre Asociado, or commonwealth, which it became in
1952. Puerto Ricans had already been granted the status of U.S. citizen in 1917, and since
then have been considered natural born U.S. citizens. Yet despite the apparent privilege
of being granted U.S. citizenship from birth, because the island remains under the
jurisdiction of the U.S. an ELA Puerto Ricans are denied the ability to self-determine.
The laws enacted by the Puerto Rican legislature and governor are subject to the final
approval of the U.S. congress, where Puerto Rico has no voting representation.
Furthermore, while Puerto Ricans on the island can hold primary elections for president
they are not permitted to participate in the general elections and have no electors in the
Electoral College. What is interesting about this reality is that as a U.S. born Puerto Rican
were I to move my place of residence to Puerto Rico I would cease to have representation
in congress and would lose my right to vote for President. My father who is an island
born Puerto Rican but only has representation in Congress and can vote for president
because he resides in Florida. This is not any different than other U.S. territories.
However, what complicates the matter is the proximity of Puerto Rico to the U.S.
mainland, the ease of travel between the island and the U.S. mainland, and the large
population of Puerto Ricans living on the U.S. mainland that retain deep ties to the island.
Considering this political situation I am compelled to question: What is at stake in such a
precarious situation? What does it mean when Puerto Ricans are denied suffrage in U.S.
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national elections and lack representation in a congress that has the ability to veto the
very laws and polices the Puerto Rican people create for themselves in their own best
interests? Finally, and perhaps most important, what does it mean when Puerto Ricans
themselves seem unable to agree on their own political status?
Remember the example of the 1998 Statehood Referendum discussed in the last
chapter. In the last 22 years there have been 4 referendums on whether Puerto Rico
should become a state, an independent nation, or remain an ELA—1998, 2012, 2017, and
most recently in 2020. In only two of the referendums did a significant number of
registered voters turn out for the election, 78% in 1998 and 71% in 2012 (2017 had a
mere 23% turn out and 2020 had a small majority at 52%). What is interesting about the
1998 and 2012 referendums was their stark difference even though they occurred only
four years apart. In 1998 50.3% of the voters selected !none of the above,” statehood
achieved 46.6%, and independence barely registered at 2.6%. Compare that to 2012 in
which the first ballot question of whether Puerto Rico should retain its current status as
an ELA 54% said no, and in the second ballot question which asked what other status
Puerto Ricans would prefer 61% said statehood. I have previously theorized that the 1998
result demonstrated a rejection of the manner in which the U.S. congress could attempt to
offer a single solution to address the complexity of Puerto Rico and its political status.
While Puerto Ricans are afforded the title of citizen, and were in this instance provided
with an opportunity to self-determine their political status, this provision required that
they choose among a limited set of options that remain subject to Western, neo-capitalist,
prescriptions of legitimacy. In that moment their response was an intensification of
ambiguity; I am tempted to suggest a desire to be an even queerer state even if they
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would not articulate it in those terms. Yet since then, in 2012, 2017, and 2020 Puerto
Ricans have sided with statehood.
The political identity of Puerto Rico seems to be wrapped up both in its
continuing legal status as an ELA as well as in the inability of the islands inhabitants to
come to an agreement on how they should live out their political independence. On one
hand this reflects an instability in the epistemological posture of the state and on the other
offers the potential for a different kind of self-determination. This, I argue, is an instance
of enacting awkward citizenship, of political disturbance.273 The refusal to elect from the
either of the choices in the 1998 referendum and instead elect "none of the above,”
followed by the choice for statehood in 2012, 2017, and in 2020 chosen by only half of
the island reflects a tension that could be a site for the emergence of a different kind of
liberation. As political consciousness Puerto Rico continues to desire a legitimacy that
would move them out of the limbo they are in as a colony, but continue to struggle to
come together as a people on what that legitimacy should look like.
These experiences at the polls give clues to the transnational identity of Puerto
Ricans. If the colonized state is reflected and speaks through the actions of its citizens
then Puerto Rico is a state that lives in tension with regard to its identity. The Puerto
Rican state as queer subject struggles with how to express and live into an autonomy that
brings about liberation, or at least a different alternative to the one hundred and thirtysome year history of ambiguity that followed four hundred years of Spanish rule. Yet
Puerto Rico is denied the ability to arrive at a final determination of its political status. It
is denied the political identity of independent nation and that of statehood and as such is
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relegated to remain in its current state of political limbo ensuring instead that they remain
particularly othered within the larger narrative of the U.S. national political imaginary.
Thus while Puerto Ricans retain privilege vis a vis citizenship, they do not ever really
escape the uncertain and precarious political status that they have been trapped in for the
last several hundred years.
The various uses of categories in attempts to establish firmly both the identity of
Puerto Ricans and where we belong as political subjects continue to fail. The
internalization of these failed attempts at categorization leaves the subject feeling
perpetually !other,” wondering what to call ourselves; American or Puerto Rican. This is
reflected not only in the ways that Puerto Ricans identify in the dominant U.S. white
culture, but how we identify with each other. We experience a conflict between criteria
for Puerto Rican-ness that exhibits itself in the pride in being born on the island versus
the uneasiness in not sharing in the cultural/national birthplace.274 It is more common
when asked !what we are” for Puerto Ricans to answer !where we are from.” Thus when
asked by gringos, white Americans, !what we are” we answer that we are from Puerto
Rico; note, not latina/o, not Caribbean.275 But when those of us born in the U.S. are asked
the same question by other Puerto Ricans we answer that we are from where ever it was
that we were born; New York, Philadelphia, Chicago.276 I have experienced this often
when asked where I am from. I first wonder if the question refers to my brown skin and

274

Sandoval-Sánchez, !Imagining Puerto Rican Queer Citizenship,” 157.

275

Duany, !Nation and Migration,” 58.

276

Sandoval-Sánchez, !Imagining Puerto Rican Queer Citizenship,” 157.

155

non-European facial features, or if it is simply a question of where in the U.S. I am from.
Either way the answer is complex, I identify as Puerto Rican but unlike my father I was
not born on the island. I am also a U.S. born citizen but I feel a deep difference from
“American” culture. As a child my world was comprised of two communities, Puerto
Ricans at home and church, and mostly white Americans at school. My life’s experiences
are wrapped up in migrating between both of those communities and always being not
quite Puerto Rican enough or American enough. It is remarkable how indicative my
personal experience of identity is of how anxious Puerto Ricans in diaspora and on the
island are with our collective identity as colonized subjects. We know that we are Puerto
Rican, but we are unsure of what that means exactly in terms of the U.S. political
landscape.
Puerto Ricans on the island and those of us in diaspora experience our national
identity as one that is caught in a perpetual migratory oscillation between disparate
locations of citizenship and being. Puerto Rican national identity is seeming always
hovering somewhere over the ocean that separates the island of our ancestors from the
main land of our colonial subjugator.277 Ours are identities whose metaphor is un vacilón,
an oscillation between U.S. citizen and Puerto Rican, a constant shifting that follows our
shifting from English to Spanish, a transnational migration between various [S/s]tates of
queerness.278
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Queer Epistemologies: Jotería en Vaivén
Queer epistemologies similarly privilege the body. Queer theory has long
interrogated the experience of the body in ways that are helpful in privileging the
knowledge of the body, and in doing so seemingly place queer experiences on equal
footing with pentecostal’s experience of the divine. One particularly important queer
philosopher was the lesbian Chicana Gloria Anzaldúa. Her work always took the the
body seriously and she understood her own philosophical work as emerging from her
body. The title of one her early works edited with Cherríe Moraga, This Bridge Called
My Back reveals that these women were concerned with the experiences of their material
bodies. They wrote about race, class, education, and sexuality, which recognized that
their experiences in the world were impacted by the bodies they lived in. In her
contribution to the collection Audre Lorde writes “When I speak of knowledge, I am
speaking of that dark and true depth which understanding serves, waits upon, and makes
accessible through language to ourselves and others. It is this depth within each of us that
nurtures vision.”279 This depth that Lorde writes about was a depth that comes from a
lineage of woman who have experienced the world differently because of their material
bodies, in this case the color of their skin. Anzaldúa also addressed this kind of deep
knowledge in her monumental text Borderlands La Frontera, published in 1987, when
she wrote about la facultad. She wrote “la facultad is the capacity to see in surface
phenomena the meaning of deeper realities, to see the deep structure below the
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surface.”280 For Anzaldúa those who posses such deep knowing are those on the margins
of their communities, a knowing they develop because of the experiences of their
material bodies. In other words, the epistemological postures which produce a deep
knowing, la facultad, are the result of real, ontological experiences as real to them as the
Holy Spirit is to pentecostals. They know because they experience in their bodies.
These queer epistemological postures can be described as similar to pentecostal
and Puerto Rican epistemological postures. In both instances the subject is not merely
oriented towards objects of desire, pentecostals to the divine, Puerto Ricans towards the
U.S., queer persons to other persons in ways that do not fit the social parameters of
heterosexuality. Rather than think of the subject as merely related to the object of desire it
is oriented to we might instead think of the subject in terms of how it is oriented to the
world. That is, we can describe the subject by thinking about epistemological posture
through which the subject “extends through [the body] into the world,” as Sara Ahmed
writes.281 The focus is less about the object of one’s desire and more about the differences
in how one relates to the world around them. Thus the queer subject experiences different
ways of directing their desires than socially normative subjects because they orient
themselves in and through their social space in different ways. The queer subject
develops a distinct worldview rooted in the experiences of the body. The analogy reveals
that it is the experience of desire and how that desire orients one to the world that the
pentecostal, Puerto Rican, and queer subject share in common. In each case the subject
experiences a deep knowing that neither may be able to explain theoretically. They
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simply know, that they know, that they know. That knowing is at the core of their
epistemological postures.
Important in Smith’s arguments about pentecostal epistemology and the
pentecostal subject is that he accepts this deep knowing as it is, he believes the
pentecostal believer. In other words, Smith takes the pentecostal subject seriously and not
merely as a notion for theorizing. This acceptance causes me to wonder about believing
the Puerto Rican and queer subjects in similar fashion, or at the very least putting those
three epistemologies in the same sphere. They are each rooted in ontological
understanding about the experiences of the subject’s material body. They accept the
presuppositions of the subject, that is they trust the deep knowing of the subject. Each in
their own way disrupts the status quo of hegemonic social constructions, or said
differently they disrupt the idea of what is expected of them by normative regimes of
power. A pentecostal epistemology causes the subject to engage in counterinterpretations,
the epistemological posture of the Puerto Rican religio/political subject deploys a jaiba
sensibility, and a queer epistemology engages in disidentificatory strategies of survival.
Each extends itself in such a way that moves sideways, around, in unexpected directions
and in doing so experience a process of subjectification that allows for a moment of
dignity where otherwise they would be denied.
Awkward Subjects and Disidentificatory Practices
What I have attempted in this work is to describe pentecostal, Puerto Rican
political, and queer epistemologies in a way that demonstrates a common thread between
them and which relies on that common thread to say something meaningful about the
marginalized subject. That common thread is that in all three the subject is produced from
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an experience that counters that of the normative and hegemonic structures that organize
the social world in which that subject dwells. These subjects are each awkward. In their
use of awkward to think through pop-feminism Carrie Smith-Prei and Maria Stehle
define awkward as a combination of ward, which invokes direction, and awk, which
invokes misdirection.282 I cannot help but identify the parallels between this definition
and the process of subjectification in the pentecostal, Puerto Rican, and queer subject. In
each of these the sense of progression conforming to Western philosophical descriptions
of the subject seems absent. These subjects rely on the knowledge of their bodies to guide
them in answering the question “who am I?” As such the process of subjectification is
revealed to be a messy one, one that does not always progress logically. Rather, it occurs
all at once, yet stretched out over time that is measured in the experiences of the body.
Smith-Prei and Stehle write,
…awkwardness messes with timing and with the timeline, it messes with space
and location. It is very much of the body and its hormonal secretions, but it is also
social and ephemeral, moving in and out of visibility, gone in an instant though
leaving its emotional traces.283
They further explain that awkwardness is a demarcation of the upsetting of social norms.
In the previous chapters I have attempted to demonstrate the ways in which these
subjectivities disrupt normative ideas about the legitimate subject. Each, in their own
way, expresses a truth that their is more to truth and knowing than what our cognitive
minds can conceive. Our bodies matter.
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José Muñoz’s theory of disidentification understands this. For too long has the
discourse around the subject been focused on questions like that of the philosophical
model that relies on the binary of essentialism versus constructivism.284 Yet for Muñoz
the way to think about they subject begins with shifting the conversation around identity
formation away from an either/or fixation on fixed traits that the subject is imbued with
or traits that socially conditioned and written onto the subject through contextual
experiences of the world around them. The issue with this way of thinking about the
subject is that both essentialism and constructivism are subject to the scripts of Western
psychoanalysis and as such are both always already socially constructed and contextually
determined in a way that privileges one social context over all others. The Western
paradigm of the subject becomes the stencil used to trace all subjectivities. Even what is
termed essential dispositions are themselves determined by hegemonic, Western,
patriarchal, etc., ideologies and motivations. The essential is already a socially
constructed paradigm. This then presents a problematic for bodies that do not fit into the
script of Western being and its cast of identities. The identities of these bodies and the
subjects they constitute fit neither the essentialism nor constructivism arguments. The
pentecostal, the Puerto Rican, and the queer ultimately desire that which society denies
them, the ability to self-determine in ways that do not prescribe to hegemonic ideologies
and that seek a different way of knowing that begins first with the experience of their
bodies. They desire a narrative script that does not conform to the script of western
colonial patriarchy which casts them in narrow identities confined to particular
interpretations of their affectations. These subjects know deeply in their bodies that they
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do not fit into normative articulations of identity formation and the Western model they
are grounded in because the script was not written for them.285 Muñoz wants us to
understand that no body and subject anywhere can be reduced to either an essential model
of subjectivity and that the body/subject of the white, male, heterosexual, fits the script so
well not because he is fulfilling some universal or a priori way of being. He fits the script
because the script was written for him and by him.
Thus when the pentecostal refuses to articulate in theoretical syllogisms and
responds simply with “I know, that I know, that I know,” or Puerto Ricans engage in
messy migrations and assert their place as political subjects despite their ambiguous
citizenship, or queers refuse to assimilate to hetero-patriarchal gender and sexual
constructions, they are in similar ways enacting disidentificatory practices that reflect
affective epistemological postures that allow for survival in a social world that would
relegate them to the margins. One need not focus solely on the artist, like Muñoz, to
identify these practices. One need only look at the quotidian lives of those who live
among us on the margins to witness the kind of strategy Muñoz describes thorough
disidentification. When certain bodies fail to fit the hegemonic scripts of their social
world they behave in ways that become the "survival strategies the minority subject
practices in order to negotiate a phobic majoritarian public sphere that continuously
elides or punishes the existence of subjects who do not conform to the phantasm of
normative citizenship.”286 These are each subjects who align along planes of subjectivity
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that employ the awkward rather than discard it, they are awkward citizens. These subjects
demonstrate that disidentificaiton is not about merely assimilating to the dominant
demands of identity or conversely resisting and counteridentifying.287 It is rather about
reframing categories, eliciting permanent structural changes, and "negotiating the flux of
discourse and power" rather than some essentializing choice between two polar
opposites.288
The manner of this disidentification takes various forms. It is simultaneously a
hermeneutic, process of production, and mode of performance that oscillates between
reception and production.289 This might be described in a Butlerian sense as a process of
materialization out of which emerges the disidentificatory body. I would describe this
process as one of vaivén, ever shifting between localities of being in such a way that the
movement itself is revealed to be the very definition of subject and not the localities
between which it moves. While the pentecostal, Puerto Rican, and queer person engage in
daily life attempting to define themselves as genuine subjects and may not be invested in
these kinds of philosophical ideas they are nonetheless enacting various forms of
resistance. They are caught up in the struggle to situate themselves within a larger social
world that has already made claims about them that deny their agency. They extend into
space with the movements of their bodies and reshape spaces, or reorient space and time,
along the axes of their sense of self, and this movement is rooted in, or perhaps motivated
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by, the knowledge production of their bodies. In short, disidentification is about survival,
it is primarily a response to the hegemonic demands for conformity.290 It is about
reimagining the already encoded meanings that minoritarian subjects are presented with
and about rewriting scripts they are demanded, even conscripted into to playing.291
This dissertation is concerned with the practices of these awkward subjects and
the kind of queer subject it produces whose body behaves in ways that participate in a
struggle for liberation. The metaphor of vaivén has been important because it operates in
ways that are different from borderlands. Theorizing liminality through vaivén offers
fresh and constructive ways of thinking about queer Latino/as at the borders of latinidad,
it points to different practices of survival and self-determination, it produces a particular
epistemological posture not unlike that of pentecostals. This is why I have attempted to
theorize pentecostal, Puerto Rican, and queer subjectivity together, because witnessing
them interacting with each other in my own experience of identity I have discovered that
they operate in similar ways. Each operates through disidentificatory practices that
deploy awkwardness as a strategy against regimes of power and truth that would disavow
them. This has been an exercise in thinking about the subject in different ways that do not
constrain the subject, nor my own theory of the subject, to a final destination. Rather, I
have sought to locate the subject in the messiness that is subjectification and leave it
there, not because it cannot be liberated from the messy awkwardness of its
epistemological postures, but because there is no need to.
Conclusions: Ethics and Politics of the Awkward Subject, or Locating My Voice
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The ethics and politics that concern the queer subject in this dissertation are
focused not with the traditional moral questions of ethics but rather with the underlying
cultural systems of culture that create the particular conditions out of which the
epistemological positions of the queer subject emerge. In other words, my attempt has
been to deploy cultural theory to think about the particular and distinct cultural moments
in which the queer subject comes to be queer. As such my interest in ethics and politics is
in how the queer, or disidentified, subject reflects a critique of dominant systems of
culture. Cultural theory in my work is therefore a kind of ethical inquiry into how it is
that the necessary conditions arise for a particular subjects to emerge within cultural and
social worlds and the role of both the subject and their social world in that production.
Similarly, politics does not denote the specific structures of government of any
nation state, nor does it make reference to specific hierarchies. Rather it regards
secondary definitions that denote the operation of power as power, and the relationship
between individuals within a society and of those individuals to the society in which they
live, as an organism in and of itself. By relying on the term politics my attempt is to
explicate the complex inter-weavings of influence and symbiotic relationality between
and among subjectivities, both of individuals and of systems.292 In this usage politics
suggests an ever-shifting landscape, a fluid and fluctuating web of relations that always
already implicates others. I have used "politics" to denote that the relations that occur are
more than merely accidental, more than a mere byproduct of seemingly serendipitous,
though random, happenings, but that there is a systematic operation that can be traced
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throughout a society over time. Without over stating a teleological movement towards
some eventual end, or suggesting that there exists a clear premeditated motivation in such
operations of power, I want to point to an insidious progression that builds upon itself and
exponentially reproduces itself and takes on various and shifting motivations and aims
that do in fact accomplish an end, though not an ultimate one. It is as if to say that by
pinpointing a singular moment in the development of a subject or society one can identify
what is not but appears to be an intentional teleological progression that seems to be
rooted in an historicity which imbues that subject or moment with meaning. Furthermore,
by including a term like politics in this discourse it does not allow the postmodern
argument to remain ephemeral and theoretical, but rather compels it to consider the real
material effects of the operation of power in societies, and this in turn brings us back
around to why the term ethics is also valuable in the discourse of the subject, and by
extension cultural theory. Cultural theory ought to be the kind of theory that compels us
to consider an anthropology, or ethnography, which is concerned with the actual material
effect of phenomenon that are cataloged under culture.
This work has intended to consider the emergence of the subject by thinking
about the subject in relation to the real material and political social world in which it
exists. Neither the subject nor its social world are sui generis, both are always already in a
symbiotic relationship of mutual creation. In this process both are subject to the regimes
of power and truth which are also not sui generis or static but always in a process of
shifting and morphing, not unlike the becoming of the subject. As such the subject, its
social world, and the regimes of truth are each delicate and susceptible to influence from
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the others. Take Barthes’ example of the importance of wine in French culture.293 For the
French wine holds a peculiar place of cultural importance in that it can serve a myriad of
purposes for the French subject regardless of how those purposes may be contradictory,
and provides the necessary moral and environmental requirements for the selfjustification of its consumption. To be French is to be a “drinker of wine” and as such the
concept of wine defines French subjectivity.294 Such a mythology allows one to map the
systems of culture at play in France’s social imagination and the development of the
French subject. Barthes argues that while it can be said with pride that wine is the nation
at the same time its very production is inseparable from French capitalism. What is seen
as an essential part of French-ness and French history is in fact a quite recent association
brought about by an economic and political machine. The consumption of such a myth is
the result of a semiological system taken as inductive, a natural relation being ascribed to
the signifier and the signified.295 If we overlay this example onto the Puerto Rican subject
we perceive of the ways in which that subject is confounded and confounding within the
U.S. political/social imaginary. What is essentially Puerto Rican cannot be separated
from the political colonial history of the island and as such the Puerto Rican subject is
bound up in that historicity and yet simultaneously not essentialized by it.
Frantz Fanon examines the state of the colonized through an analysis of colonized
states and the colonized peoples within those states. Fanon understands that we are
products of the world in which we live, but also understand that the world of the subject
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is impacted, often violently, by systems of power and domination which cause irreparable
effects. He writes
"singularity of the colonial context lies in the fact that economic reality,
inequality, and enormous disparities in lifestyles never manage to mask the
human reality...the economic infrastructure is also a super structure. The cause is
effect: You are rich because you are white, you are white because you are
rich."296
Here we might replace context with culture and in doing so unmask the ways in which
the production of a culture is not simply the result of individuals and societies developing
and fluctuating in long and extended waves over time. Rather, culture also shifts in a
moment, a violent moment, and Fanon points to various revolutions as evidence of this.
The point here is not to dismiss the notion that culture emerges slowly, but to suggest that
the phenomena that give rise to the shifts and movements and the progression of a culture
are often quite deliberate, even though their intention is not necessarily to manipulate
culture in a premeditated sense. (Though such premeditation does exist as is evident in
the expulsion and massacre of indigenous nations throughout North and South America.)
In short, Fanon points to the progression of micro/national culture as a result of a
macro/global culture undergirded by ideologies of dominion, to which violence is the
inevitable and most effective response for the colonized to successfully decolonize.297 For
the colonized to respond with a force equal to the colonizer would, in Fanon’s view,
allow for them to realize their own selves and for the colonizer to recognize the full
humanity of the colonized.
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However, such violence is not exclusively enacted through actual bloodshed. The
violence of the imperial colonial project is also evident in the ways that the colonizing
culture imbues meaning and identity on the colonized culture in direct relation to itself.
This translates to the colonial enterprise in that the colonizing nations defined themselves
in contradiction to their perception of the colonized.298 Thus the production of the cultural
Other is not a natural phenomenon contained to the internal social cultural world of the
colonized, but rather the production of the colonizing culture in order to describe itself.299
In turn this culture produced by the colonizer becomes internalized by the colonized as
their own through the process of conquest and domination. Similarly, the queer subject
emerges from a process of distinguishing itself, or finding itself distinguished, from the
normative narratives that tell bodies how they ought to behave.
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